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Introduction
This study sets out to analyse the policies o f the Labour Party and the attitude o f  
the movement to the Northern Ireland problem. The main focus will be the Labour 
movement during the years o f opposition between 1979 and 1997 with a brief overview of 
the years preceding the 1979 election. The policies, ideas and arguments on the question of 
Northern Ireland need to be analysed against the backdrop of the enormous changes which 
the Labour Party itself went through in its eighteen years o f opposition. These included 
various policy changes as well as ideological and structural changes, beginning with a sharp 
move to the left in 1981, followed by a steady reform process initiated by Neil Kirmock and 
ultimately resulting in Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour Party’: a party almost unrecognisable 
compared to that led by James Callaghan. This thesis sets out to look at the broad Labour 
movement with all its various pressure groups. There are essentially three component parts 
o f the Labour movement: firstly the Parliamentaiy Party whose priority is very often the 
Party’s electability, secondly the Constituency Parties who in the early and mid-eighties 
were primarily concerned with ideological and policy matters and, finally, the trade union 
movement which could be described as the conscience of the movement as its main concern 
was always the welfare o f its members and o f the working class in general, both employed 
and unemployed. Throughout this analysis o f the Labour movement’s attitude to the 
Northern Irish conflict it is, o f course, important to set each development against the 
backdrop o f events taking place in Ireland and the policies pursued by the Tory government 
because much o f the debate in the Labour Party was often influenced by the changes which 
took place within Ireland such as the steady increase in the electoral strength o f nationalism
in Northern Ireland, ^  the changes in Anglo- Irish relations (for example, the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement) as well as the broad changes which took place in the both the British political 
scene and the wider international climate especially during the 1990s, However, the official 
policy o f the Party as articulated by the front bench will constitute the bulk o f this study but 
the role o f the other component parts o f the Labour movement each play an important part 
in the development o f policy. For example the CLP’s were considerably more sympathetic 
to the aspirations o f Irish nationalism whereas the trade union movement was less 
enthusiastic about a nationalist agenda and, in many cases, were markedly more sensitive to 
the concerns o f Northern Ireland’s Protestants.
The research into Labour Party policy on Northern Ireland during the opposition 
years is limited to work by Dr. Paul Dixon and Dr. Paul Bew^ in addition to wider studies 
by Dr. Michael J. Cunningham  ^and Drs. Brendan O’Leary and John McGanyri which have 
included brief inclusions on the subject o f Labour Party attitudes. Dr. Dixon’s work has 
often suggested that the Labour Party has continued to maintain a bipartisan relationship 
with the Conservative Party; this particular thesis will be challenged. His work has also 
criticised Labour for its inheritance o f Liberal thinking which tends to show undue
 ^Up until the mid-eighties there were only two nationalist MPs returned to Westminster and during the 
seventies tlie combined nationalist vote was about 25%. After tlie 1997 general election there were five 
nationalist MPs elected (SDLP & Sinn Fein) with the combined nationalist vote totalling over 40%: 
Flackes, W.D. & Sydney Elliot Northern Ireland: a Political Directory 1968-88 (1989) & Guardian, 3 
May 1997.
 ^Bew, P & Dixon, P. ‘Labour Party Policy and Nortliem Ireland’ in Barton, B. & Roche, P. (eds.) The 
Northern Ireland Question: Perspectives and Policies (1994). Dixon, P. ‘The Usual English Doubletalk’: 
The British Political Parties and the Ulster Unionists 1974-94. Irish Political Studies Vol. 9 (1994), ‘The 
Politics o f Antagonism: Explaining McGarry and O’Leary’ & ‘Explaning Antagonism: The Politics of 
McGariy and O’Leary’ Irish Political Studies No. II  (1996), ‘A House Divided Cannot Stand: Britain 
Bipartisanship and Nortliern Ireland’ Contemporary Record Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1995) and The 
British Labour Party and Northern Ireland 1959-1974 (PhD, University o f Bradford, 1993).
 ^Cmmingham, M, J, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland 1969-89 (1991).
McGarry, J. & O’Leary, B. (eds.) The Future o f  Northern Ireland  (1990). McGarry, J & O’Leary, B. 
Explaining Northern Ireland  (1995), ‘Regulation o f National and Ethnic Conflicts’ Parliamentary Affairs 
Vol. 47  (1996) and ‘Proving Our Points on Northern Ireland (and Giving Reading Lessons to Dr. Dixon)’ 
Irish Political Studies No. II  (1996). O’Leary, B. & McGariy, J. The Politics o f  Antagonism: 
Understanding Northern Ireland  (1993). O’Leary, B., Lyne, T., Marshall, J. & Rowtliom, R. Northern 
Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993).
sympathy towards Irish nationalism^ and he also takes a critical view o f Labour’s 
preparedness, during the eighties, to cynically seek an understanding with Unionism in the 
event o f a hung Parliament.*  ^ This thesis sets out to reveal the complexity o f the Labour 
movement’s varying and ever-developing perception of, and relationship with, both Irish 
nationalism and Ulster unionism. Drs. O’Leary and McGarry have an analysis more 
favourable to the pro-unity position that the Labour Party held and Brendan O’Leary was 
himself an advisor to the shadow front bench Northern Ireland team during the early 
nineties whilst Labour’s ‘unity by consent’ policy was still in place. It is also important to 
take seriously the work by Geoffrey Bell whose brief historical study o f the Labour Party’s 
position on the Northern Ireland question^ has helped to contribute to the widely held 
perception o f Labour as being woefully troubled and confused by the Irish problem. His is 
a left-wing analysis which amounts to a damning indictment of the Labour Party for its 
handling o f the Northern Ireland problem throughout the twentieth century. Although Bell 
is an Ulster Protestant he is supportive o f the aspirations o f Irish nationalism and criticises 
the Labour Party for failing the nationalist people o f Northern Ireland. Bell completed his 
main work on the Labour Party and Northern Ireland shortly after the Party’s historic 
decision to adopt a policy favouring Irish reunification. His work is not valued so much for 
its intellectual contribution but it is of historic importance as it articulates better than any 
other work the mood o f the Labour left at the time, which was one o f hostility to those 
such as Rees and Mason and o f a desire to champion the Irish nationalist cause.
Although this thesis is set out into chapters which are based on the four parliaments 
from May 1979 to May 1997, this period o f history has three distinct phases in the
 ^Bew, P & Dixon, P. ‘Labour Party Policy and Northern Ireland’ in Barton, B. & Roche, P. (eds.) The 
Northern Ireland Question: Perspectives and Policies (1994) pp 162-3.
® Dixon, P. ‘The Usual English Doubletalk’: The British Political Parties and the Ulster Unionists 1974-94.
Irish Political Studies Vol. 9 (1994).
^Bell, G. Troublesome Business: the Labour Party and the Irish Question (1982).
development of political debate in Britain on the question o f Northern Ireland. The first is 
from 1979 until the signing o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. This was the period 
when the left carried considerable influence and at times was able to set the agenda. It was 
the era o f conflict in British politics (the miners’ strike and the inner city riots characterise 
the period) and Ireland was seen as another arena o f conflict in which the left felt that it 
needed to take sides. The polemic o f the period was rich with the language o f class 
conflict: ‘imperialism’, ‘oppression’ and ‘liberation struggle’. This was aided by the 
politicisation o f the Provisionals, the intransigence o f the Thatcher government during the 
hunger strikes and developments such as the ‘shoot-to-kill’ saga. The second phase is from 
1986 up until about 1990-91 when the ‘Brooke talks’ process got underway. This was a 
period o f transition in which the left began to lose influence in the Labour movement. The 
Anglo-Irish Agreement initiated a gradual re-examination of the Irish conflict and Britain’s 
role in it. Although this period witnessed the left launch the ‘Time To Go’ initiative to try 
and breath new life into the withdrawal movement, this in fact amounted to the last stand 
by a pressure group rapidly losing influence and relevance in the Labour movement. The 
period from the early nineties, up to the 1997 general election, witnessed a sea-change in 
attitudes to the Irish problem and this was aided by the fact that the wider political climate 
became markedly less adversarial following Margaret Thatcher’s resignation, the ending of 
the cold war and the attempts at conflict resolution in South Africa and the middle east. 
This thesis will set out to analyse the Labour movement’s journey through these three 
phases arriving, as it did in 1997, at what has been described, by contemporary journalists, 
as a neutral position on the constitutional question having adopted a policy advocating Irish 
re-unification sixteen years earlier. The issues to be looked at are complicated and also 
have various historic, social and political dimensions each o f which will be assessed through
the chronological framework set out above and will be set against the three aforementioned 
political areas o f the international arena. Conservative government policy and the 
metamorphosis o f the Labour movement itself over these eighteen years.
Chapter 1; British Labour’s Irish Problem Prior to 1979
Since the earliest days o f the British Labour movement there had always been a 
considerable element sympathetic to the aspirations of Irish nationalism. During the 
eighties and even nineties Labour Party literature often referred to their ‘historic’ 
commitment to a united Ireland* and yet there also existed, within the British left, a large 
body o f opinion which found no empathy whatsoever with Irish Catholic/Gaelic 
nationalism. For example, many on the British left condemned James Connolly for his 
involvement in the 1916 Irish Rising,^ the Labour Party supported the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 
1921 which established the partition o f Ireland^ ® and in 1949 it was Attlee’s Labour 
government that passed the Ireland Act which ensured the permanence o f partition with the 
commitment that “in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of  
His Majesty’s Dominions and o f the United Kingdom without the consent o f the Parliament 
o f Northern Ireland”. The Unionists could not have asked for more and yet a consistent 
belief has existed throughout 20th century political history that the Tories are the friends of 
Unionism, while Labour are the friends o f Irish nationalism. By the mid-1990s the pro­
unionist Labour MP Kate Hoey was still complaining o f the continuing existence o f this 
notion and arguing that there was no reason for British socialists not to have good relations 
with the Ulster Unionists.
The Attlee government has gained itself the image o f an administration particularly 
unsympathetic to Irish nationalism with its speedy willingness to introduce the Ireland Act
* Labour Party NEC, Northern Ireland: Statement to tlie I98I Conference pp.5-6. Labour Party NEC 
Statement for tlie 1994 Conference, p.4. Also, Mo Mowlam restated the ‘historic commitment’ in Labour 
Party News, Mai'ch 1995.
 ^Ellis, P.B. A H istory o f  the Irish Working Class (1972) pp. 232-3.
Reed, D. Ireland: the K ey to the British Revolution (1984) pp.69-72.
As quoted in Farrell, M. Northern Ireland: the Orange State (1976) p. 188.
Ulster Review, Issue 19, Spring 1996.
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in 1949 as a direct response to the Dublin government’s decision to declare the 26 counties 
o f Ireland a Republic. However there did exist concern over the South’s neutrality in both 
the Second World War and the developing Cold War and with De Valera making a visit o f 
condolence to the German Embassy at the news o f Hitlers death in 1945^  ^ relations 
between the two governments were not particularly warm. These factors ensured that any 
emotional attachment to the aspirations o f Irish nationalism in the Labour Party were 
eclipsed, in large part, by the wider concerns o f safeguarding the western alliance and being 
seen to act favourably toward the Northern Ireland government after its co-operation 
during the War. Whilst there did not exist any great interest in Irish affairs, not even 
amongst the great left-wing reformers o f the time such as Shinwell, Cripps and Bevan, 
there did exist a small body o f opinion within the Parliamentary Party which remained 
opposed to the continued partition o f Ireland. A small group o f about thirty back-bench 
Labour MPs came together to form the ‘Friends o f Ireland’ who were not so much 
campaigners against the discrimination in Northern Ireland but were primarily concerned 
with Irish re-unification and with supporting the newly launched Anti-Partition League in 
Ireland. Athough the Friends of Ireland were supported by what were mostly left-wing 
Labour MPs and also had the support o f the two Communist MPs elected in 1945, the APL 
was a conservative organisation launched in Northern Ireland by the Nationalist Party; the 
party which had supported Franco in the Spanish Civil War, which remained under clerical 
influence and was resolutely hostile to Communism. However, the APL was launched 
following the Labour victory in May 1945 in the hope that their grievances would be 
responded to by the Party which had originally been opposed to the partition o f Ireland in 
1920. In spite o f the Friends o f Ireland supporting an amendment to try and defeat the
Lyons, F.S.L. Ireland Since the Famine (1971) p.557.
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Ireland Act and the holding o f various public meetings around Britain/^  ^the efforts o f both 
the APL and Labour’s back-bench pessure group were in vain. The Friends o f Ireland did 
not have a Tony Benn or a Clare Short and with their leading figure being Geoffrey Bing, 
MP for Hornchurch and an Oxford educated Northern Irish lawyer, they lacked the 
dynamism and numbers to influence the government. Both the APL and the Friends of 
Ireland went into rapid decline during the 1950s with the Friends o f Ireland disappearing 
soon after the defeat o f the Labour government in 1951. This small and shortlived interest 
in promoting the Irish nationalist cause within the Labour movement was not based upon 
actively challenging the Unionist government or attacking Stormont on matters such as 
democratic rights or civil liberties for the Catholic minority in the way that later pressure 
groups were to do. The Friends o f Ireland group was tinged with Irish nationalist, 
romanticism and was allied to an anti-partition party in Ireland which, with its traditionalism 
and conservatism, was not seen by the rest o f the British Labour movement as a force for 
progressive change in Northern Ireland.
When the Labour Party was returned to office following the general election o f 
1964, after thirteen years o f Tory rule, the Ulster Unionists had anticipated the worst. The 
Labour leader, Harold Wilson, was considered sympathetic towards Irish nationalism and, 
indeed, during his first years in office he arranged for the remains o f Sir Roger Casement to 
be returned to the Republic o f Ireland. Wilson certainly wanted to improve Anglo-Irish 
relations but his motives were probably more to do with improving trade between the two 
countries than anything else. As events unfolded it became self-evident that the Unionists 
had nothing to fear. James Callaghan has pointed out, with the benefit o f hindsight, that the
Farrell, M. op cit. pp. 189 & 197.
Boylan, H. A Dictionary o f  Irish Biography (1988) p. 23. 
Wilson, H. The Labour Government 1964-1970 (1971) p. 110.
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early sixties were the years o f opportunity for Northern Ireland; the IRA was moribund 
and the Unionists had, in Terence O’Neill, a leader who was prepared to make changes to 
break with the past and yet Labour chose not seize the opportunity. They would not put 
pressure on Stormont because, evidently, they were unable to foresee the disaster that lay 
ahead. Ireland hardly featured on the British Labour movement’s agenda even though 
within Northern Ireland tension had started to develop once again and during the elections 
o f 1964 Belfast witnessed its worst sectarian riots since the 1930s. The phenomenon o f  
Paisleyism had begun to emerge and so too had the question o f civil rights with the 
establishment in 1964 o f the Campaign for Social Justice, but still British socialists were not 
interested. Ulster rivalries based on religion and national identity appeared to many on the 
British left as an outdated squabble compared to the momentous events taking place around 
the world. The 1960s saw Britain disengage from the last of her colonies in Africa and the 
left were satisfied that Britain’s Imperial era had finally come to an end. Areas with willing 
populations such as the Falklands, Gibraltar, Hong Kong and Northern Ireland seemed to 
be o f no interest: nobody on the left, from the Labour Party to the Trotskyites were able to 
see the problems which lay ahead in these areas.
During the 1960s the debate in the British Labour movement was o f a very different 
nature to that which existed during the 1980s or 1990s. Issues such as minority rights, 
racism, gay rights, civil liberties, environmental and third world concerns hardly featured in 
left-wing debate prior to the 1970s. The matters which were o f greatest importance were, 
for the Labour Party, its attempt to try and build on the Attlee government’s 
achievements^* and for the wider left (especially the Communist Party) its support for 
nuclear disarmament, opposition to the Vietnam war and agitation within the growing shop
Callaghan, J. Time and Chance (1987) p.270.
*^ Jefifeiys, K. The Labour Party Since 1945 (1993) pp.78-80.
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stewards’ movement. Terms which have now entered the political mainstream such as 
‘loyalist veto’, ‘Catholic ghettos’, ‘sectarian divide’ and ‘Irish dimension’, for example, 
were simply not a part o f the British left’s vocabulary. How Northern Ireland was being 
run seemed to be o f as much concern to the average British socialist as matters such as the 
workings o f local government on the Isle o f Man or the Shetland Islands. Even Tony Benn 
(who was to become such a vociferous opponent o f Unionism in the 1980s) stated, after a 
visit to Northern Ireland as a government minister in May 1968, that his meeting with Brian 
Faulkner, the Stormont minister for commerce, “gave me an idea o f  what an advantage it is 
to have a separate government, and I could see why the Scottish Nationalists are 
enthusiastic about the idea.”^^  When the first signs of an impending crisis in Northern 
Ireland appeared, they were met with a certain amount o f bewilderment and a complete 
lack o f understanding. Ignorance o f the Irish problem within the Labour leadership appears 
breathtaking. Even within the Labour cabinet, as late as May 1969, ministers were 
suggesting intelligence gathering to find out more about the Ulster problem. Richard 
Crossman, in his Diaries, describes his inquiry in the cabinet about the RUC thus: “Of 
course I gather they are oppressive but we haven’t got any reliable picture o f the degree of  
their oppression”.^ ° Seven months previously, television pictures had shown the RUC 
batonning unarmed civil rights demonstrators in Derry.
The outstanding exception within the Labour movement was a back bench pressure 
group, the Campaign for Democracy in Ulster, which was set up in 1965 by the Labour MP 
Paul Rose and sponsored by up to 100 MP’s including individuals such as Stan Orme, 
Michael Foot, David Owen, Eric Heffer, Roy Hattersley and Kevin McNamara.^  ^ The
i^Benn, T. Office without Power, D iaries 1968-72 (1988) p.68.
Crossman, R. The Diaries o f  a Cabinet M inister Vol3 1968-70 (1977) p.478. 
Bell, G. op cit. p. 103-4.
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CDU was unique within the Labour movement in so far as that it was the only body which 
mirrored the civil rights movement in trying to highlight problems such as anti-Catholic 
discrimination, gerrymandering in local elections and police excesses in Northern Ireland. 
Although the CDU contained MPs who had been part o f  the Friends o f Ireland group in the 
1940s, in sharp contrast to this group the CDU was not interested in promoting the Irish 
nationalist cause either through the Nationalist Party or the Dublin government, or by 
arguing for re-unification; instead they focused soley on the question of civil rights abuses. 
It is also interesting to note that the CDU could not be described as left-wing, indeed Paul 
Rose was to ultimately leave the Labour Party to join the SDP in the 1980s; the SDP was 
itself was set up by fellow CDU member David Owen. There can be no excuse for the lack 
of understanding within the Labour leadership mentioned earlier, because the CDU 
continually lobbied the government about the Ulster situation. As early as the summer o f  
1967 the CDU presented to the Wilson government a report detailing the many 
undemocratic shortcomings on the part o f the Stormont regime, following a visit to the 
province in the April. The report concluded by requesting a Royal Commission to look 
into the government o f Northern Ireland, but Downing Street was not interested. When 
Rose suggested that they should at least appoint an ombudsman for Northern Ireland, he 
was told that it would not be possible for the British government to impose such a 
m easure.22 Two years later Stormont had to introduce just such an ombudsman. During its 
last three years in office the Wilson government ran into more and more difficulties 
regardless o f developments in Northern Ireland. The government began to lose direction, 
unemployment continued to rise (with an increase o f 10% during 1967-70), back bench 
revolts became more and more frequent and the growth in trade union militancy led to
22 Rose, P. Backbencher's Dilemma (1981) p. 181-2.
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Barbara Castle introducing the ill fated Tn Place o f Strife’ white paper on industrial 
relations which nearly split the movement.23 In addition to this Party membership had 
dropped by about 15% from 1965 to 1970.24
It does seem evident that with so many problems and with a leader who certainly 
could not be described as a conviction politician, the Labour government was determined 
to avoid the Ulster problem for as long as possible. What is also curious is that Wilson did 
not seem overly concerned by the fact that television pictures were being transmitted 
around the world showing a part o f the United Kingdom in political turmoil with police 
attacking demonstrators holding placards demanding ‘one man one vote’. As a British 
prime minister who attached such significance to Britain’s standing abroad (especially in the 
US) one can perhaps only explain this by the fact that Wilson did not tend to think of 
Northern Ireland as an integral part o f Britain.2  ^ Wilson had the misconception that 
because there seemed to be such anger from the Unionist right, by the time the civil rights 
movement got off the ground, that O’Neill’s policies must surely be going in the right 
direction anyway. Discussions in Downing Street at the time seem to have evolved around 
the question o f how to deal with O’Neill in terms o f appeasing the demand for reforms by 
the civil rights movement but at the same time keeping him in office in the face o f right- 
wing Unionist opposition; taking over control o f the province, in the event the collapse of 
the Stormont government, was the very last thing that Downing Street wanted.26 The 
Labour leadership appeared to be lurching back and forth with the basic feeling that surely 
it must support the civil rights movement (to anyone described as a socialist, they were 
certainly making reasonable if not highly desirable demands) but then realising their
23 Jeffeiys, K. op cit. pp.? 1-76.
24 Thompson, W. The Long Death o f  British Labourism (1993) p.79.
25 Jones, B. & Keating, M. Labour and the British State (1985) pp. 174-77. 
2^  Wilson, H. op cit. p.692.
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responsibility as Her Majesty’s Government deciding that it would be best to stand by the 
Unionist government.2? Having ignored the CDU and the impending crisis for so long, 
Wilson finally set up a Northern Ireland Committee in the cabinet, not to give serious 
thought to Ulster’s internal political problems but, rather, to finally begin preparing for the 
worst. James Callaghan (who was initially kept off the committee) took ultimate 
responsibility for Northern Ireland as Home Secretary. When O’Neill finally resigned in 
April 1969 and was succeeded by the more right-wing Chichester-Clark the Labour 
leadership’s thinking appears to have changed somewhat. Although Chichester-Clark was 
even less favourable to the CDU, Wilson realised that his election meant that Ulster had 
reached an impasse out o f which he could not see it coming in the immediate future. The 
idea o f being seen to be supporting Ulster’s Tory Party was obviously quite unpalatable but 
there was no real alternative: Northern Ireland was virtually a one party state and Labour 
Party thinking had certainly not begun to conceive o f such ideas as power sharing or any 
other form o f consociational government to deal with what was essentially an inter ethnic 
conflict. Both Callaghan and Healey argued that Downing Street had to support “the 
Protestant Government. The Protestants are the majority and we can’t afford to alienate 
them.”28
It was no great surprise when, on the 14th o f August 1969, Wilson finally agreed to 
deploy British troops, first to Londonderry and later to Belfast. Although, today, some on 
the British left try to talk o f Labour’s ‘shameful’ decision to send in the British army to 
prop up the Unionist regime, at the time hardly anybody in the Labour movement or the 
wider left actually condemned the decision. With people like Bernadette Devlin and Kevin 
McNamara calling for the British government to introduce direct rule and working class
22 Crossman, R. op cit. p.463 & p.478 also Callaghan, J. op cit. 
2* Crossman, R. op cit. p.622.
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women in the beleaguered Catholic ghettos happily welcoming the British soldiers, it is 
hardly surprising that in fact most on the left saw little harm in Wilson’s decision. Despite 
the heightened profile o f the civil rights movement during the late sixties the left had not 
developed a coherent analysis o f the Ulster problem, even though a curious interest had 
developed. A lot o f left-wing papers had started to include articles about Ireland but they 
often amounted to little more than brief histories o f the Irish struggle and perhaps a few 
quotes from James Connolly (the one Irish republican for whom almost every British left 
group seems to have completely uncritical admiration). Even as late as July 1969 a march 
to Trafalgar Square in support o f the civil rights movement could only attract an estimated 
1,000 demonstrators and most o f these were members o f Irish groups such as the Connolly 
Association rather than Labour Party activists.^^ When British troops were finally deployed 
some left-wing journals, such as Tribune, positively welcomed the decision and naively 
envisaged the troops being recalled after a short period o f time once a political solution had 
been achieved.^® Most o f the left concentrated its efforts on demanding a recall o f  
Parliament in order to discuss the crisis. As for the newly reinvigorated Trotskyite left, 
which had grown in stature following the Soviet crushing of the ‘Prague Spring’ and had 
won many new disciples thi oughout the student protests o f the sixties, it also showed a 
certain amount o f confusion and naivety over the Ulster crisis. One o f the immediate 
problems for those trying to develop a Marxist, class based analysis o f the crisis, was that 
whilst they automatically felt a need to support the Catholic demands, the very people 
tiying to crush the civil rights movement by force were the Protestant proletariat. It was 
the existence o f the sectarian divide between the Protestant and Catholic working class 
which caused such problems for the Labour movement and continued to do so right
Morning Star, 14 July 1969. 
Tribune, 22 Aug. 1969.
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through to the 1980s. Although many on the Trotskyite left wanted to portray events as 
simply a struggle against British imperialism, the fact there was also this sectarian conflict 
within the Irish working class meant that Militant, for example, argued that British troops 
ultimately served the interests o f the ruling class and that they “cannot provide lasting 
protection to the Protestant-Catholic [sic] workers”. Instead they called for a “common 
Trade Union Defence force” Supposedly, because the trade unions were the only non 
sectarian group in Ireland, the Militants felt that they could look to them to unite both the 
Catholic and Protestant proletariat. A number o f individuals on the Labour left, who were 
to become such vocal supporters o f the ‘troops out’ cause, such as Tony Benn and Ken 
Livingstone^^ also saw no reason to criticise Wilson’s decision to deploy British troops at 
the time. Tony Benn’s only concern was that Westminster might well get dragged into 
running the province;^^ one can only assume that he still thought it better to leave 
responsibility for Northern Ireland’s governance to the Unionists.
When Labour went into opposition, following the election defeat o f June 1970, the 
following four years o f Conservative rule witnessed the most violent years in Northern 
Ireland’s history. The debate around the Irish question began to shift towards the issue o f  
Irish reunification and the matter o f Britain’s historically oppressive role in Ireland. Part of  
the reason for this was the emergence o f the Provisional IRA, who began to openly engage 
the British army and were consequently able to present the problem as re-opening o f the 
age old conflict between Irish nationalism and British imperialism. The Conservative 
government did not help this by clearly choosing to support the Unionists and adopt a 
repressive security policy to try and thwart the newly revived republican movement. The
Militant, Oct. 1969.
22 Livingstone, K. I f  Voting Changed Anything They‘d  Abolish It (1987) p.27.
23 Benn, T. op cit. p. 199.
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consequence o f this was that much o f the left seemed to be simply responding to events as 
they unfolded and often used Ulster as another way o f attacking the Tories in a way that 
certainly would not have been done had a Labour government been managing the crisis. 
The Labour Party itself witnessed a minor, brief re-emergence o f pro-united Ireland 
sentiment as the party shifted to the left after the 1970 election defeat, but overall Ireland 
still remained very low on Labour’s agenda. Despite the epic events taking place in Ulster, 
which repeatedly stole the headlines during the early seventies, it was only the far left that 
took a keen interest in the crisis: the Labour front bench position remained one of 
bipartisanship with the Tories. When, in August 1971, Stormont introduced internment, 
Callaghan continued to support the government even though the Tories’ attitude was to 
simply leave things to the Unionists because they knew best. Callaghan’s only complaint 
was that no political initiative had followed internment, yet Labour conferences had 
previously voted to oppose internment.24 With back bench unease growing over 
bipartisanship and individuals such as Paul Rose and Kevin McNamara leading the attack 
on front bench ambiguity, Wilson’s latent sympathy with the idea o f a United Ireland re- 
emerged following the violence that flared up after the introduction o f internment. On 
November 25th 1971 Wilson announced to the House o f Commons his ‘15 Point Plan’ to 
achieve eventual Irish re-unification over a fifteen year period. The plan was an example o f  
what many describe as a typically English socialist attitude towards Ireland because the 
proposals included the suggestion that the Republic “would seek... membership o f the 
Commonwealth recognising the Queen as Head...” and even went on to ask for changes to 
the Republic’s constitution in order to “give assurance that there would be no constitutional 
impediment to the creation o f a National Health Service on the British model” and also that
24 Bell, G. op cit. pp. 112-15.
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changes should be made to social security, family planning, and censorship laws.25 Bew  
and Patterson were to criticise what they described as the “superficial nature o f the 
s t r a t e g y ” 36  and there can be no doubt that although Wilson had made visits to Ireland 
(north and south) prior to the decision, the plan does appear somewhat naive and made the 
paternalistic assumption, so often adopted by those devising Labour Party policy right up to 
the 1990s, that a British Labour government could resolve the Irish problem ‘from above’. 
Even people such as Kevin McNamara might have been surprised at the announcement at 
the time, but did not in fact attach a great deal o f credence or hope to an idea which he 
believed suited Wilson only whilst in opposition.^? It might be fair to say that Wilson 
simply found the idea o f disentangling the British state from the Irish problem rather 
attractive at the time, but the Labour Party as a whole had still not come near to developing 
a realistic policy which set out to achieve a solution based on recognising and trying to 
accommodate the aspirations o f both the traditions in Ireland.
The Labour Party had completely lost the initiative when, in March 1973, the Tories 
produced their white paper outlining the idea o f a Council o f Ireland and a new devolved 
government for Northern Ireland. Callaghan had been replaced by Merlyn Rees as Labour 
spokesperson on Irish affairs in November 1971 and after Heath introduced direct rule in 
March 1972 with William Whitelaw as the first Secretary o f State for Northern Ireland, 
Rees consequently became the shadow secretary and from this period right up to 1980 the 
question o f a united Ireland was almost completely sidelined within the Labour movement. 
In 1972 and again in 1974 the miners had successfully struck against the Tory 
government’s wage constraints and so political debate within the Labour Party centred
25 Wilson, H. op cit. pp. 68-70.
2  ^Bew, P. & Patterson, H. The British State and the Ulster Crisis (1985) p.40. 
22 McNamara, K. Interview April 1995.
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around the questions o f incomes policy, state intervention to bolster Britain’s ailing 
economy and the issue o f the government’s relationship with the ever growing trade union 
movement. After the second miners’ strike the Tories were defeated in the general election 
of February 1974 and the Labour government which took over was the most hapless and 
incompetent since the war and it seemed as if the LHster crisis was simply the last o f its 
priorities: they certainly could not afford the luxury o f going on an idealistic crusade to 
solve the Irish question. Rees and the rest o f the Party were happy to support the Tories’ 
white paper and the resultant Sunningdale agreement which finalised plans for a Council of 
Ireland and a power sharing executive comprising Nationalists and Unionists to govern 
Northern Ireland, which took office on January 1st 1974. Merlyn Rees had never been 
greatly enthusiastic about the Sunningdale agreement. He considered the Irish politicians 
to be o f rather low calibre and considered the power sharing venture “a piece o f British 
suburban illusion”.2 * Rees, unlike Wilson, had very little sympathy with Irish nationalism. 
He has talked o f how his father had served in Ireland with the British army after the Irish 
rising in 1916 and at the Somme with the Ulster division (an important part o f Ulster 
folklore which has long given weight to the Protestant demand that Britain should be 
obliged to reciprocate their loyalty) but nevertheless considered Ireland particularly 
conservative, traditionalist and rather a strange place to understand.29
Within less than three months o f taking office the new Labour government, so 
conscious o f the strength o f working class militancy, were confronted with the Ulster 
Workers’ Council strike; launched to try to derail the Council o f Ireland and the power 
sharing Executive. This strike, which was the most overtly political strike in 20th century 
British or Irish history, created a great deal o f frustration and political confusion
2* Benn, T. Against the Tide, D iaries 1973-76 (1989) p.526.
2  ^Rees, M. Northern Ireland: a Personal Perspective (1985) pp. 1-2.
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throughout the Labour movement and especially amongst the far left groups. The strike 
only lasted for two weeks and although many argued that its strength lay in intimidation 
and the strong arm tactics o f the Loyalist paramilitaries, the Unionists on the Executive 
considered that it had such support and was doing so much harm to Northern Ireland that 
they resigned thus bringing the power sharing experiment to an end and leaving the Labour 
Party with little idea as to what to do next. Merlyn Rees and Stan Orme (his assistant) 
were taken aback by the success o f the strike and they began to talk o f the emergence o f a 
new form of ‘Protestant nationalism’^ o or ‘Ulster nationalism’ which had developed over 
the preceding years.^  ^ Rees entered into his diary that “It had to be faced that the 
community were in favour o f what the Ulster Workers Council were doing - Ulster 
Nationalism was growing”.42 As has been outlined earlier Labour did not have the political 
clout or confidence to maintain such a liberal idea as power sharing in the face o f such a 
crisis, whereas a Tory government would almost definitely have able to defeat the UWC 
strike, or would have perhaps carried the confidence of the Protestant population with 
them, thus avoiding the strike (although abolition of the Council of Ireland would have to 
have been part of the deal). The UWC strike also revealed the Labour Party’s, and in 
particular Merlyn Rees’ lack o f authority in government, because they were not prepared to 
demand action on the part o f the military establishment to defeat the strike. When John 
Hume prepared a plan to secure oil distribution throughout the province the army were 
reluctant to use force to ensure the implementation o f the plan because they wanted to 
avoid a showdown with the Loyalist paramilitaries.42 In fact the British army were quite 
intransigent about being used in anyway to smash the strike44 and it has been asserted that
40 Times, 4 June 1974.
41 Sunday Times, 18 June 1978.
42 Rees op cit. p.85.
42 Ibid. p. 127. also Bell, G. op cit., p. 122.
44 Bew, P. & Patterson, H. op cit. P.67., Rees, M. op cit. P.69 also 7m // Times, 18 Sept. 1978.
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many troops and RUC men were openly fraternising with Loyalist paramilitaries on the 
picket lines/^ The Executive did not stand a chance; Rees was resigned to its defeat even 
before the strike had begun - “as I told Harold Wilson soon after taking office, it would 
collapse before long, which happened in May”.'*®
The UWC strike was a significant test for the British Labour movement and the 
wider left. It raised many questions for the left such as Labour’s commitment to the 
working class even if they were striking for a cause with which almost the entire British left 
did not agree, which community (Catholic or Protestant) did Labour empathise with more 
and the whole question o f Britain’s relationship with Ireland (especially the issue o f 
financial subsidies to the north) and the idea there was in fact two Irelands or at least two 
different nationalisms. Whilst Wilson and Orme had sympathies with Irish nationalism, 
Merlyn Rees did not. Unlike Wilson, he considered the UWC a body made up o f bona fide 
“active trade unionists”'*^  and was annoyed with the Irish government for considering the 
Provisional IRA to be as political as the UWC, Rees evidently only considered the latter to 
be politically motivated. He was also irritated by Dublin’s request that the British army be 
used to defeat the strikers and his reaction gives an interesting insight into his attitude to 
the whole Irish question: “I had long believed that Dublin did not fully comprehend the 
situation in the North but this letter [asking Wilson to use the troops against the strikers] 
took the breath away. What, I wondered would a Dublin government ever do with the 
Protestant community in general and the working class in particular if its long-term aim of a 
United Ireland was ever realised? Use the army to keep East Belfast down?”'** This then 
leads to the question, why was Rees and his successor Mason, prepared to use the army to
*^® Farrell, M. op cit. p.317. 
'*®Rees, M. op cit. p.317. 
'*7lbid. p.65.
'**Ibid. p.73.
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keep West Belfast down? This in turn makes one consider to what extent did the Labour 
Party at this time, give serious thought to trying to accommodate and accept the nationalist 
tradition within Ulster, if they felt that Dublin did not respect the legitimate aspirations of 
the unionist tradition. The Labour Party, by the mid-1990s finally recognised the problem 
of trying to achieve what has become popularly known as ‘parity o f esteem’ between the 
two traditions, instead o f trying to come down in favour o f just one tradition which the 
policy o f  ‘unity by consent’ did during the eighties. The issues o f greatest irritation for 
Wilson seemed to be economic and financial, rather than political. As has been described 
earlier Wilson did not think o f Northern Ireland as an integral part o f the British state and 
the fact that this economic backwater was being subsidised by the British exchequer, made 
the behaviour o f the UWC all the more infuriating. When the strike began he quickly 
cancelled a meeting which had been organised to plan a £9 million subsidy for the Belfast 
shipyards and after the strikers had won their victoiy he complained, in his television 
broadcast, that “People on this side o f the water... have seen the taxes they have poured 
out almost without regard to cost - over £300 million a year this year with the cost o f army 
operations on top o f that going into Northern Ireland... Yet people who benefit from this 
now viciously defy Westminster... spend their lives sponging on Westminster and British 
democracy and then systematically assault democratic methods. Who do these people think 
they are?”49 The problem was that they saw themselves as the same as the people ‘on this 
side o f the water ; Wilson clearly did not. Jones and Keating have pointed to this dilemma 
in Labour Party thinking at this time and rightly pointed out that no Labour leader would 
have condemned British workers on strike in the same way: the problem for Labour was 
that “although Wilson regarded the ‘Ulster Worker’ strikers as outside the British political
Wilson, H. op cit. p.75 & p.7
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community, he still presumed them to be subject to its sovereignty”.^ ** The Conservative 
Party has also developed the same view of Ulster Protestants, but the problem for Labour 
was that it was all the more unsettling and confusing that Sunningdale was defeated by the 
Protestant working class when, for so long, many on the left had blamed Ulster’s 
sectarianism on the ‘Orange ascendancy’. The legacy of the UWC strike was a Labour 
Party bereft o f ideas on Northern Ireland for the next six years.
The Ulster Workers’ Council strike also caused considerable problems for the far 
left in the movement, as it witnessed a rare and resounding victory for a section o f the 
working class but not for what the left considered political progress. The Militant tendency 
criticised the UWC strike as being simply a ‘lock out’, but it was also critical o f the 
Provisionals and Dublin. Militant has consistently been the far left group most sympathetic 
to the loyalist working class, so that after the strike it was scathing about Wilson’s vitriolic 
speech and also about those who had demanded that the army be used to crush the strike. 
Interestingly, it had begun to develop a position o f opposition to the idea o f arguing for re­
unification because o f its sympathy for Protestants who feared the “theocratic” state in the 
south: “The capitalist Republic represents lower living standards, worse social services and 
pensions to them [in the North]”.®* The strike also made them consider that a likely 
outcome would only be re-partition, with a Pakistan/India type conflict resulting in 
Catholics being forced out o f Belfast and Protestants being forced out o f border areas. 
To varying degrees the UWC strike forced a rethink amongst the entire British left; the idea 
that they should just give their support to the oppressed Catholic minority was evidently
®** Jones, B. & Keating, M. op cit. p. 176. 
M ilitant, 31 May 1974.
Militant, 24 May 1974.
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too simplistic and greater consideration had to be given to the problem o f loyalist working 
class intransigence, rather than just blaming the ‘Orange ascendancy’.
Up until Labour lost power in 1979, Party policy focused purely on achieving an 
improvement in the area o f security in Northern Ireland and little else. Rees introduced, in 
1975, a new elected assembly to be known as the Northern Ireland Convention, but this 
served only to fill the political vacuum after Sunningdale and show to the outside world 
that Labour were trying to stand back and allow Ulster politicians sort out their own 
problems. In contrast to government policy in the 1980s and 1990s the view was that the 
roles o f both Dublin and Westminster should be played down and an attempt be made to try 
and give the Northern Ireland parties centre stage. The Convention ultimately failed and 
was wound up in March 1976. Few people even wanted to discuss Ireland and there was 
only a small, silent minority, including people such as Tony Benn, Michael Meacher, Eric 
Heffer and Tam Dalyell, who saw British withdrawal as the solution.®'* Part o f the reason 
for this was that morale within the Labour Party was very low. The Callaghan government 
was drifting from crisis to crisis and, regardless o f the constant wrangling over the 
Common Market and economic policy, the most perplexing question for the movement was 
that o f the relationship between the trade unions and the Labour government. In the midst 
of all these problems Roy Mason, appointed Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 
September 1976, set out to try and simply thwart the Provisional IRA militarily, bring some 
semblance o f normality to the province and maintain direct rule for the foreseeable future 
because he actually considered it the best form of government for Northern Ireland.®® 
Other than that nobody in the Party had the will to embark on any kind o f new initiative to
®^  Cumiingham, M.J. op cit. p.93.
®'*Benn, T. op cit. p. 164 & Benn, T. Conflicts o f  Interest, Diaries 1977-80 (1990) p.529. 
Irish Times, 6 Nov. 1976.
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find a political solution to the Irish problem. Mason’s junior Minister at the NIO, Don 
Concannon, has argued that the instability in Northern Ireland was such that there was little 
possibility o f developing a considered political initiative because they were “running the 
place by the seat o f our pants.”®® In addition Mason considered Ulster politicians to be 
rather incompetent and unreasonable,®"  ^ he therefore embarked upon his job with a great 
deal o f enthusiasm believing (in a rather typically English way) that he could sort out the 
Irish regardless o f any major political initiative. With the Conservative Party supporting 
him and the Labour leadership happy with the new direction in policy. Mason became 
rather intolerant o f criticism especially from Irish nationalist quarters.®* The new policy 
initiated by Rees and enhanced by Mason has become known as the three pronged policy of 
Ulsterisation, normalisation and criminalisation. The essential aim o f the policy was to end 
the war like appearance o f Ulster by reducing the army’s role and involving the RUC to a 
greater extent, and also by ending internment and convicting terrorist suspects through the 
newly introduced no-jury courts, so that the paramilitaries would be portrayed as ordinary 
criminals. Without realising it Mason was actually exacerbating the problem, even though 
the short term reductions in violence appeared impressive. The wider left was also unable 
to foresee the importance o f the prison conflict which was to develop over the next four or 
five years. In fact the lack o f interest in Irish affairs meant that when allegations began to 
be made that widespread torture was being used to extract confessions from terrorist 
suspects as part o f the new policy o f securing convictions through the courts, the left was 
slow to seize on the significance o f this new development and it was left to Amnesty 
International to carry out an investigation which concluded that “maltreatment o f suspected 
terrorists by the RUC has taken place with sufficient frequency to warrant the establishment
®® Coiicaimon, D. Interview, 11 March 1998. 
®^Bew, P. & Patterson, H. op cit. p. 92.
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of a public enquiry to investigate it.”®^ Although some on the far left did take up the issue 
of torture, very little pressure was applied from the back benches apart from the odd 
criticism by Kevin McNamara, Paul Rose and Ian Mikardo, so that Mason managed get off 
quite easily on the issue o f torture. As for the H-Block campaign initiated by republican 
prisoners in protest at the removal o f Special Category Status, there was even less concern 
even amongst the hard left. By 1978 the situation had deteriorated to the extent that 
prisoners were smearing excrement on cell walls, as well as refusing to wear prison clothing 
in order to reiterate the point that they considered themselves political prisoners o f war. As 
a consequence Mason was publicly criticised by Cardinal O’Fiaich over his prisons policy.®** 
Despite the fact that many in Ireland considered this both a political and a human rights 
issue, in Britain very few were interested. The only group to try to campaign on the prison 
issue was the Troops Out Movement (a leftist, British based pressure group which grew 
out o f the Anti-Internment League). The Labour back benches were completely indifferent 
even though the H-BIock campaign was to develop into a milestone event in Irish history 
which would actually help to alter Labour policy in the early 1980s.
The one decision that the Callaghan government took which was to confound 
utterly the idea o f Labour’s ‘historic commitment to a united Ireland’, was the decision in 
1977 to form a pact with the Ulster Unionists in order to safeguard Labour’s fragile 
majority in the House o f Commons. Ironically it was the one time Campaign for 
Democracy in Ulster supporter, Michael Foot, who first approached the Unionists about a 
deal which would also lead to an increase in the number o f Northern Ireland seats, which 
would inevitably result in simply a greater number o f Unionist members.®* In addition to
®* Bell, G. op cit. p. 131.
®^  Amnesty International, Report o f  an Amnesty International Mission to Northern Ireland  p. 70. 
®** Guardian, 2 Aug. 1978.
®* Bew, P. & Patterson, H. op cit. p.92.
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this Mason, despite his general disdain for Irish politicians, had already alienated the main 
Northern nationalist party: the Social, Democratic and Labour Party. The SDLP, as well as 
being Labour’s sister party, was the voice o f moderate Irish nationalism in opposition to 
violent republicanism and almost every Northern Ireland minister has been aware o f the 
importance o f maintaining good relations with a party which held out the only hope of 
drawing Catholics away from the Provisionals. But not Mason; he had already angered the 
SDLP over the question o f torture allegations, his failure to attempt a new political 
initiative and his apparent desire to achieve simply a military solution. The behaviour o f the 
Labour government had helped to push the SDLP to the right, with the party trying to 
water down its socialist content and adopting a more traditional nationalist a g en d a . Th i s  
shift to the right resulted in the expulsion o f the left-winger Paddy Devlin in 1977. 
Callaghan’s decision to broker a deal with their historic enemies: the Ulster Unionists, 
infuriated the SDLP. It seemed to be conclusively evident that Labour were bereft o f both 
principles and ideals on the subject of Northern Ireland and were prepared to go to any 
lengths to secure power for itself at Westminster. Although some on the Labour back 
benches were outraged by the decision, opposition to the deal was relatively small. When 
the Redistribution o f [Northern Ireland] Seats Bill was finally presented to the House in 
November 1978, only 38 Labour MP’s voted against the government.®  ^ This event perhaps 
more than any other highlights the nature o f the Labour Party on the Irish question during 
this period. The idea that Britain’s socialist party could do such a deal with people who 
were to the right o f the Tories and actually increase their numbers in the House seems 
incredible (the increase has never been reversed), but Ireland was virtually an irrelevance in 
Labour politics: the main issue of relevance was maintaining power.
®2lbid. pp.95-99.
®^  Cunningham, M.J. op cit. p.259.
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In ideological terms also, some elements in the Labour Party during the mid-1970s 
were embarking on a complete rethink in terms of analysing the Ulster conflict. Dick 
Barry, a Labour Party policy advisor on Northern Ireland, produced two research papers in 
1976 and 1978 which represented what were essentially pro-unionist revisions of Irish 
history.®'* Although the NEC rejected them, the documents were an indication o f the extent 
to which the new ideas of the ‘two nation theory’ or ‘Protestant nationalism’ were 
competing with the notions o f a Irish reunification and British withdrawal. The arguments 
were that Irish nationalism was socially reactionary and that Ulster unionism was the 
inevitable consequence o f a community under threat from an alien, Catholic/Gaelic 
nationalism. The republican movement was described as being, at the beginning o f the 
century, “concerned to promote the social power o f the Roman Catholic Church”, whilst 
Stormont’s abuses and discriminatory tactics were explained as not being the intended 
policy o f the Unionist Party but simply the only possible “response to Catholic nationalist 
attempts to disrupt democratic government in Northern Ireland”. In explaining the 
sectarian conflict, Barry went on to argue that loyalist violence was an inevitable response 
to the Provisional IRA threat and that groups such as the UVF and UDA ought to be 
described as ‘counter terrorist organisations’.®® Geoff Bell argued that “This re-write of 
history went on to reverse everything most socialists in Britain and elsewhere had ever 
thought about Ireland”.®® The contrast between the analyses which were appearing during 
the seventies and the arguments which were to appear during the early 1980s, in the Labour 
movement, could not be more stark. Labour activists were being sapped o f the will to 
embark on any campaign to change party policy on Ireland, as the troublesome seventies
®'* Labour Party Research Dept. ‘The Ir i^  lQuestion’ Info. Paper 21, Sept. 1976 and NEC Study Group on 
Nortliern Ireland RE 1705/June 1978.
®®Ibid. (Paper 21, Sept. 1976).
®® Bell, G. op cit. p. 126.
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wore on; that is if any will existed at all. One o f the arguments for the lack o f ideas or new 
initiatives on Ireland, in the Labour Party during the 1970s was that party membership had 
been declining consistently throughout the decade and the type o f young radical socialists 
that could have injected some vitality into the party, were more likely to be attracted into 
one o f the ever growing Trotskyite groups. It is ironic, therefore that the one Trotskyite 
grouping which operated within the Labour Party was Militant (they also dominated the 
Labour Party Young Socialists) and o f all the far left groups, their analysis o f the Ulster 
conflict happened to be closest to the Dick Barry school of thought.
When Labour were finally defeated in the House o f Commons on the vote of 
confidence that would precipitate the general election in 1979, two votes that they hoped 
that they could rely on, namely Gerry Fitt o f the SDLP and Frank Maguire the independent 
Nationalist, were in fact to let them down. On both counts it was due to Labour’s 
behaviour towards Ireland: Fitt because o f the deal with the Ulster Unionists and Maguire 
because o f the prisons issue.®  ^ Labour had unwittingly sown the seeds o f further problems 
in Ireland, because o f alienating moderate nationalist opinion, further disillusioning northern 
Catholics, because o f the ruthless security policy and perhaps most significant o f all, its 
failure to resolve the prisons crisis. The party had lost any idealism; “In effect. Labour in 
the 1970s had become ‘all but doctrineless’ ”.®* It had failed to show imagination in 
looking for a solution, such as trying to accommodate and work with nationalist Ireland, 
especially the Dublin government or trying to draw the Unionists into taking a more 
pragmatic stance. Yet the Tory administration which took over in 1979 was to at least try 
and develop precisely such policies.
®7ibid. p. 133.
®* Jefiferys, K. op cit. p. 105. Quoting Drucker, H.M. Doctrine and Ethos in the Labour Party (1979).
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Chapter 2: *The Left-wing Backlash’ 
Labour Policy 1979-83
Following the Conservative victory in the general election o f May 1979, the Labour 
Party began a traumatic and ultimately divisive reassessment of its ideology, its direction 
and its very purpose in British politics. Since 1964, the party had only spent the period of 
1970-74 out o f office and yet the left bitterly complained that the years in office had been 
wasted with nothing to show except ever rising unemployment and an economy in crisis. 
Eric Shaw describes the left-wing assault on the Party’s leadership as an attack on the 
‘revisionist social democracy’ which had been Labour’s ruling body o f ideas up until the 
late 1970s.®** The showdown was basically between socialists and social democrats within 
the movement. Social democracy had been in the ascendant throughout the sixties and 
seventies, but with the dropping o f Keynesian economics and the decision to ask for an 
International Monetary Fund loan, the Labour government was attacked by the left which 
inevitably argued that social democracy was bankiupt. Shaw also argues that because 
Britain was “now so entangled in the web o f an open, highly interdependent world 
economy where vast power was wielded by the financial markets that a socialist or social 
democratic national economic strategy had ceased to be a viable option”. In addition to 
failing to fully appreciate this, the left also “had an exaggerated view o f the amount o f  
power that victory in the electoral process and the possession o f a democratic mandate 
actually conferred upon a government in an internationally integrated market system.”?® It 
is only with the emergence o f ‘New Labour’ under Tony Blair in the 1990s that such 
notions have been laid to rest and recognition o f the significance o f the global economy 
fully recognised. Ministers in the Callaghan government considered their actions to be
®^  Shaw, E. The Labour Party Since 1979 (1994) p .l. 
?®Ibid. p. 15.
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necessary given the international economic climate following the oil price increases o f the 
early seventies but, to the left, they were class traitors. All the ingredients were in place to 
induce the left in to an all out assault on the right-wing leadership after the 1979 election 
defeat. Groups such as the Institute for Workers Control, the Campaign for Labour Party 
Democracy and, later in 1980, the Rank and File Mobilising Committee gained considerable 
influence throughout the movement. In addition to this “several o f the major unions no 
longer displayed instinctive loyalty to the leadership, and after 1979 the left had a 
spokesman, in Tony Benn, who was capable o f securing broad support for policy 
changes.”?* At the Labour Party conference in 1979, at Brighton, the leadership were 
virtually on trial and the right did not have either the confidence or popular support to resist 
the left-wing backlash. By 1981 Callaghan had been replaced by the left-wing Michael 
Foot as party leader, Tony Benn had only missed out on securing the deputy leadership by 
1% of the conference vote, policies such as unilateral nuclear disarmament, withdrawal 
from the Common Market and extended public ownership had been adopted and finally the 
party had made the decision to return to its historic commitment to a united Ireland.
It would be wrong to assume that the 1981 conference decision to adopt the policy 
of achieving “the unification of Ireland by agreement and consent”?? was simply another 
part o f Labour’s left-wing shift. The conflict which took place between socialists and 
social democrats after May 1979, it could be argued, was mirrored by a conflict on Irish 
policy between those o f the Dick Barry ‘two nation’ school o f thought and those who 
sought an end to bipartisanship with the Tories. However, for a long time, the left 
concentrated on achieving organisational changes, such as mandatory reselection of 
parliamentary candidates whilst Ireland remained virtually an irrelevance. Although Roy
?* Jeffeiy, K. op cit. pl09.
?? Labour Party NEC, Nortliern Ireland: Statement to the 1981 Conference, p.7.
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Mason had a vote o f no confidence passed against him by his Barnsley Constituency 
Labour Party in September 1979?? and the left undoubtedly saw him as the type o f figure 
that they would like to have deselected, the arguments against him, in fact, had little to do 
with his record as Northern Ireland Secretary o f State, but instead were concerned with his 
outspoken support for membership o f the Common Market.?'* When, in August 1979, a 
march was organised by the Troops Out Movement and others, to coincide with the tenth 
anniversary o f the deployment o f British troops in Northern Ireland, the event was 
sponsored by only thirteen Labour MPs and just four Constituency Labour Parties.?® 
Although most o f those who organised this march considered Labour’s performance in 
Northern Ireland to have been appalling, throughout the Labour rank and file Irish policy 
came a long way down the long list of complaints levelled at the leadership after Mrs 
Thatcher had been elected.
At leadership level, there remained a commitment to bipartisanship throughout 1979 
and 1980, Roy Mason remained {^abour’s front bench spokesperson on Northern Ireland 
until mid-June when Callaghan replaced him with Brynmor John as the new shadow 
minister with Tom Pendry (who had served briefly under Roy Mason) as his assistant.?® 
This appointment was made some weeks after the shadow cabinet elections were held and 
John himself had not been elected but was picked from the back benches as a rather 
colourless replacement for Mason. Even the Tories attacked Labour for this decision, 
pointing out that they evidently did not consider Ulster an important enough issue to 
warrant a shadow cabinet member as spokesperson. When appointed, John was clearly 
uncertain about his new role; “He declined to say what his views on Northern Ireland were.
?? Tribune, 7 Sept. 1979.
?'* Guardian, 4 March 1980.
?® Committee for Witlidrawal from Ireland, Ireland: Voices fo r  Withdrawal (1979) p.63. 
Labour Weekly, 29 Jmie 1979.
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saying he must acquaint himself thoroughly first.”?? The new Secretary o f State for 
Northern Ireland, Humphrey Atkins, was given an easy ride by John and Pendry. In his 
very first contribution as the opposition spokesperson in July 1979 Brynmor John made 
clear that “First, there will be a broad maintenance o f that support which the Opposition 
give to the Government, and which has hitherto existed, particularly in relation to 
security.”?* Front bench speeches on Irish affairs were characterised by a bland and 
equivocal tone with Brynmor John often more concerned with cuts in public spending in 
Northern Ireland rather than with the constitutional question. At this stage opposition to 
bipartisanship only amounted to a few left-wing back benchers who included Frank 
Dobson, Martin Flannery, Joan Maynard, Ian Mikardo, Jo Richardson, Jock Stallard, Denis 
Skinner and Clive Soley.?^ In Tom Pendry’s first contribution he articulated current main 
stream Labour thinking towards the Provisionals arguing that the government were 
struggling “not against a bona fide enemy or political movement with a clearly defined 
philosophy, prepared to win the hearts and minds o f  the people o f Northern Ireland by 
democratic means. Instead, the Government are dealing with a small, dedicated group of 
fanatics”.*® The significance o f this and Brynmor John’s statement on bipartisanship and 
security, mentioned earlier, lies not in the context o f the debate in 1979 but in the sea 
change in Labour/left-wing thinking over the following two years. Attitudes to 
bipartisanship and security (or more specifically the Prevention o f Terrorism Act) as well as 
attitudes towards the Provisionals and the validity o f republican aspirations with the rise of 
Sinn Fein were to alter drastically leaving men such as John and Pendry to appear, with 
hindsight, as a rather uninspiring postscript to the Rees/Mason era.
??/m /i Times, 20 June 1979.
Hansard Vol. 969 Col. 940 (2 July 1979).
?^  Ibid. Vols 969-975. See votes on direct rule, EPA and otlier Northern Ireland debates. 
*®Ibid. Vol. 969 Col. 1050 (2 July 1979).
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When Ireland was finally debated at the Labour Party conference in October 1979, 
Brynmor John did not make a contribution to the debate. It was only at the Brighton 
conference that the leadership was forced to reconsider its determination to continue with 
the safe option o f maintaining bipartisanship. Northern Ireland had not been discussed at 
conference since 1974 and although in 1979 only four constituencies sent in resolutions on 
the subject,** the NEC were being pressured to call a debate but tried to argue that there 
was just not enough time. It was finally agreed by a show o f hands that half an hour be 
allotted to the last day o f conference to discuss Northern Ireland*? and this was only after a 
400 signature petition had been submitted calling for a debate.*? The debate itself evolved 
around two resolutions; the first o f which called for British withdrawal and the second 
called for an end to bipartisanship with the Tories. Although the ex-Northern Ireland 
minister Stan Orme spoke in opposition to British withdrawal, it was unusual to see the 
left-wing Michael Foot speak to oppose both resolutions and to actually defend the position 
of bipartisanship using the tactic o f promising delegates that if they voted down both 
resolutions then the NEC would set in motion a Northern Iteland policy review.*'* It would 
appear that after a week in which the leadership had been under such a severe attack from 
the Labour left, the NEC certainly were not going to allow the spectacle o f conference 
voting to commit a fiiture Labour government to withdraw British rule fiom Northern 
Ireland. Over the following years it became clear that a Labour conference would not be 
likely to actually vote in favour o f troops out, but in 1979 the leadership feared that the 
left-wing backlash was likely to ensure just such an outcome. So the NEC’s Northern 
Ireland Study Group (which was to eventually advocate Irish re-unification in 1981) came
** Tribune, 5 Oct. 1979.
Irish Times, 5 Oct. 1979. 
*?Bell, G. op cit. p .l38. 
Irish Times, 6 Oct. 1979.
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into being as a result of the leadership’s fear that without such a concession the left might 
have otherwise created a serious problem in the troublesome area o f Irish policy.
In November 1979 the government published its proposals for negotiations to 
achieve a settlement based on devolution. The plan was doomed to failure, not least 
because the Ulster Unionists refused to join the talks and because the SDLP later boycotted 
the assembly, but what was significant about the white paper was that it included for the 
first time the phrase ‘Irish dimension’. It took some time for the Labour Party to fully 
realise the significance o f this apparently innocuous term, but over the coming decade it 
was to become central to the debate on Northern Ireland and to both government policy 
and Labour Party thinking. It is perhaps unfair to criticise Biynmor John’s lack of foresight 
at this moment in time - few could have predicted the course o f events during the eighties - 
but his response to the proposals lacked imagination and indicated that the front bench was 
completely out o f touch with rank and file opinion. On the subject o f a return to Stormont 
he not only failed to rule it out but simply explained that “We in Parliament would need to 
ponder very hard the return o f such a body as Stormont... elected on a simple majority 
vote, before we accepted it.”*® If hard pondering was all that stood between the Labour 
Party and a return to Stormont, which a decade later even the Ulster Unionists had given 
up arguing for, then progress on Labour’s front bench, in terms o f imaginative and 
progressive thinking over the intervening seven years, appeared to have been minimal. 
Although elements in the wider movement may have started to become restive John and 
Pendry continued in the same vein, often only criticising the government for its economic 
policies in Northern Ireland. When, in July 1980, the government introduced its white 
paper: ‘The Government o f Northern Ireland: Proposals for Further Discussions’ which set
Hansard Vq\. 974 Cols 1512-17 (29 Nov. 1979).
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out a plan for devolution, Brynmor John responded by announcing that although the PLP 
preferred the option o f power sharing the second proposed option o f a majoritarian 
executive was not opposed. Instead he simply expressed reservations about a proposed 
council o f the elected assembly not being powerful enough in relation to the executive and 
that there was not an assurance that there would be equality o f appointment (between 
minority and majority parties) for the chair and deputy chair for the proposed departmental 
committees.*® It is worth noting that back bench opposition to the government and to 
bipartisanship sometimes took the form o f just the odd interjection by those such as Martin 
Flannery or Denis Canavan, but the key figure always contributing to debates on Northern 
Ireland was Kevin McNamara.*? The frustration at watching Brynmor John accepting the 
idea o f a majoritarian administration for Northern Ireland, albeit with a few misgivings, was 
best articulated by Kevin McNamara. It was he who as always articulated the ideological 
opposition to the government’s proposals and on this occasion took the opportunity to set 
out clearly his opposition to devolution, independence or integration and to advocate 
unification with the Republic.**
Left-wing agitation in the Labour movement on the question o f Irish policy, 
however, remained negligible throughout 1979. Nevertheless a slow burgeoning o f interest 
in changing Irish policy did begin to develop during late 1979 and 1980. Many o f the 
individuals who were involved in trying to get a debate at the Brighton conference, 
eventually came together in February 1980 in what was to become known as the Labour 
Committee on Ireland and organised their first conference in late March,*  ^ which was 
attended by representatives o f forty four CLPs.^® This group was made up o f mainly rank
*®Ibid. Vol. 988 Cols 565-573 (9 July 1980).
*?lbid. Vols 969-989.
**lbid. Vol. 988 Cols 616-621(9 July 1980).
*** Tribune, (letter by Don Flynn, one o f tlie founders) 1 Feb. 1980. 
9®lbid.20 June 1980.
39
Iand file Labour activists, although three back bench MP’s namely Joan Maynard, Ernie 
Roberts and Jock Stallard, were also active with the committee.®** They set out simply to 
try and achieve a change in Labour Party policy which would include an end to 
bipartisanship along with a commitment to attain Irish re-unification and began producing a 
journal entitled Labour and Ireland in the April. The LCI was to grow continually 
throughout most o f the eighties, both in numbers and influence. In addition to the LCI 
there also existed the Labour Party Northern Ireland Parliamentary Group which was made 
up o f twenty eight back bench Labour MPs as well as four Lords. Although this group had 
been dormant throughout most o f the seventies, after the election o f Jock Stallard as chair 
in October 1980 they began holding monthly meetings to stimulate debate on Irish policy 
and apply pressure on the front bench team to abandon bipartisanship with the Tories.®*?
The Campaign for Democracy in Ulster was still operating with Kevin McNamara as 
chairman and Lord Fenner Brockway as president but the campaign was wound down in 
the early eighties. Despite the existence o f these groups, pressure on the leadership to 
change course on Irish policy was in fact minimal. Nevertheless one can safely assume that 
within the leadership the argument that as a socialist party Labour could not continue 
bipartisanship with their historic enemies in such an important policy area, must have 
carried some considerable weight especially now that they had the luxury of being in 
opposition. The decision by the NEC to set up the Northern Ireland Study Group did seem 
to satisfy the left-wing critics for a short period o f time. Instead o f attacking the leadership 
over bipartisanship and their record on Ireland in government, a lot o f these people were 
prepared to wait and see what the Study Group would come up with and to concentrate
Irish Times, 3 April 1980.
Labour Weekly, 4 July 1980.
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their efforts on trying to stimulate debate in the direction of considering Irish re-unification 
as the best solution to the Ulster problem.
Within left-wing debate, pro-Union sentiment still existed after 1979 and was fairly 
influential. The Campaign for Labour Representation in Northern Ireland (CLR) emerged 
in the late seventies with a number o f ex-B&ICO members making up an organisation 
based in Belfast, which included people fi*om both unionist and nationalist backgrounds. 
Their main demand was for the British Labour Party to organise and contest elections in 
Northern Ireland. For this reason they were to become the Labour Committee on Ireland’s 
main ideological opponents throughout the eighties. The LCI and many on the Labour left 
dismissed the CLR as pro-Unionist because they did not envisage an all-Ireland solution but 
sought to establish the British (rather than the Irish) Labour Party within the six counties. 
Despite this opposition the CLR became a very persistent lobby group; they worked hard at 
lobbying MPs and got their message across in the letters pages o f Tribune and Labour 
Weekly to a far greater extent than did the LCI.^? One of their supporters was the MP 
Frank Allaun, who presented to the NEC Study Group a paper arguing for extension o f the 
Labour Party to Northern Ireland.**'* Dick Barry also continued to exert considerable 
influence as a key advocate o f the ‘two nation’ theory, in the face o f growing interest in the 
idea o f Irish re-unification. As the party’s research officer on Irish policy, he was a non- 
NEC member o f the Northern Ireland Study Group and as a member o f the Campaign for 
Labour Representation, was able to carry the argument for Ulster integration into British 
party politics right into Labour’s new think tank. Although many on the left, most notably 
Kevin McNamara, vilified Barry as a pro-Unionist®*® because he believed in Ulster
See Labour Weekly and Tribune from May 1979 until tlie early 1980s.
**'* Allaun, F. ‘Wliy the Establishment of tlie British Labour Party in Nortliern Ireland Could Help Bring 
Peace’ (1981).
®*® McNamara, K. Interview April 1995.
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integration with Britain and argued for it in the Study Group, Barry himself has argued that 
his views were based on two main factors: first, he was recognising Protestant dislike for 
the ‘theocratic state’ in the South and secondly he believed integration with Britain was the 
best way to guard against a return to Stormont, integration therefore being an anti-Unionist 
position because the Ulster Unionists were an essentially parochial party who did not want 
integration with Britain.®*® Despite this there can be little doubt that Barry was certainly 
unsympathetic to Irish nationalism and so what is curious, is the fact that he did in fact sign 
up to the final NEC statement in 1981, which advocated Irish re-unification.
Although Tony Benn had sat in the Cabinet when British troops were deployed to 
Northern Ireland in August 1969 and continued in government and opposition throughout 
the seventies to remain completely silent on the subject of Northern Ireland, he was to 
become the most important advocate o f British withdrawal during the early eighties. 
During the struggle within the Labour movement, between socialists and social democrats, 
Tony Benn became the undisputed leader o f the Labour left and along with championing 
many other causes, he chose to join the slowly emerging movement demanding British 
withdrawal. According to his diaries, Benn had been quietly sympathetic to the idea o f a 
united Ireland for some time,^? but only in early 1980 did he decide to go public with his 
beliefs. On the 18 March 1980 he addressed a meeting at Westminster Central Hall, on the 
future o f socialism entitled the ‘Debate o f the Decade’, during which he was heckled by 
anti-H Block demonstrators and so responded by stating his opposition to the continued 
partition of Ireland.®* To suggest that Benn decided to ally himself with the troops out 
cause simply because in opposition he could seize the opportunity to do so, ignores the fact
®®Bany, D. Interview March 1996.
®? Benn, T. Against the Tide (1989) pp. 164, 273 & 457 and Conflicts o f  Interest (1990) p.259. 
Irish Times, 19 March 1980 & Tribune, 21 March 1980.
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that he had remained silent when in opposition during the early seventies. A more credible 
explanation might be that unlike 1970, 1980 witnessed a showdown between left and right 
for the soul o f the Labour movement and so Benn had to embrace all issues o f importance 
to the left, in order to present a comprehensive set o f ideas upon which to build a new 
radically socialist Labour Party. As early as February 1980 the Irish Times was aware o f  
what Benn was up to on the NEC and stated that the Labour leadership deduced that he 
was “trying to play up what may prove to be a popular left-wing cause.”®® There can be no 
doubt that Tony Benn’s decision to go public with his views in early 1980 was a major 
coup for those seeking an end to bipartisanship and the troops out lobby in general, because 
Benn’s many rank and file supporters would have undoubtedly been influenced by his 
statements and because he was the most high ranking politician to advocate British 
withdrawal to date.
The NEC Study Group on Northern Ireland was finally set up in March 1980 and 
was comprised o f four MPs: Eric Heffer, Joan Maynard, Joan Lester and Jo Richardson; 
four trade unionists: Alex Kitson (chairperson o f the group), Alan Hadden, Doug Hoyle 
and Neville Hough as well as Tony Saunois (a Militant supporter) representing the Young 
Socialists.*®® The MPs were broadly anti-partition whilst the trade unionists were much 
more cautious about the border question and Tony Saunois, as a Militant, was more 
sympathetic to the ‘two nation’ theory. In addition to the NEC members and four research 
officers, the group had eight co-opted MPs, four from the shadow cabinet: Merlyn Rees, 
Roy Mason, Stan Orme and Brynmor John; and four from the PLP: Don Concannon, Jock 
Stallard, Martin Flannery and Stan Thome.*®* Although Geoff Bell states that
®® Ibid. (Martin Cowley article) 16 Feb. 1980.
Labour Weekly, II April 1980.
*®* Labour Party NEC, RD: 432/June 1980.
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“membership o f the study group was evenly balanced between pro- and anti­
partitionists”*®? in actual fact there were far more anti-nationalist minded people on the 
group with only the four NEC MPs and three o f the back bench MPs holding a clearly anti­
partition line. It was also incorrect for Bell to talk o f Dick Barry ousting David Lowe (the 
International Research Assistant) from the group in order to create a majority in favour of 
partition.*®? The reality was that, first o f all David Lowe was not ousted, but in actual fact 
remained with the group right through to the completion of the 1981 policy statement.*®'* 
Secondly, the very notion o f an individual being ousted to change the political complexion 
of the group is ludicrous in the light o f the fact that at many o f the meetings less than half 
of the group often attended*®® and if all the anti-partition members had wanted to, they 
could have usually formed a majority by simply making certain that they all attended. At 
the first NEC meeting convened to set up the Study Group there was immediate pressure 
from the left in the shape o f Labour’s Home Policy Committee, which was chaired by Tony 
Benn. Benn wanted the Group to begin work on the basis o f tiying to draw up a policy 
designed to achieve Irish re-unification. Although the NEC voted down the suggestion, it 
was evident that there was going to be continual pressure on the study group to drop 
bipartisanship and support a united Ireland. This immediate pressure also served to show 
up the group’s divisions, because while Eric Heffer and Joan Maynard were sympathetic to 
Benn’s suggestion, it was the trade unionists who were most opposed to the idea with Alex
V.
Kitson arguing on behalf o f the T&GWU that to adopt a pro-nationalist agenda would only 
serve to divide theirs and other trade unions’ Northern Ireland membership*®® (this was an 
argument that trade unionists were to use consistently throughout the eighties). The group
*®?Bell, G. op cit. p.141.
*®?Ibid. p.141.
*®'*NEC Study Group on Northern Ireland, minutes: 30 June 1981. 
*®® Ibid. minutes: 15 April 1980 to 30 June 1981.
Irish Times, op cit. 16 Feb. 1980.
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also had to take into consideration the fact that, in Brynmor John, the Labour Party had a 
spokesperson who was every bit as committed to bipartisanship and opposed to re­
unification as any o f his predecessors.*®?
The Northern Ireland Study Group began its work against the backdrop o f a party 
beginning to take an interest in the Irish question and an enthusiasm for the sentiments o f  
Irish nationalism. Along with Tony Benn’s new found enthusiasm and the emergence o f  
the LCI, by the spring o f 1980 it could be seen that a new mood was emerging: the Party’s 
official paper noted that “there is a growing feeling among constituency party members and 
back bench MPs that a return to a united Ireland is the only long term option.”*®* In the 
March the Greater London Labour Party adopted a composite motion demanding that the 
Parliamentary Labour Party commit itself to a policy o f withdrawal from Northern 
Ireland*®® and at the Labour Party’s special conference, set up by the leadership at the end 
o f May, calls for a united Ireland were receiving rapturous applause.**® In a Commons 
debate on the Emergency Provisions (Northern Ireland) Act, Martin Flannery took the 
opportunity to point to the new climate emerging in the Party: “It is not the climate that has 
emerged from the two Front Bench speeches. It is a climate that is developing throughout 
the Labour movement in which the bipartisan policy has been severely questioned.”*** It is 
also evident that the Tories were growing concerned with these developments by the 
summer o f 1980; they produced a policy document which warned that they were going to 
lose the support of the Labour Party in Parliament because o f the back bench pressure to 
end bipartisanship.**? In the June the growing crisis in the Northern Ireland prisons was
*®?Ibid. 16 June 1980.
Labour Weekly, 4 July 1980,
*®®Ibid. (letter by delegate), 14 March 1980. 
**®Ibid. 8 June 1980.
I ll  Hansard, Vol. 969 Col. 446 (22 July 1980).
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finally forced onto the Labour leadership’s agenda. Previously there had only been the odd 
protest about the prisons crisis with Clive Soley calling for reforms to be made in the Maze 
prison and Tam Dalyell asking the Secretary o f State to consider political status for some of 
those convicted in the Diplock courts, i*? But it was the Home Policy Committee, chaired 
by Tony Benn, which forced the issue by presenting to the NEC a resolution calling for the 
abolition o f  the Diplock courts and “interrogation centres”, the right for prisoners to wear 
their own clothes, the right to receive visits, the right to reading, writing and education 
facilities, the right to trade union rates o f pay and to trade union membership, as well as 
stating that “we are opposed to the repression and torture in the prisons o f Northern 
Ireland”.!I'* Two weeks later the NEC voted to adopt the resolution in full and, although 
the motion stopped short o f arguing for political status for paramilitary prisoners, was 
consequently denounced in the strongest terms by both Margaret Thatcher and James 
Callaghan, as well as by Merlyn Rees and Roy Mason.**® The National H Block/Armagh 
Committee, which had been set up by Sinn Fein and others, was beginning to gather 
momentum and many in both Ireland and Britain were prepared to lend support to the 
campaign on humanitarian grounds; especially as the prisoners did now appear to be 
suffering in appalling conditions. Benn and his supporters were no doubt aware o f this and 
were therefore determined to get the issue on to the Labour Party’s agenda even though it 
was an issue which appeared at the time to be potentially divisive. Despite the undoubted 
existence o f pro-nationalist sentiment in the Labour movement, there did existed no 
sympathy for Irish republicans who were prepared to use violence for political ends. It was
Hansard, Vol. 975 Col. 1185 (11 Dec. 1979) & Vol. 982 Col. 623 (3 April 1980).
**4 NEC Home Policy Committee, minutes: 9 June 1980.
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for this reason that few were to support the demand for political status, but the suffering of 
the prisoners did prick the conscience o f a movement that held civil and human rights dear.
As the mood o f the Labour Party began to shift towards favouring Irish re­
unification, so an even more stark divide became evident between those sympathetic to a 
pro-unionist attitude to the Ulster question and those who were now arguing that a united 
Ireland was the obviously natural socialist demand. The former group started to become 
more vocal as they saw the direction that the Party seemed to be moving in and were 
arguing that forcing the North into union with the theocratic Republic was a backward 
step, with Irish nationalism in general being portrayed as downright reactionary. This was 
the era o f confrontational politics and maximalist demands and it very often appeared that 
the two sides simply saw the other’s arguments as spurious and fictitious: the united 
Irelanders seemed to have no appreciation o f Protestant fears about the Catholic dominated 
state in the South, while the pro-partitionists seemed to be oblivious to the plight of  
Northern nationalists. This can be partly explained by the fact that at this stage republican 
support had not yet been revealed in electoral terms and so republican arguments were 
easily dismissed as actually having very little support. During this period Tribune *s regular 
columnist on Irish affairs was John de Courcey Ireland who continually denounced 
nationalism, criticised the pope as “the reactionary prelate”, and condemned the united 
Irelanders in the Labour movement for trying “to force those million Ulster Protestants to 
climb onto the obscurantist religio-bandwagon”.**® The failure to appreciate the ‘other 
side’s’ arguments within the debate in the Labour movement, almost mirrored the kind o f  
zero-sum politics and intolerant polemic that took place in Northern Ireland. One o f the 
key protagonists, the CLR, were certainly growing anxious at the new trend in the
**® Tribune 7 Sept. 1979.
! \
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movement. When the Study Group’s first discussion document was printed in Labour 
Weekly in early 1981 to gauge the membership’s opinion, in the same edition Ben Cosin (of 
the CLR) had an article printed showing a change in tactics to cope with the new mood. 
The CLR were arguing that, rather than hinder any progress towards re-unification, the 
Labour Party’s presence in Ulster would be conducive to that process: “We should not put 
nationalist slogans before socialist policies; and it is imperialist arrogance to assume that an 
act o f  British policy can unify Ireland... most crucially, however, Ireland can be united only 
through co-operation between the Catholic and the Protestant sections o f the working class 
in Northern Ireland; and only our party can do that”.**? No doubt the CLR was hopefiil 
that Dick Barry’s influence in the working party would ensure that the NEC agreed to 
extend Labour Party organisation to Northern Ireland and reports did begin to appear 
throughout the year indicating that just such an outcome was in fact likely.***
The Study Group, although sensitive to the growing mood in the party, was 
nevertheless mostly made up of people broadly unsympathetic to Irish nationalism. It was 
agreed at the very first meeting o f the group, that during any visits to Ireland members 
were not to meet with Provisional Sinn Fein unless the meeting took place south o f the 
border.**® In any event no meeting ever took place with either the Provisionals, the Irish 
Republican Socialist Party or the Irish Independence Party despite three visits to Ireland by 
members o f the Study Group.*?® After two visits to Northern Ireland, in 1980, to consult 
with political organisations, the Group had met eleven labour and trade union groups, three 
unionist parties, two leftist groups: the CLR and the Workers Party/Republican Clubs, one 
nationalist party: the SDLP, the security forces, the Peace People and the Civil Rights
Labour Weekly, 9 Jan. 1981.
***Ibid. 12 Dec. 1980.
**® NEC Study Group on Northern Ireland, minutes: 15 April 1980. 
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A s s o c i a t i o n .  ^21 light o f the fact that only a tiny minority o f the people that the group met
could be described as nationalist, one can safely assume that re-unification was not looking 
like such a viable option at this stage and indeed Labour Weekly was to report that “in its 
visits to both the North and the Republic, the working party has come under strong 
pressure from the trade unions and the Northern Ireland Labour Party to avoid a united 
Ireland p o s i t i o n ” . 1 2 2  in addition to this all the labour and trade union groups that were met, 
with the exception o f the IT&GWU, were also opposed to the granting o f political status 
for paramilitary prisoners, as were all the political p a r t i e s .  ^ 23 Throughout 1980, despite the 
change o f mood within the rank and file and the pressure of Labour’s Parliamentary Group 
on Northern Ireland, it was by no means a fore gone conclusion that the Study Group 
would decide in favour o f a united Ireland. In fact considering the political complexion of  
the Group and the fact that early 1981 saw the departure o f the left-wingers Joan Lester 
and Eric Heffer from the Study Group in order to concentrate on other Party work^24 
appeared very probable that any new policy would not include a commitment to re­
unification.
The Labour Party’s annual conference in October 1980 witnessed the composite 
motions calling for British withdrawal and an end to bipartisanship easily defeated and 
Brynmor John made a lengthy speech explaining his opposition to a united Ireland and his 
commitment to maintaining b i p a r t i s a n s h i p .  1 2 5  Despite the resignation o f James Callaghan 
shortly after the October conference and the success o f the left’s candidate Michael Foot in 
defeating the favourite, Denis Healey, to become Labour Party leader, this apparent left- 
wing shift did not result in any change in the party’s position on Ireland. In his shadow
^21 Interim Report o f the work o f tlie Northern Ireland Study Group, RD: 490/July 1980.
Labour Weekly, 3 Oct. 1980.
123 Labour Party Home Policy Committee, RD: 614/Dec. 1980.
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cabinet re-shuffle Foot replaced Brynmor John with Don C o n c a n n o n .126 Concannon was a 
long standing advocate o f bipartisanship and had served under Roy Mason at the NIO from 
1976 to 1979, but nevertheless he was a livelier and more confrontational figure than 
Brynmor John in the House o f Commons. Despite being disliked by the left he was 
privately in favour o f the idea o f Irish unity, but having served in Palestine with the British 
army he was greatly sympathetic to the security forces in Northern Ireland and bitterly 
opposed the Provisional IRA. Concannon readily admits to a personal hatred o f the 
Provisional and has argued that he believed in upholding the Westminster tradition of 
responding to argument and persuasion but not responding to duress; consequently he was 
determined not to respond to republican demands on either political matters or the prisons 
i s s u e .  127 On a personal level he was well liked in Northern Ireland constitutional political 
circles, often being on first name terms with many o f Northern Ireland’s political figures. 1 2  ^
In January 1981 the Study Group finally published its discussion document, ‘Northern 
Ireland: the Next Steps’. The problem which is immediately apparent with this document 
and with the whole basis for the group’s deliberations on the constitutional question, is that 
they had confined themselves to the ‘straight jacket’ o f considering basically just four 
constitutional arrangements. Ever since the very first meeting o f the Study Group in April 
1980 the ‘Programme of Work’ document, which was put before the meeting, ensured that 
the Group continued to examine its four suggestions, which were 1) a devolved 
government, power sharing or otherwise, 2) integration with Great Britain, 3) some form of 
independence for the province and 4) re-unification with the s o u t h .  129 The one change with 
the ‘Next Steps’ document was the inclusion o f the idea o f joint sovereignty, or as it was
Labour Weekly, 12 Dec. 1980.
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called at the time “shared responsibility” for Northern Ireland between Britain and the 
R e p u b l i c .  2^0 The problem with preparing a ‘shopping list’ o f solutions such as this was that 
when the discussion document was published in Labour Weekly and circulated amongst the 
constituencies and the trade unions to gauge opinion throughout the movement, the 
recipients o f  such a document were restricted to choosing one o f the five options as a 
replacement for direct rule. With the Anglo-Irish Agreement o f 1985, the Downing Street 
Declaration o f 1993 and finally the ‘Good Friday Agreement’ o f 1998, the debate on 
Northern Ireland has steadily matured to the point where it is almost universally accepted 
that the idea o f choosing one simplistic constitutional arrangement has had to be rejected in 
favour o f  realising that a negotiated settlement must be sought, which involves all parties 
and which may well involve a combination o f various constitutional and governmental 
arrangements. The first draft o f the ‘Next Steps’ paper was drawn up about six months 
before its publication and yet hardly any alterations were made to it apart from the inclusion 
of the joint sovereignty p r o p o s a l ,  what is curious is that despite monthly meetings, little 
was done to revise and to expand upon these basic options and the independence idea was 
kept even though it was such an impracticable and economically unrealisable plan.
One o f the immediate consequences o f the Study Group’s discussion document was 
a swift and angry response from the anti-partitionists. As well as complaints in Labour 
Weekly *s letters pages over the alleged pro-unionist nature o f the document, there came a 
vociferous attack from Kevin McNamara. Initially these attacks seemed to be rather 
excessive because the ‘Next Steps’ app^red a modest paper which basically set out five 
areas for members to consider: 1) the economy, 2) a Bill o f Rights, 3) the constitutional 
question, 4) security and 5) organising the Labour Party in the North. What seems to have
130 'Northern Ireland: tlie Next Steps’ as published in Labour Weekly, 9 Jan. 1981.
2^1 Labour Party, ‘Draft Consultative Paper on Northern Ireland’, RD: 506/Aug. 1980.
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aggravated McNamara was the language o f the document and probably the knowledge that 
it had been drafted by Dick Barry. For example, on the economy it was suggested that a 
gas pipeline be built from Britain to the North rather than from the Republic and, crucially, 
the question o f re-unification was concluded with the idea that to achieve unity “The party 
would have to make it clear it does not believe the decision should be left to the Northern 
Ireland people alone; and that it would seek Parliamentary approval for the expulsion of  
Northern Ireland from the United K i n g d o m .” ^22 Tbe term ‘expulsion from the UK’ is very 
much a Unionist phrase used to dismiss calls for British withdrawal as undemocratic and 
authoritarian. Within Ulster politics people are very sensitive to the language that people 
use; for example. Unionists are very quick to dismiss anything that either government 
suggests which uses republican language such as ‘demilitarisation’ or ‘six counties’, so the 
left in Britain had learned how to recognise someone o f the ‘two nation’ school o f thought 
or o f the ‘socialism before nationalism’ persuasion. McNamara dismissed the whole 
document as a ‘Unionist paper’ and attacked the fact that it had included the integration 
suggestion which was “a recipe for continuing death and tragedy in Northern Ireland, a 
further corruption o f our civil liberties, a threat to public security in Great Britain, a drain 
on the treasuries o f the UK and the Republic o f Ireland and a continuous embarrassment to 
whatever British Government we may have in the councils o f the w o r l d . ”  ^ ^3 jje went on to 
complain that little effort was made to look at all-Ireland arrangements and, interestingly, 
he advocated that Labour should improve relations with Dublin as a major part o f its future 
policy. This, o f course, was the direction that both Labour and the Tories went in 
throughout the eighties. Dick Barÿ was well aware o f the distrust that many people had in 
him and wrote later on that “I got the feeling that Kevin McNamara was unhappy about my
122 Ibid.
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position as Party Officer on Northern Ireland affairs... He also believed me to be a unionist, 
even an Orangeman, hence his reference to an Orange tract [to describe the ‘Next Steps’]. 
I had become used to this kind o f abuse by now.”i24 it is probably fair to say that 
McNamara was reflecting the feelings o f the PLP back bench Northern Ireland Group, 
because their anticipation that the Study Group would move towards favouring a re­
unification position had been put in doubt due the tone o f this the first paper to be 
published by the group after nearly a years work.
What McNamara and the Northern Ireland Parliamentary Group were, o f course, 
unaware of, was the immense impact that the H Block hunger strikes were to have on 
political opinion. The fears that the anti-partitionists had during the early months of 1981, 
with the publication o f the ‘Next Steps’ and the departure o f Joan Lester and Eric Heffer 
from the Study Group, were to be reversed as the political climate began to change not just 
in Ireland, but throughout Britain as well. Margaret Thatcher was the first Prime Minister 
to depart from the post-war consensus and was intent on confronting organised labour, 
thus precipitating the emergence o f a much more raw and confrontational form o f class 
politics. It was in this volatile and turbulent political environment that the left began to 
enjoy a brief but dramatic revival. The establishment o f the Social Democratic Party as a 
right-wing break away group from the Labour Party appeared to many on the left to 
indicate that Labour could return to its socialist principles without the hindrance o f the 
right-wing/social democrat elements, thus finalising the victory o f the socialists over the 
social democrats in the battle for the soul o f the Party. A political realignment was taking 
place and the Labour left sought to ensure that the Party would take up the role o f standing 
for a clear socialist agenda and to represent the working class in much the same way as was
Labour & Trade Union Review, Oct. 1994.
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done at the beginning o f the century. The inner city riots in Brixton, Toxteth, Handsworth 
and Moss Side during 1981 helped to generate an element of panic amongst conservative 
forces but a certain degree o f interest amongst the far left, many o f whom believed that 
they were witnessing the break up o f the post-war capitalist order. The inner city riots 
brought the issues o f racism, inner city decay and the question o f an emerging, lawless 
‘under-class’ onto the political agenda. The political order in Britain in 1981 could be said 
to have been in a state o f flux, the far left almost succeeded in taking complete control of 
the Labour Party with Tony Benn failing to secure the deputy leadership by just one per 
cent o f the vote at the October conference (but never the less secured the votes o f many of 
the major unions, most notably the T&GWU)^25 ^nd an optimistic left were to see positive 
implications in almost every crisis; the Irish hunger strikes were to prove no exception. To 
many on the left the situation in the H Blocks simply helped to add to the sense o f crisis in 
the country and combined with the inner city disturbances they were seen as yet another 
welcome thorn in the side o f the Thatcher government.
There can be no doubt that the hunger strikes had an immense impact on attitudes 
toward the Northern Ireland problem, not least on left-wing attitudes to republicanism and 
therefore republican aims; but the impact should not be exaggerated, it must be looked at in 
the context o f a Labour movement whose attitude had begun to change more than a year 
earlier. Within Parliament the official Labour Party line was to fully back the government’s 
position on the prisons crisis and Concannon asked the Secretary o f State from the outset 
not to bother making statements on the hunger s t r i k e s .  ^^6 this reason the issues 
involved were never properly debated throughout the hunger strikes and, as if to make a 
point, the PLP took the unprecedented step (two weeks into Sands’ fast) o f allotting its
2^5 Report of tlie 1981 Labour Party Conference. 
Hansard, Vol. 1000, Cols 131-2 (3 March 1981).
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own debating time in the Commons to discuss not the political crisis or the growing unrest 
throughout the province but the Northern Ireland e c o n o m y .  ^ 27 phg Militant faction within 
the Labour movement also underestimated the impact o f the hunger strikes and in fact was 
optimistically predicting the demise o f sectarian politics at the time that Sands was 
beginning his fast. Shortly before Sands’ by-election victory in Fermanagh/South Tyrone 
Militant argued that “the Provisionals or the H-Blocks campaign through which they are 
working are completely incapable o f mobilising mass support and o f exerting mass pressure 
on the authorities to force concessions.”i28 Even after his election they were clinging to the 
idea that there was a ‘new mood’ o f non-sectarianism in the province but after Sands death 
they finally conceded that massive support and sympathy for the hunger strikers had indeed 
d e v e l o p e d .  ^29 The problem with a group such as Militant was that its analysis was based 
solely on social or class issues and they refused to recognise the importance that the two 
communities in Northern Ireland attached to their national identities. As a Trotskyite 
grouping it was opposed to nationalism but because o f this they failed to recognise the 
importance attached to national identity by the working classes within Ireland. Therefore, 
whilst dismissing the Provos activities as ‘individual terrorism’ (Leninist terminology), they 
persistently argued that the solution lay in uniting the Protestant and Catholic working 
classes around a Labour/trade union campaign to seek improvements in areas such as 
housing, health and jobs. This attitude was not just confined to Militant; many in the 
Labour movement were repulsed by sectarian politics and wanted to believe that the 
northern Irish working class were being duped by their political leaders. But just as the 
UWC strike had brought home the reality o f Protestant working class support for unionism
127 Ibid. Vol. 1, Col. 290 (18 March 1981).
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so the hunger strikes, and the subsequent electoral successes for Sinn Fein, were to awaken 
many in the Labour movement to the reality o f Catholic working class support for the 
Provisionals. It was not just the enhancing o f the sentimental support for Irish nationalism 
and for the ideal o f a united Ireland following the death o f each hunger striker, but the 
show o f popular support for Bobby Sands through the ballot box in the Fermanagh/South 
Tyrone by-election which in actual fact had the greatest impact on attitudes. Although on 
polling day Don Concannon had warned that “a vote for Mr Sands is a vote o f approval for 
the La Mon massacre, the murder o f Lord Mountbatten at Warrenpoint [sic] and all the 
other senseless murders” the fact that so many voters had ignored such pleas and given 
Sands such a sizeable endorsement led to a major rethink throughout the Labour 
movement. In fact the historic impact on Labour thinking is probably best summed up by 
the Labour Weekly editorial which followed the by-election, but was written before Sands’ 
death: “Northern Ireland is at long last seen as a political question, by both politicians and 
the public.” "^^  ^ This curious statement (which begs the question, what is considered a 
political question if not the Northern Ireland problem?) is an indication o f how the by- 
election altered Labour’s decade old view o f the Provisionals as a small group o f terrorists 
in much the same mould as the Red Army Faction in Germany or the Red Brigades in Italy 
or as Tom Pendry described them two years earlier: ‘not a bona fide political movement’ 
but ‘a small, dedicated group o f fanatics’. For so long the lack o f empathy with the 
Provisionals was due to the fact that unlike the Labour movement they did not present 
themselves to the electorate in order to gain a mandate, they therefore did not sit on local 
councils, they did not work within the community, they did not work with the trade unions 
in the workplace and they insisted on using violence not just against the security forces but
Hansard, Vol. 2 Col. 1101 (9 April 1981). 
Labour Weekly, 24 April 1981.
56
against elected political opponents. The hunger strikes by contrast, were an example of 
non-violent passive resistance which even led Dick Barry to reflect, after his visit to the 
dying Sands, for what political cause would he starve himself to d e a t h ?  Clive Soley - a 
future front bench spokesperson - has argued that the two key effects o f the hunger strike 
were firstly “it undermined the argument o f those who were saying that these were just a 
bunch o f psychopathic killers” and secondly the government’s political direction and 
attitude had to change from that o f just crisis management “because the international 
impact o f it was so powerful.” Indeed he has argued that only with the appointment of 
James Prior in September 1981 was crisis management for the first time dropped and a 
more thoughtful political position a d o p t e d .  *'^2 addition to this, the fact that the majority 
o f the people in a border constituency were prepared to elect a dying IRA man and later 
elect, a republican candidate, Owen Carron (due to the law being amended to prevent 
prisoners standing for election) with an even larger vote, led many in the Labour 
movement, and most importantly those on the Study G r o u p , t o  reconsider their view that 
there existed only a sentimental attachment to republicanism in Ireland. They began to 
consider that having believed for so long that a united Ireland was impossible because o f  
Protestant opposition, that perhaps it was unrealistic to try and maintain the Union in the 
face o f a combination o f continuing violent opposition, impressive electoral opposition and 
a dramatic display o f passive resistance which was creating adverse publicity for Britain 
throughout the international community.
The first group to be set up within the Labour movement in support o f prison 
reform in Northern Ireland, as a result o f the H Block campaign, was ‘Charter 80’ which
4^2 Bany, D. Interview, March 1996.
^^ 2^ Soley, C. Interview Dec. 1996.
Study Group on Nortliern Ireland, minutes: 1 & 30 June 1981.
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was launched in September 1980 and had the support o f Labour MPs Jock Stallard, Eric 
Heffer and Tony Benn.^^s jhen in April 1981, after Bobby Sands had begun his hunger 
strike, about twenty Labour MPs launched a ‘Don’t Let Irish Prisoners Die’ campaign 
which included Denis Skinner, Ernie Roberts, Bob Parry and Denis Canavan, as well as 
Lord Gifford and Peter Hain.*'^ '’ In March Foot replaced Tom Pendry with Clive Soley as 
the Party’s assistant spokesperson on Northern Ireland in a move which appeared to 
indicate that the official Labour line was to become more flexible on the H-blocks issue, but 
in actual fact bipartisanship was to be maintained throughout the hunger strikes. 
Concannon had specifically requested that Soley be given the post in the full knowledge 
that he was one o f the new generation who sought a break from the bipartisanship o f the 
past and wanted a re-unification policy adopted. Soley has since explained that Concannon 
wanted a realistic united Ireland policy but did not know how to get there and so it was to 
be the Hammersmith MP’s job to do exactly that. Clive Soley, whilst being deeply 
committed to Irish unity, was also an ex-probation officer and was determinedly opposed to 
political status not least because he believed that to do otherwise would be irresponsible 
because it would open the floodgates for all sorts o f convicts to claim that their crimes had 
been politically m o t i v a t e d . 4^? when Sands finally died on 5 May, Michael Foot’s response 
was to lend his support to the uncompromising position that Margaret Thatcher had taken 
throughout the hunger strike. Foot and Concannon issued a joint statement shortly after 
Sands’ death declaring that “His death was his own decision. It was unnecessary because 
parliament will never grant the demands o f the p r o t e s t e r s . . . I n  the House o f Commons, 
although Michael Foot received applause for his support for the government, both front
Irish Times, 20 Sept. 1980. 
Irish Post, 18 April 1981. 
Soley, C. Interview Dec. 1996. 
Labour Weekly, 8 May 1981.
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benches were attacked by the back bench Labour MP Patrick Duffy (hardly a left-winger) 
who said “Is the Prime Minister aware that one o f the difficulties in Ireland is that there has 
always been too much ‘me too-ism’ in the House on this subject? Is she aware o f the 
widespread impression overseas - notably on the part o f the New York Times, until recently 
a stout ally o f this country’s policy on Northern Ireland - that the death o f Mr. Sands whom 
you, Mr. Speaker, have already described this afternoon as a fellow Member o f Parliament 
will be due to the right hon. Lady’s intransigence.” '^^  ^ Kevin McNamara had wanted to 
deliver a much more condemnatory speech, but by leaving it to Patrick Duffy he believed 
that the anger felt even by moderate opinion on the back benches was articulated quite 
adequately.
The political atmosphere grew very tense after Sands’ death; the Labour Party 
headquarters at Walworth Road was occupied by anti-H Block demonstrators for a number 
of hoursi5i and Don Concannon was condemned for visiting Sands shortly before his death 
to explain Labour’s opposition to his demands: John Hume described it as “a cheap and 
offensive publicity stunt”152 and Jock Stallard denounced it as “insensitive”.i53 However, 
Concannon has consistently refused to divulge exactly what was said during the visit except 
to say that he would concede that Sands was not simply a thug “he was different” and that 
he did at least present him with a rather more philosophical argument than the type of  
rethoric that he had grown used to from republicans. i54 Tony Benn, who was now calling 
for the deployment o f UN troops (a statement which drew criticism from Ken
Hansard Vo\. 4 Col. 17 (5 May 1981).
150 McNamara, K. Interview, April 1995. He had wanted to deliver a speech based on the O ’Donovan 
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Livingstone) 155 and had previously led demands for Bobby Sands to be entitled to take his 
Commons seat, had consequently incurred the wrath of the leadership, with Michael Foot 
asking Benn not to make any further public comments on the Northern Ireland situation. i5^  
In addition to this the Labour leadership was coming in for criticism from the Irish 
community, especially the Irish members o f the Party. Steve Bundred wrote to Foot to 
complain that the recent GLC elections (in which he had won Islington North) had 
highlighted “the damage which is being done to our party’s standing within the Irish 
community by the attitude which you and Don Concannon have displayed on the Northern 
Ireland problem. When the ballot boxes were opened they showed a far higher percentage 
of spoilt papers than is normal and the majority of these were votes for Bobby Sands or for 
the H Blocks prisoners in general.” i57 There were undoubtedly growing divisions 
throughout the Labour Party in the midst o f the hunger strike crisis. The back bench PLP 
Northern Ireland Group were growing increasingly angry with Concannon and Foot. By 
mid-May Labour Weekly had reported that “The rift between the fi*ont bench leadership 
and MPs who want a shift away from a bipartisan policy widened this week... A motion 
blaming the governments intransigence for the death o f Bobby Sands last week was signed 
by 29 Labour M P s . ” ^58 At a lengthy Parliamentary Labour Party meeting on Northern 
Ireland, held the following week and attended by forty MPs, Foot was heavily criticised by 
all eighteen speakers for maintaining the policy o f b i p a r t i s a n s h i p .  5^9 ^ e^ House o f
Commons Martin Flannery enthusiastically stated that “recent events in Northern Ireland 
have created a new situation and that many people hope that the love-in on Northern
Irish Post, 20 June 1981.
5^6 Benn, T. The End o f  an Era (1992) p. 122 & p. 130. 
Irish Post, 23 May 1981.
Labour Weekly, 15 May 1981.
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Ireland between the two Front Benches will gradually be broken”. Despite left-wing 
disquiet. Tribune remained unsympathetic and having argued that political status could not 
be granted, not least because it would have to apply to the UDA and UVF also, argued 
after Sands’ death that “The IRA does not want that [a political solution] - it wants more 
martyrs.”!®^ The NEC, which was far to the left of the shadow cabinet, was also 
uncomfortable with the situation and the NEC Study Group, despite Concannon’s previous 
support for the government’s handling o f the crisis, agreed a resolution which stated that 
“the NEC also condemns the Tory Government’s stand on prison conditions and facilities” 
and “We are opposed to all forms o f repression and torture in the prisons o f Northern 
I r e l a n d .” ^ 2^ The hunger strikes represented an extremely vexing situation for the Labour 
leaders in similar fashion to the way that the miners strike was to do so three years later. 
They were well aware o f the fact that they were witnessing developments o f historic 
proportions and, as a Party still coming to terms with the recriminations from the left which 
followed the fall o f the Callaghan government, they were very conscious o f rank and file 
disquiet. For this reason Concannon’s decision not even to call for statements jftom the 
government in the Commons on the prisons crisis was probably a mistake in so far as that it 
conveyed to the rank and file an insensitive leadership working hand in glove with the 
Tories while international opinion was beginning to move against the government in a way 
in which Concannon had not probably foreseen back at the beginning o f March 1981.
Despite the groundswell o f opinion amongst the left and amongst the rank and file 
in general, in favour o f moving away from bipartisanship in the wake o f Sands’ death, the 
leadership was not prepared to do a U-turn in the middle o f the crisis. The Northern
Hansard, Vol. 4 Col. 878 (14 May 1981).
Tribune, 1 & 8 May 1981.
NEC Study Group on Northern Ireland, resolution, RD: 864/May 1981.
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Ireland Study Group on the other hand was beginning to think differently, in actual fact the 
impact that the hunger strikes had on the Group was such that most members on it appear 
to have made quite an astonishing ideological U-turn. Don Concannon, for example, had 
been arguing in the Study Group, only in the February, that a re-unification policy could 
not be adopted because it would actually set back the prospect o f unity by forty y e a r s .  1^2  
By the summer the majority o f the Study Group agreed that Party membership should not 
be extended to Ulster because “support for Labour Party organisation in Northern Ireland 
would be contrary to the principle o f a united Ireland, to which the majority o f the Study 
Group are committed” and stated that in the long term “we are moving towards a removal 
of the British presence.” Merlyn Rees also began to publicly question the continuation 
of British rule in I r e l a n d . *^ 5 in spite o f his initial ‘forty years’ theory, Don Concannon 
argued much later that the Study Group wanted to achieve “peace and reconciliation 
between the communities in Ireland. After a great deal o f thought and consultation we 
came to the conclusion that this desire can only be fulfilled when the border is removed.’’^^  ^
However on the opposition front bench he continued to take a rather more circumspect 
line. In response to Tony Benn’s call for the deployment o f UN troops and to the call by 
Militant and by the left-wing Labour MP Ron Brown for Northern Ireland to have “a 
people’s militia based on the trade union movement” Concannon told Parliament “I 
cannot believe that by replacing the Army with a United Nations force or a workers’ militia, 
or by unilaterally pulling out o f Northern Ireland, we shall promote peace or stability in the 
province. The deep seated differences between the communities there would never be 
resolved by taking an india-rubber to the map o f Ireland and trying to remove or erase the
6^3 njid minutes, 25 Feb. 1981.
Ibid. minutes, 1 June 1981.
Times, 18 May 1981.
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border. At the end o f the day the physical border is not the real issue. It is the border in 
the hearts and minds o f the people o f Northern Ireland to which we must address ourselves. 
There is little scope for the map maker in such a delicate conflict o f national identity.” 
This was said in the light o f continuing rumour over the likely united Ireland policy soon to 
be adopted by the Party and so Concannon perhaps chose a rather non-committal line. But 
clearly the atmosphere o f the time was concentrating minds to the extent that Don 
Concannon also made the interesting suggestion (in the light o f Labour’s joint sovereignty 
ideas eleven years later) that the 1949 Government o f Ireland Act should be amended: 
“Perhaps a formal recognition o f the aspirations for dual nationality o f the people of 
Northern Ireland would be no bad thing.”
The trade union movement, having carefully avoided the Irish question for so long, 
witnessed the beginning o f a slow but steady change in attitudes. The position o f the TUC, 
since the seventies, had been to only support a Bill o f Rights and to support non-sectarian 
campaigns such as the ‘Better Life For All’ trade union campaign in Northern Ireland. The 
only union to hold a clearly political position on Ireland was the Bakers’ Union, the 
BFAWU, which since the late seventies had supported a united I r e l a n d .  ^70 Despite the 
media image that developed during the mid to late eighties o f a trade union movement 
exerting unhelpful pressure on a Labour Party attempting to moderate and modernise its 
image, the trade unions actually played an important role in preventing Labour from 
adopting a radical, ‘troops out’ policy. With the Labour movement being dominated by the 
big industrial unions such as the T&GWU, the AEEU and the GMBATU, their votes 
always had a moderating influence on the question of Irish policy. One important reason
^^^Ibid. Vol. 7 Col. 1034 (2 July 1981).
Ibid. Col. 1035.
Britain and Ireland Human Rights Centre, Discrimination Human Rights & the Trade Unions: A Policy  
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for this was that these unions (along with many others such as UCATT, EEPTU, NUPE, 
ASTMS, UCW, COHSE, FBU and USD AW) had members in Northern Ireland and were 
therefore sensitive about the loyalist/nationalist divide within the region. Not only were 
they concerned about alienating their Protestant members in the event o f a pro-unity policy 
being adopted but there was also veiy real concern with some unions about the safety o f  
their members in general. For example, the Union o f Communication Workers which 
organised workers in the Post Offices o f Northern Ireland had, by the 1990s, fourteen o f its 
members killed over a twenty five year p e r i o d .  7^i The Confederation o f Health Service 
Employees had problems with their members being threatened or compromised within 
hospitals where suspected terrorists were being treated. The Fire Brigades’ Union also felt 
that it was in an extremely difficult position as its members were often threatened in riot 
situations and traumatised as a consequence o f dealing with the aftermath o f a bomb 
explosion or fire bombing in which human lives were lost. Many members had to take 
considerable time off as a result o f stress-related s ic k n e s s .  ^ 22 por these reasons and 
because o f unions such as the AEEU having a large loyalist membership especially in the 
Belfast shipyards, few in the trade union movement were as willing as many in the Labour 
Party were to adopt a pro-unity position.
The beginnings o f change began when, in early June 1981 the England and Wales 
Trades Councils’ conference voted in favour o f Irish re-unification despite a determined 
attempt by Len Murray, the TUC general secretary, to prevent such an outcome. Union 
attempts at promoting the Irish nationalist cause had not previously been tolerated; 
Tameside Trades Council had been disaffiliated from the TUC in 1980 after launching a
171 Ibid.
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‘Support the Irish People: Bring the War to Britain’ c a m p a i g n . i73 A year later the hunger 
strikes aroused far greater and more sympathetic interest in the Irish question. The 
Coventry Trades Council came out in support o f the hunger strikers in May 1981 and in 
early June there was a well attended trade union conference on the H Blocks and the Irish 
question held in East L o n d o n .  i74 At the England and Wales annual Trades Councils 
conference Len Murray argued that if the conference adopted the Greater London 
Association o f Trades Councils motion on Irish unity, such a decision would “imperil the 
lives o f our colleagues in Belfast” and that “The Northern Ireland Committee [of the Irish 
Congress o f Trade Unions] would be split from top to bottom if it were to identify with the 
political objective o f the motion, They have told us they would not do it.” 7^s Despite this 
the conference passed the motion unanimously and thus began a debate within the trade 
union movement which broke the long standing silence on the Irish question. The far 
reaching motion stated “Conference regards partition as the root cause o f the continuing 
violence and bloodshed in Northern Ireland and regards a united Ireland as the only lasting 
solution to the conflict” and went on to call for British withdrawal, scrapping o f the 
Diplock courts, scrapping o f the PTA and the Emergency Provisions Act as well as the 
disbanding o f the UDR and RUC.^^e Gradually small pressure groups emerged in various 
trade unions to push for a unity policy and later in the eighties a number o f unions without 
members in Northern Ireland, such as the NUR, NALGO and NUPE, began to support 
Irish re-unification. The first such pressure group was the Associated Staffs for a United 
Ireland which was set up in the white collar union, the Association o f Scientific, Technical 
and Managerial Staffs. At the ASTMS 1981 annual conference held shortly before Bobby
7^3 Tribune, 18 April 1980. 
174/ns/j Post, 30 May 1981. 
7^5 Times, 6 June 1981.
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Sands’ death, an ad hoc meeting was held on the hunger strikes as a result o f there having 
been no debate on Ireland and was attended by more than eighty delegates. Later in the 
year a further meeting was held to establish the ASUI and they claimed to have had about 
200 active supporters within the u n i o n .  7^7 This group continued to campaign within the 
union right up to the nineties, regularly producing their own journal. Unity, and enjoying 
relative success in keeping Northern Ireland on the agenda in the ASTMS as well as in the 
MSF which was established after a merger with TASS in 1988. Despite these important 
changes within the trade union movement it would be wrong to perceive this as being on a 
par with the growing trend in the Labour Party. Significant though they were, the changes 
in the unions were minimal and there did not exist in the movement figures comparable with 
Tony Benn, Ken Livingstone or even Kevin McNamara who provided a focus for 
campaigners for Irish unity. Indeed within certain unions such as the AEEU and the 
GMBATU there still remained virtually no debate on the national question, nor did that 
change for the duration o f the eighties and nineties.
James Callaghan, who had had considerable involvement in Irish affairs dating back 
to the beginning o f the troubles when he was Home Secretary, also began a major rethink 
on British involvement in Ireland after Sands’ death. For the first time people’s minds were 
really being concentrated by the hunger strikes and statesmen such as Callaghan who had 
been in a position to have an impact had never developed ideas that could be described as 
imaginative let alone radical. But in early July Callaghan delivered a speech to the House 
o f Commons in which he declared that “I believe that our well intentioned but paternalistic 
attitude has undermined the sense o f responsibility that the people o f Northern Ireland 
should feel for their own destinies. We see examples o f that every time a proposal is put
7^7 ASUI pamphlet by Hugh MacGrilleii, 1986.
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forward. The proposition that I wish to put is that Britain, from now on, should make it 
dear that she intends increasingly to regard the people of Northern Ireland as responsible 
for proposing and taking the initiatives to solve the problems o f how they are to live with 
one another.” He was reflecting the frustration felt by someone who had sat as the head of  
the government charged with trying to take care o f  the Northern Irish problem and it could 
be argued that he was coming to the natural and obvious conclusion from one in his 
position. He concluded that “My case today is that Britain should at once begin the 
process o f formulating a policy based on that principle... with the ultimate aim o f giving the 
people of Northern Ireland complete responsibility for their own affairs.” He envisaged 
that “a new Northern Ireland would emerge as a broadly independent State.” 7^8 it is also 
important to consider that such a bold plan would, o f course, appear so much easier from 
the opposition benches and Callaghan almost certainly would not have tried to go ahead 
with such an idea were he still in office. As has been said before if a Labour government 
were to try and implement such a plan they would be accused o f treachery by an alliance of  
the right-wing o f the Conservative Party, the right-wing press, and other elements within 
the British establishment; only a Tory government could achieve such an enormous 
constitutional change and so the suggestion was probably designed to be food for thought 
for the Conservative Party. In spite of Callaghan arriving at his conclusions as a result of 
watching an impasse develop in Northern Ireland over many years; as the eighties wore on, 
both government and Labour Party policy often tended towards a solution ‘from above’ 
with a desire to involve a further outside government, namely Dublin, in the shape o f the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement o f 1985 and the Labour Party’s ‘joint authority’ plans o f 1992.
Hansard, Vol. 7 Col. 1049.
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Labour’s Study Group had included independence as one o f its options and 
dismissed it early on. Independence for Northern Ireland was consequently never seriously 
considered by either the Conservative or Labour Party over the next sixteen years. 
However many o f those given responsibility for reformulating policy on Ireland had not 
experienced the years o f frustration that Callaghan had and those who were sympathetic to 
Irish nationalism envisaged an independent Ulster as the worst scenario because it appeared 
to mean a return to Stormont but without the option o f Westminster stepping back in if the 
Unionists once again felt they had carte blanche to do as they wanted with the Catholic 
community. One o f the factors which no doubt had a very great impact on the Study 
Group was the result o f the rank and file consultations which took place following the 
publication o f the ‘Next Steps’. The final report on the responses to the consultative 
document showed that over fifty per cent o f the submissions from Britain favoured the 
concept o f a united Ireland. There were ninety responses from CLPs and Labour Party 
branches, as well as eleven from various organisations in Northern Ireland and the report 
concluded that “Overall, the only clear cut patterns which emerge from the evidence favour 
the concept of a united Ireland, oppose the organisation of the Labour Party in Northern 
Ireland and call for the withdrawal o f t r o o p s . ” ^79 ^  vvould appear correct for Dick Barry 
(who drafted this final report) to argue that although the Labour Party was probably going 
to adopt some form o f re-unification policy anyway, the hunger strikes made the outcome 
inev i tabl e .F irs t  o f all the policy o f bipartisanship simply had to go; Britain’s socialist 
party could no longer be seen to be supporting a government that was coming under 
criticism from throughout the world, from sources as diverse as American Democrats, Lech
7^9 NEC Study Group, Report on the responses to the Consultative Paper ‘Northern Ireland: tlie Next 
Steps’, RD: 891/July 1981.
Barry, D. Interview, March 1996.
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Walensa and, o f course, the Irish government. Once it was accepted that a policy distinct 
from the Tories had to be adopted the choices available were limited and so a commitment 
to achieving re-unification in the long term had to be agreed because o f the current political 
climate as well as the restive left-wing mood within the Labour Party at the time.
The final statement presented to the 1981 conference by the NEC Study Group was 
agreed overwhelmingly (although by no means unani mous l y) . The  constitutional options 
finally offered were much the same as in the ‘Next Steps’ except that joint sovereignty had 
been discarded in favour o f the unusual idea o f a confederation o f the British Isles. This 
was rejected because the Group “concluded that it would be extremely difficult if not 
impossible to achieve.” Independence was not a realistic option economically, devolution 
(which the Tories favoured anyway) would mean a return to Stormont and so short term 
direct rule was to be replaced by power sharing, which was to be the block upon which 
consent for a united Ireland was to be b u i l t .  1 ^ 2 The decision to finally adopt a policy 
favouring a united Ireland was a major policy shift, after more than ten years o f the 
‘troubles’, six o f which were presided over by a Labour government. It can be argued that 
it was achieved as a consequence o f essentially three main factors. 1) The left-wing shift in 
the Labour Party, along with the departure o f centrists/social democrats into the SDP. 2) 
A desire to break with the past because the Rees/Mason era appeared to be wasted years in 
which Labour had continued with the same attitude to Ireland as the Tories, just as the 
1974-79 terms in office, as a whole, were considered wasted years. 3) The H Block hunger 
strikes and more importantly Bobby Sands’ election victory. Not surprisingly, the new 
‘unity by consent’ policy was not without its critics. Some on the left were very dismissive 
such as the back bench MP Chris Mullin who argued that “the document is in practice a
Report o f tlie 1981 Labour Party Conference.
1^2 Labour Party NEC, Nortliern Ireland: Statement to the 1981 Conference, pp. 5-9.
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fudge from end to end, ” ^^2 ciive Soley conceded that the policy was indeed “a 
compromise which most o f us could just about live with” but it was to be developed into 
quite a coherent long term strategy.**'  ^ Militant were broadly supportive o f the statement; 
they were enthusiastic because the language o f  the document was in line with their views 
on uniting the Catholic and Protestant working class and doing so on the basis o f socialist 
policies. They supported ‘unity by consent’ because they argued that otherwise “Capitalist 
unity forced on the Protestants would precipitate a civil war, the expulsion o f the Catholics 
from the north and the likely repartition o f the c o u n t r y . ’ ’ ^^^ (This is precisely what Kevin 
McNamara was to argue years later as shadow spokesperson on Northern Ireland.)
The CLR were unhappy with the new policy and David Morrison argued that 
wanting to see a power shared government as a step towards re-unification meant that “the 
NEC wants to build on the success o f the unattainable to achieve the impossible.”^^  ^
Although the CLR were disappointed with the commitment to re-unification, Dick Barry 
did manage to have a commitment to a new party o f labour for Northern Ireland included in 
the final statement. At the beginning o f June “It was agreed by a clear majority, that the 
Study Group recommends a) the Labour Party should not organise in Northern Ireland, b) 
the Labour Party should not support the setting up of a conference to discuss the 
establishment o f a mass party o f  l a b o u r . ”  ^ *7  in August Barry managed to get his way
and had included at the end o f the final NEC statement the words “We therefore believe 
that interested trade unions in Northern Ireland should support a Conference o f trade 
unions, trade councils, shop stewards committees and other Labour movement 
organisations in Northern Ireland to discuss whether it is possible to form such a Labour
31 July 1981.
Soley, C. Interview Dec. 1996.
M ilitant, 25 Sept. 1981.
Times, 20 Aug. 1981.
187 NEC Study Group on Nortliern Ireland, minutes: 1 June 1981.
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Party.” 188 This ambiguous and non-committal statement was clearly left open to 
interpretation. When questioned by Enoch Powell in the House o f Commons the following 
year about Labour putting up candidates in elections in Northern Ireland, Don Concannon 
was unequivocal in declaring that the Labour Party would not be following such a course of 
action. 189 Part o f Don Concannon’s personal reasoning for his opposition to the idea was 
that he believed that it would split the Northern Ireland trade union movement. i9® 
Nevertheless in respect o f the 1981 statement the NEC did set up a Liaison Committee to 
work with Northern Ireland trade unionists in tiying to set up a ‘conference o f Labour’. 
The committee was set up in July 1982 but made no progress because o f cancellations by 
various unions whenever a meeting was proposed or because o f elections or other more 
important concerns. There was clearly a lack o f enthusiasm for the project on the part of 
all sides involved. Frank Allaun, a leading supporter o f the idea o f setting up the Labour 
Party in Northern Ireland, resigned from the NEC in September 1983 and this effectively 
spelt the end o f the venture. i9i The following year the Liaison Commitee reported that it 
would not attempt to pursue the idea o f setting up a ‘conference o f Labour’ as a result of 
the poor response from the Northern Irish trade u n io n s .  *92
During the next eighteen months, in the run up to the 1983 general election, the 
debate within the Labour Party on Northern Ireland shifted into new, more selective areas. 
Debate within the left on the Irish question tended to evolve around three main areas: 1) 
The constitutional question, which had been resolved for many within the Labour Party 
with the adoption o f ‘unity by consent’ (although the demand for the removal of Unionist
*88 Labour Party NEC, Northern Ireland: Statement to the 1981 Conference, p. 26.
Hansard, Vol. 22 Col. 862 (28 April 1982).
*9® Concannon, D, Interview, March 1998.
*9* Labour Party Organisation Committee, Report on tlie Nortliern Ireland Liaison Committee. 
RD: 2816/September 1983.
*92 Labour Party Nortliern Ireland Liaison Committee, RD: 2955/March 1984.
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consent - or loyalist veto - gradually emerged on the left). 2) Questions o f repression, such 
as the Prevention o f Terrorism Act, strip searching, the use o f plastic bullets and the 
military’s use o f lethal force. 3) The question o f what the left’s response should be to the 
people who often bore the brunt o f this repression, namely the Provisionals, and to what 
extent they should be viewed as a liberation movement. The rise o f Sinn Fein as an 
electoral force during the early eighties, opened up new arguments for the Labour left and 
gave them a party with whom they could develop a solidarity, having despaired with the 
SDLP for so long as supposedly the only progressive party. With ‘unity by consent’ 
established as Party policy and Clive Soley articulating the new position on the front bench, 
groups such as the LCI began to focus on civil liberties issues such as plastic bullets and the 
PTA. As early as March 1981 the home affairs group o f the PLP had voted unanimously to 
oppose the PTA*93 and the NEC Study Group also decided to declare in its final statement 
that “We cannot accept that such legislation should continue in existence and we would, 
therefore, repeal this [Prevention o f Terrorism] Act.”*94 The 18 March 1981 was the first 
occasion that the Labour Party abstained on the PTA in the Commons. For years prior to 
1981 there had always been a small number o f about 20-30 left-wing Labour MPs who 
would vote against the PTA Continuance Order and when the Party chose to abstain for the 
first time, there were still 37 back benchers who voted against the renewal o f the Act. 
Then in 1982 the numbers voting against the PTA, increased to the considerable figure of 
52 Labour MPs. *95 In addition to such an impressive rebellion against the whips, Clive 
Soley, the Party’s assistant spokesperson on Northern Ireland resigned from the front 
bench in protest at the decision to simply abstain rather than oppose the Act. This was a
Labour Weekly, 13 March 1981.
*94 Labour Party NEC, Nortliern Ireland: Statement to tlie 1981 Conference, p. 14.
*95 Cunningham, M.J. op cit. Appendix C: p.263.
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major coup for the LCI and others, because Soley only returned to his front bench post two 
months later after having been reassured by the leadership that the PLP would, in future 
vote against the PTA in future. *96 Soley’s importance was further highlighted by the fact 
that Don Concannon had held out, refusing to accept anyone else as a replacement and 
demanding that something had to be done to ensure that Soley returned as his assistant. *9? 
Then on 7 March 1983 the PLP did, for the first time, vote against the PTA. *98
Clive Soley had a reputation as a civil and human rights campaigner and he also 
came to articulate and develop the ‘unity by consent’ policy with far greater imagination 
than any other figure. It can be argued with some conviction that Clive Soley contributed 
more in terms o f intelligent analysis and novel, though pragmatic, ideas than any other front 
bench spokesperson including Peter Archer and Kevin McNamara. Soley represented the 
‘unity by consent’ school o f thought in sharp contrast to the ‘troops out’ school o f thought, 
on the Labour left, whose leading lights were to be people such as Tony Benn and Ken 
Livingstone. Unlike Benn and Livingstone, Soley was not sympathetic to the Irish 
republican cause but, instead, pursued unity believing it to be in the best interests o f both 
Ireland and Britain. His was a typically English socialism and his view was that Britain 
could resolve the problem for the Irish by gradually uniting North and South with ideas 
such as “creating an interdependence in such things as energy supplies, transport, social 
security benefits... Physical cross-border links in the form of pipelines, power cables and the 
like.” Along with ensuring that “the Irish Government is willing to make major 
constitutional changes” and “the British and Irish Governments harmonise pensions, social 
security payments, financial aid to industry and other related legislation,” he also argued
*96/m /7 Post, 22 May 1982.
*97 Soley, C. Interview Dec. 1996.
*98 Cunningham, M.J. op cit.
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that “the Catholic Church must be pressed to examine this doctrine [that children in mixed 
marriages be brought up Catholic] to see if it could be enforced less rigorously.”^^  ^ Unlike 
people such as Kevin McNamara and Clare Short, Soley did not originate from an Irish 
background and consequently was quicker to criticise Catholic influence in the Republic. 
He was also therefore able to avoid the criticism, that McNamara was to attract, that he 
simply had an emotional and sentimental attachment to the idea o f  a united Ireland. Soley 
argued, with conviction, throughout the eighties that gradual re-unification was simply the 
best solution to the Irish question. The problem with this view was that Labour was then 
left open to the accusation throughout the eighties that it sought unity as a grandiose plan 
devised by a paternal government at Westminster which it believed was delivering self- 
determination even though the Protestants may argue that such a plan would in fact be 
denying them self-determination. For example Soley argued that “The political power to 
resolve the problem lies not in Belfast, nor in Dublin, but in London.” Part o f the reason for 
this attitude was a sense o f anger at Unionist intransigence: he told the NEC Study Group 
that “we should say to the Unionist parties that their failure to compromise, combined with 
the failure o f the border since it was established makes it essential that we now consider an 
all-Ireland solution.”2 oo He has explained since that as with Cyprus and Sri Lanka, if the 
crucial nearby power with whom a community (feeling threatened and under siege) were 
looking to for support takes an ambivalent view then this will in fact exacerbate the 
problem creating frjrther insecurity. For this reason he took the view that, instead of 
continuing with the previous policy o f crisis management, London had to take the lead and 
make it clear to the Unionists that they could not set the a g e n d a . S o l e y  was also careful
Soley, C. ‘Ireland: a Policy for Labour’, submission to the NEC Study Group, May 1981.
200 Ibid.
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not to use the republican rhetoric favoured by Livingstone and others, such as talking o f  
‘Irish national liberation’ and an end to ‘British Imperialism’ because he saw them as 
outdated slogans. For this reason he was able to gain the attention o f moderates within the 
Party along with his consistent condemnations o f republican violence, his impeccable 
record on the question o f civil liberties and not least his moderate and likeable manner.
Whilst Soley and others were projecting the moderate and more acceptable face o f  
pro-reunification sentiment, there began in the early eighties, a more outspoken and 
controversial support for the aims and aspirations o f Irish republicanism, among certain 
sections o f the Labour left. As the newly elected leader of the GLC, Ken Livingstone was 
able to use his prominent position to argue the case for British withdrawal and to explain 
his republican sympathies. During the hunger strikes he described the IRA prisoners as 
“freedom fighters” and demanded immediate British withdrawal from Northern I r e l a n d . 202  
Then during the following months he initiated a new phenomenon within the Labour Party; 
he began to foster a solidarity with the Provisional which coincided with, and was aided 
by, the rise o f Sinn Fein as an electoral force. It would be wrong to explain this 
phenomenon as simply the consequence o f Sinn Fein’s electoral rise, because the 
emergence o f pro-Sinn Fein solidarity was developing anyway and was part o f the process 
o f the development o f a new (mainly London based) Labour left, which had begun to 
champion many marginal political causes such as ethnic minority rights and gay and lesbian 
rights. Ken Livingstone, who was to become the leading figure in this new Labour left, 
was similar to Soley only in so far as that he also had no Irish origins, he was also young 
and had a moderate, likeable manner. But Livingstone continually courted controversy 
because he chose a confrontational style, most notably on the subject o f ERA violence
202 If.jgfj P qs (^  2 0  J u n e  1 9 8 1 .
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which he consistently explained as being the responsibility o f the British government 
because o f their policies and tactics in Northern Ireland. Much o f the Labour left were very 
uncomfortable with Livingstone’s behaviour. Tribune severely criticised him in late 1981, 
arguing that he was abusing his position as GLC leader and creating unnecessary problems 
for the Labour movement: “Whep they [rank and file Party workers] ring doorbells to 
recruit members and ask people to vote Labour, they are, o f course, happy to answer 
queries on Labour record in London. Many of them are less happy to find themselves 
talking about the I R A . . . ”2 ^ 2  jhere still existed, in the Labour Party, the desire to avoid 
debate on the Irish question especially if it appeared to damage the Party in terms o f 
electoral support and especially when the views expressed by Livingstone had veiy little 
support throughout the movement anyway. The two styles o f Soley and Livingstone 
essentially set the scene for the 1980s: the divide on Ireland was no longer between pro- 
and anti-partitionists, it was between the ‘unity by consent’ school o f thought and the pro- 
Sinn Fein/troops out school o f thought.
Throughout 1982 the pro-Sinn Fein people began to gain ground throughout the 
Labour Party and were aided by Sinn Fein’s successes in the Northern Ireland Assembly 
elections in the October. They continued to apply pressure on civil rights matters, such as 
the PTA, and the persistent lobbying to have the Party adopt a policy o f banning the use of 
plastic bullets also gathered momentum as a straight forward human rights issue. In May a 
group o f more than twenty MPs, including Geny Fitt, Denis Skinner, Jo Richardson and 
Ian Mikardo, signed an early-day-motion in the Commons calling for an end to the use of  
plastic bullets. 2 0 4  Denis Canavan pressed the Secretary o f State in the Commons over the 
use o f plastic bullets later that month but Concannon’s only reservation was that the baton
203 Xf^ibune, 16 Oct. 1981. 
Irish Post, 22 May 1982.
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rounds were being used beyond the strict rules that should apply to them.^os Then at the 
annual Labour conference in the October a composite motion was passed, despite NEC 
opposition, which called for “our parliamentary spokespersons on Northern Ireland to 
campaign for the withdrawal o f plastic bullets from the Royal Ulster Constabulary and army 
in Northern I r e l a n d  ”206 Don Concannon spoke during the debate to argue against the 
motion and stated that it would be a veiy difficult policy for him to carry out, because it 
would be difficult for him to replace plastic bullets with something else.2 0 ? It began to look 
as if the more gains that the left made, the greater the problem of an unwilling leadership 
became. The left continued to pursue issues relating to Ireland in a way never before seen 
in the Labour Party. In February 1983 the GLC proposed giving the Troops Out 
Movement £50,000 to carry out research into the workings o f the PTA. The GLC finally 
backed down on the decision after intense pressure which included the personal 
intervention o f Michael Foot who argued that “The Troops Out Movement is committed to 
policies which could cause immense suffering in Northern Ireland - policies which the 
Labour Party conference has rejected by large majorities.”208 These unprecedented 
developments also added to the wider image problem for the Labour Party during the early 
eighties as a party fraught with an internal struggle between left and right, because the left 
had almost created a situation in which only a commitment to British withdrawal was 
considered the left-wing position on the Irish question.
It was helpful for the Labour Party, but by no means simply coincidental, that in 
conjunction with the change in Party policy the Tories also began a subtle and slow shift in 
policy beginning with the appointment of James Prior in September 1981. The Tories of
Hansard, Vol. 24 Col. 1042 (27 May 1982). 
2°  ^Report o f the 1982 Labour Party Conference. 
202 Times, 2 Oct. 1982.
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course were not immune to the impact o f recent developments (as well as the changes in 
international opinion) which had been partly responsible for the change in Labour Party 
thinking. Indeed Clive Soley has stated that Prior’s appointment was the beginning o f a 
new departure for the Conservative Party^ o^  and it might even be suggested that the 
changes in the Labour Party might well have concentrated Tory minds. Michael J. 
Cunningham has argued that one o f the reasons that James Prior decided to make a new 
attempt at achieving devolution was that this was the sort o f measure the government 
would have to introduce if they were to try and maintain Labour Party support. 2 1 0  When 
Prior first introduced his proposals for devolution for Northern Ireland to Parliament in 
April 1982, Concannon chose the unusual response o f arguing that the time was not right 
for such a development because “Where economic and social conditions are so depressed, 
and where one in five o f the workers in Northern Ireland is on the dole, it is unlikely that 
there will be a wide or enthusiastic response to constitutional changes.’’^ ^^  The fact that 
Northern Ireland’s economy was in trouble was a particularly spurious argument. First of  
all, if the changes (which Labour broadly supported) were to bring political stability it could 
only be helpful for the economy and secondly his statement that the government were 
putting the cart before the horse by proposing these reforms flew in the face o f the often 
repeated Labour argument that a political solution must be the priority. Indeed Clive Soley 
was to contradict the economic argument when offering his own analysis in the Commons. 
When the White Paper came before the House for its second reading two weeks later 
Concannon had decided to drop this argument and, in spite of the SDLP’s opposition, was 
altogether quite supportive o f the government. Concannon set out Labour’s response to
2®^  Soley, C. Interview, Dec. 1996.
210 Cunningham, M.J. op cit. p. 148.
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the plan at length and for the first time stated that Labour was now committed to ‘unity by 
consent’; although Martin Flannery was quick to criticise him for his reticence on the 
subject. He stated that while Labour supported the spirit o f the Paper the main criticism 
was that Labour would include minority party representation at every level o f executive 
power when devolution came whilst the government’s Paper did not make such provision 
clear. Criticism was also made o f the fact that the chairman o f the Assembly (who would 
have considerable power) would be elected by its members, almost certainly ensuring that 
he would be a Unionist. Concannon also argued that there should be a parliamentary tier to 
the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council on which the Assembly members could sit and 
that there ought to have been much greater emphasis on the Irish dimension. 2 1 2  Clive 
Soley’s contributions indicate that there was clearly a veiy marked difference between the 
two front bench spokesmen. Soley’s analysis of the economic situation was very different; 
he argued that current Tory economic policies in Northern Ireland meant that “that 
economy will continue to collapse. I would also suggest... that the more that happens the 
greater will be the impetus towards a united Ireland. That is a good thing which I wish to 
encourage.” In direct contrast to Concannon he stated that violence was not the main 
reason for the lack of investment, implying that partition was, and that the economy should 
be looked at on an all-Ireland basis which would happen anyway with the government’s 
free market policies because market forces dictate that investment and trade will move in 
away which ignores national frontiers thus making the Northern Ireland border increasingly 
irrelevant.2i3 A further difference between Concannon and Soley was that the latter argued 
that the biggest disappointment was the lack o f emphasis on the Irish dimension. In fact it 
would appear that while Concannon concentrated on policy and legislative detail, Soley had
212 Ibid. Vol. 22 Cols 860-6 (28 April 1982) & Vol. 23 Cols 479-485 (10 May 1982).
213 Ibid. Vol. 22 Col. 928 (28 April 1982).
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the job of dealing with the wider political and historical issues and o f attacking the other 
parties’ policies such as the Tories, the Unionists and, most interestingly, the SDP.214 
There was in fact very little Labour input during the debates on the Bill but this was 
because they did not want to help the Unionist and right-wing Tory filibuster. Concannon 
explained that “there is nothing in the Bill that will prevent Labour’s policy from being 
furthered... That is why the Bill has the Opposition’s tacit support.” However they did try 
two amendments; the first was to try and increase the 70% margin for the assembly to 
move towards devolved government because they feared the Unionists might achieve this 
without needing minority support. The second was to try and strengthen parliamentary 
control over any move towards devolution. Both amendments failed although they were 
given assurances by Prior on the latter request.^^  ^ clive Soley later moved a further 
amendment seeking to have included in the Bill provision for a committee o f  the Northern 
Ireland Assembly designed to improve and foster relations between the North and Dublin. 
He openly conceded that the amendment was designed to further his aim o f achieving Irish 
re-unification by consent. Soley’s performances in the House were inciting the Unionists 
but bringing admiration from the Labour benches; even Roy Mason was amongst the MP’s 
who voted for Soley’s amendment even though it was, o f course defeated.^i^ The Bill was 
eventually passed on the third reading. A handful o f right-wing Tories and the Unionists 
voted against (as did Denis Skinner) but tlje PLP opted for abstention.
The Assembly elections held in October 1982 saw Provisional Sinn Fein contest 
elections (albeit on an abstentionist ticket) for the first time since the outbreak o f the 
‘troubles’. Sinn Fein won 10% of the vote^*  ^^nd although the impact was not as great as
214 Ibid. Vol. 23 Cols 542-3 (10 May 1982).
215 Ibid. Vol. 26 Col. 172 (22 June 1982).
216 Ibid. Vol. 26 Cols 756-760 (29 June 1982).
2i2Fiackes, W.D. & Sydney ^Wioi Northern Ireland: a Political Directory J968-88  (1989) p.340.
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Sands’ by-election victory in 1981, the emergence o f the Provisionals as an electoral force 
throughout the six counties, without the emotional assistance o f the hunger strikes, added 
greater weight and credibility to the new Labour left’s argument that republicans needed to 
be negotiated with and not merely condemned out o f hand. The GLC reacted almost 
immediately; 26 GLC councillors signed an invitation for Gerry Adams and Danny 
Morrison, two o f the newly elected Sinn Fein members, to visit London on 14 
December.218 The Labour leadership’s response was not condemnatory but instead rather 
pragmatic. Perhaps because o f Sinn Fein’s newly established electoral mandate, Michael 
Foot simply wrote to Livingstone asking him to explain Labour’s policy to Sinn Fein and 
their opposition to violence. Although Don Concannon was critical, and so too was Jock 
Stallard, Clive Soley stated that he would be prepared to meet the Sinn Fein delegates if 
they were to visit Westminster.^i^ Don Concannon was rather dismissive o f Sinn Fein 
electoral success and misread the political situation arguing that “the success o f Sinn Fein 
candidates in the recent Assembly elections was as much a vote against unemployment and 
the lack o f any meaningful political progress as a vote for Sinn Fein.”22o This was another 
example o f the desire that exists in the Labour Party to blame support for extreme 
nationalism on class or economic factors rather than recognising the strength o f feeling 
over the question o f nationalism and national identity. There is also no evidence to suggest 
that the Sinn Fein vote has risen notably during periods o f economic depression or that it 
has dropped during periods o f what Concannon describes as ‘meaningfijl political 
progress’; in fact throughout the period o f the peace process in the 1990s the Sinn Fein 
vote has actually held up very well as they have become identified, within the nationalist
2^8 Guardian, 7 Dec. 1982.
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community, as a party genuinely seeking a peaceful resolution. The change in left-wing 
attitudes over Sinn Fein is probably best shown by the U-tum displayed by Tribune. The 
Labour left’s weekly paper gave over its front page to a ‘Message to the British People’ by 
Gerry Adams and Danny Morrison, and its editorial supported the GLC’s decision to invite 
Sinn Fein to London. 2 2 1  Shortly before the Sinn Fein members were due to visit London 
the INLA’s Ballykelly pub bombing gave the government the opportunity to place an 
exclusion order on Adams and Morrison which was supported by Michael Foot as well as 
Jock Stallard because the favourable mood had changed dramatically after the bombing 
(even though the INLA and not the PIRA were responsible) . 2 2 2  As so often happened with 
the Northern Ireland debate, an outrage such as this immediately silenced many on the left 
and stiffened the resolve o f those such as Concannon who responded by publicly calling for 
a withdrawal o f the invitation to Sinn Fein. 2 2 3  % e consequence o f the government’s ban 
on Sinn Fein visiting London was that Livingstone (who o f course was rarely if ever 
silenced by such an event) accepted an invitation by Sinn Fein to visit Belfast. Livingstone 
did visit Belfast in late February 1983 but was condemned by Foot for doing so . 2 2 4  
Livingstone responded by pointing out that the NEC Study Group had met every political 
force in Ireland except the Provisionals and argued that “The ignorance o f the changes 
within Sinn Fein explains the angry reaction o f the leadership to my visit.”225 (Since the 
late seventies Sinn Fein had begun moving toward the left.) The GLC councillors were 
determined to go ahead with fostering good relations and dialogue with Sinn Fein, to the 
extent that they virtually became their sister party in Ireland.
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Despite the condemnations and the arguments that took place within the Party, the 
left were undoubtedly gaining ground and throwing up questions about Labour’s attitude to 
the Irish question, many o f which had never before even been an issue. If the decision in 
1981 to adopt a re-unification policy was a milestone in terms of Labour policy on Ireland, 
the behaviour of the left over the next few years also led to historic changes in the attitude 
o f the rank and file in the movement. The first occasion that Tony Benn spoke on the 
subject o f Northern Ireland indicated the optimism and determination that the far left had 
on the issue; he urged dialogue with Sinn Fein arguing that a denial o f their right to 
negotiate would lead to further violence filling the political vacuum and he rubbished ‘unity 
by consent’ as a reinforcement o f the loyalist veto declaring on behalf o f the left that “We 
are beginning to erode that veto which is nothing more than a ticket that commands British 
troops to defend the old partition.”226 Changes took place in terms o f how republicans 
were perceived and it became popular among many Labour councils to invite over Sinn 
Fein councillors. In addition to this it had almost become accepted that favouring a united 
Ireland was the respectable position for a member o f the Labour Party to have. After her 
election to Parliament in the Peckham by-election in December 1982, Harriet Harman 
wrote to the Irish Post to give her thanks to Irish voters and to tell them “You can rest 
assured o f my support for a united Ireland and for the abolition o f the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act in this country. ” 2 2 2  Despite this and despite the fact in Michael Foot they 
had the most left-wing leader since the War, there was an uneasiness and concern about the 
behaviour o f the far left in pursuing issues on Ireland despite their vilification in the 
newspapers, especially the tabloids.
  .
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The Labour Party went into the 1983 general election with what was probably its 
most radical manifesto to date. However, the manifesto statement on Northern Ireland, 
omitted the commitment to end the use of plastic bullets and the constitutional issue was 
carefully worded; the commitment to ‘unity by consent’ was explicit, but so too was the 
reassurance to the Unionists that “We respect and support, however, the right o f the 
Northern Ireland people to remain within the UK”.22s g y  g^rly 1983 the enthusiasm and 
optimism which had existed in the Labour Party had already changed because the Tories 
looked to be heading for a second election victory and so the leadership became less and 
less tolerant o f the far left’s behaviour. Moves had already been made to try and thwart the 
growth o f Militant and people such as Don Concannon and the leadership in general were 
uncomfortable with left-wing demands for Labour to adopt a more radical stand on certain 
issues such as opposing repressive measures in Northern Ireland and favouring dialogue 
with Sinn Fein. Ken Livingstone and others appeared to be unconcerned about the damage 
to the Labour leadership that their behaviour on the Irish question was causing. This was a 
unique and ongoing problem for the Labour Party across all areas o f policy as the general 
election approached. Austin Mitchell was to argue after the election, that with the Labour 
left it seemed that “To lead was to betray. Leadership itself was an anti-social act, an 
indictable offence. Leaders would sell out - unless they were stopped.”^^  ^ This does 
ignore the fact that that a great deal o f passion excited in relation to many issues and 
Ireland was no exception. In fact the more it appeared that the leadership were only 
concerned about votes the more determined the left seemed to become in trying to force 
issues that they considered to be a question o f human rights.
228 Labour Parly, 1983 Election Manifesto, The New Hope fo r  Britain p .31.
229 Mitchell, A. Four Years in the Death o f  the Labour Party (1983) p.35.
84
As the Labour Party entered the 1983 general election, it appeared to many that 
Labour’s new found commitment to a united Ireland was just one o f many new left-wing 
policies adopted by the Party along with nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from the 
Common Market. But, as we shall see ‘unity by consent’ was to outlast most o f these 
other leftist policies in the coming years partly because o f the continuing desire o f the rank 
and file not to return to bipartisanship and, to an even greater extent because political 
developments in Northern Ireland and historic changes in Anglo-Irish relations meant that 
Labour were to adjust and develop their existing policy in response to these developments.
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Chapter 3; ‘Neil Kinnock and the Impact of 
Hillsborough* Labour P a i^  Policy 1983-87
Following Labour’s 1983 general election defeat a realisation developed that the 
Labour Party would remain a marginal, minority party representing only the poorer sections 
of the working class in Scotland and the north o f England, on the council estates and those 
employed in the public sector,23o unless drastic changes were made in terms o f the Party’s 
electoral appeal. After the 1979 election defeat, the blame was laid at the door of a right- 
wing leadership and so with the left easily winning the arguments between 1979 and 1983 
and securing radical policy changes, with ‘unity by consent’ amongst them, the 
consequence o f the 1983 defeat (Labour’s worst since 1900) was that the left were to be
K-accused o f helping to create the image i) f  a divided party and o f a rather extreme and 
irresponsible party which was now viewed by the electorate as less capable o f governing 
than it was in 1979. The election o f Neil Kinnock as Labour leader following Michael 
Foot’s resignation was the first display o f the party’s yearning for unity. Kinnock was the 
soft left’s candidate, but he was determined to lead the party away from what he has 
described as “impossiblism” and “sloganised dogma” and his dislike for Bennite socialism 
was summed up in 1983 by Benn’s apparent satisfaction that “28 per cent o f the British 
people have voted for a truly Socialist programme’’.^ *^ Many on the left who voted for 
Kinnock were unaware o f the extent to which he intended reforming the Party. Kinnock 
chose to embark upon a long term strategy o f marginalising the most awkward left-wing 
individuals and discarding the most electorally unattractive policies. After proposals for 
one member one vote were defeated in 1984 Kinnock decided that “The experience o f that 
defeat o f OMOV [one member one vote], however, strongly confirmed my belief that
230 Shaw, E. The Labour Party Since 1979 (1994^ p.27.
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change o f all kinds would have to be pursued by very thorough and calculated means: it 
was clear that it would be essential to compile majorities for reforms in the Constitution or 
the amendments to policy before even putting them for decision, whether to the NEC and 
its committees or to the National Conference.”232 Although social democracy was seen to 
have been defeated in the Party during 1979-83, by the mid 1980s “Kinnock had built up a 
strong power base on the centre-left” and “Within three years, he had managed to jettison 
Bennite-style British socialism and replaced it with a variation on European social 
democracy.”233 Kinnock’s plans also included changing the way NEC/PLP study groups 
and policy committees operated, because he believed that they often produced what he has 
described as “inchoate wish lists”.234 With this in mind, it would have been safe to assume 
that Labour’s commitment to Irish re-uniftcation would be targeted for either removal or 
reform in order not to appear so partisan in favour of Irish nationalism in the light o f the 
embarrassing new relationship between sections o f the Labour left and Sinn Fein, and 
because the policy was o f little importance in terms o f appeal to the British electorate. For 
a number of reasons the ‘unity by consent’ policy was to remain intact despite being seen as 
a product o f the 1981 left-wing backlash and the policies o f opposition to the PTA and the 
use o f plastic bullets were to become consolidated.
Neil Kinnock had no interest whatsoever in Northern Irish politics and during the 
leadership contest David McKittrick concluded that “Mr Kinnock has apparently nothing to 
say about the North; he has turned down requests from the Irish Times and RTE for 
interviews on the subject. Mr Roy Mason last week told me: ‘I have never discussed 
Northern Ireland with Neil Kinnock. I don’t know what his views are on any aspects o f the
232 Ibid. p.538.
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question.’ ”235 By the end o f the decade Clare Short, who was always given a difficult time 
by the Labour leader on Irish affairs, was still prepared to say o f Neil Kinnock that he “is 
not particularly informed about Northern Ireland nor are his instincts very good.”236 it has 
been argued that, during this period, there were two wings o f opinion in the Labour Party 
on the subject o f regional policy; one o f which favoured the radical liberal ideas of 
devolution and one o f which favoured centralised government to achieve a coherent 
planned socialist economy.23? Neil Kinnock had always tended to favour the latter 
argument and despite being Welsh remained sceptical about devolution for Wales and it 
was not until 1990 that a Cardiff Assembly was finally agreed as Party policy.23 8 Part o f  
the logic o f this scepticism was also based upon a suspicion o f nationalism in general and 
there is also very little to indicate that he was either interested in or sympathetic towards 
Irish nationalism. In contrast to Kinnock’s reticence, Roy Hattersley (the centre-right’s 
candidate) did agree to an interview with McKittrick and in it he chose to use language 
which could almost be described as republican: he stated “I do believe the ultimate 
objective has to be union and I do believe the Six Counties have to be returned to 
Ireland.”239 In addition to declaring his “very low opinion o f Mr. Haughey” he stated that 
he did have a very high opinion o f Garret Fitzgerald and o f John Hume, This is not an 
untypical view on the part o f Labour politicians; favouring the leader o f the Republic’s 
most right-wing party over and above that of Fianna Fail is indicative o f the lack of 
empathy with the latter’s attempts to present itself as the ‘Republican Party’ whilst being 
led by a millionaire whose integrity had, to say the least, become rather questionable. He
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went on to develop the argument that EEC membership has changed the economic 
disparity between North and South so that Unionists can no longer argue that re-unification 
would leave them in a depressed economic backwater. Indeed the Southern dimension to 
this argument has in fact gained added weight with the Republic’s remarkable economic 
success during the nineties. He also took up the civil liberties issue thus: “Now I think we 
have got to say to the Northerners - Tf you are incorporated into Ireland, you mustn’t fear 
that you Protestants are going to be forced to live under laws as incorporated in the 
Catholic Constitution.’ ”24o This is all the more fascinating in the light of the fact that 
Hattersley has claimed that he had longed to become Secretary o f State for Northern 
Ireland during the 1970s.24i The style and language o f the interview did seem rather 
unusual for the man considered the champion o f the moderate centre-right, but then the 
interview was for an Irish readership and he may have stood to at least win over a few 
votes from those who despaired with Kinnock’s and Meacher’s (the other left candidate) 
silence on the question o f Ireland. The use o f the European argument was also a curious 
development in terms o f Labour thinking on the Irish question because even John Hume 
was not to develop this argument until much later in the eighties. It is also a fact indicative 
of Labour’s indifference on the Irish question that there had never been any high profile 
right-wing opposition to the ‘unity by consent’ policy; certainly not in the way that there 
was to the policy o f unilateral nuclear disarmament in the shape o f individuals such as Peter 
Shore and Denis Healey. Whereas in the 1990s people such as Kate Hoey and Nick 
Raynsford offered the opposing argument to re-uniftcation, in the eighties no such 
opposition existed and so it appeared very often that many in the Labour leadership, 
including those o f the centre-right such as Roy Hattersley, gave support to ‘unity by
240 Ibid.
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consent’ without any apparent conviction, so that one was left with the distinct impression 
that re-uniftcation was certainly not a view arrived at as a consequence o f lengthy internal 
discussion among the leadership.
Like most British socialists, both Kinnock and Hattersley had a deep abhorrence o f  
violence and o f those such as the Provisionals who believed in the use o f force for political 
ends. Hattersley stated, after the 1983 general election, that “the vote for Provisional Sinn 
Fein was almost the most depressing thing to happen in the election.”242 Nevertheless, the 
links between sections o f the Labour left and Sinn Fein were to gain an increase in 
democratic legitimacy following Gerry Adams election as MP for West Belfast. Jeremy 
Corbyn responded almost immediately by inviting a Sinn Fein delegation, which included 
Gerry Adams and Joe Austin, to visit London in July 1983 and amongst those that Sinn 
Fein met were the newly elected Labour MPs Clare Short and Tony Banks as well as Tony 
Benn and Ken Livingstone.243 There clearly existed, at this stage, a sharp divide between 
the pro-united Irelanders on the basis o f those who saw the rise o f Sinn Fein as a positive 
development and those who did not. Amongst the latter was the Party’s Northern Ireland 
Parliamentary Group (for whom Martin Flannery had become chair) which decided against 
meeting with the Sinn Fein delegation.244 Don Concannon, with his deep animosity 
towards the Provisionals, persistently opposed the new relationship with Sinn Fein; he 
urged members o f the Labour Party not to meet with Sinn Fein, not to allow them into the 
Houses o f Parliament and described Gerry Adams as a “godfather o f terrorism”.245 At a 
public meeting held at Finsbury Town Hall, Gerry Adams was joined on the platform by the 
Labour MP Chris Smith who was persistently heckled until he was ftnally forced to sit
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down because he took the opportunity to denounce the use o f violence for political ends.246 
Despite the controversy and divisiveness of these events, the left saw them as important for 
stimulating debate as well as for raising the profile o f Sinn Fein in the Labour movement 
over and above the SDLP which it considered a moribund middle class party. As for who 
was using who? It would seem that the Labour links were just another part o f the 
Provisionals overall strategy to achieve British withdrawal; for them “it at last seemed 
possible to build or to encourage a broad-based withdrawal movement in Britain... Gerry 
Adams promised reporters, after his triumphant October 1983 Labour Party conference 
visit, that both he and other leading Provisionals would be back in Britain regularly to build 
up their support in the expatriate community and on the left.”247 Despite Sinn Fein 
appearances at Labour Party conferences becoming a regular occurrence the Party 
leadership was deeply embarrassed, especially following events such as the IRA bombing of  
Harrods in December 1983 which left five civilians dead. The disquiet over the violence as 
well as the lack o f empathy with Sinn Fein’s culture o f militant nationalism was summed up 
by Neil Kinnock thus: “I must say that I am utterly opposed to any such relationship with 
Provisional Sinn Fein and that there is nothing in the traditions or the policy o f the Labour 
Party that justifies such relations.”24» This statement was made at the height o f the miner’s 
strike in Britain when picket line violence was at its worst; but this protracted industrial 
dispute was a matter which also led to a great deal o f soul searching and bitter internal 
tension within both the rank and file and the leadership o f the Labour movement. It should 
also be noted that although Peter Archer (Party spokesperson on Northern Ireland from 
1983-87) never met with Sinn Fein leaders,249 Clive Soley on a number o f occasions did.
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However Soley had very little sympathy with Sinn Fein and held the meetings only to put 
his views across and to try and make sense o f the Provisionals aims and tactics which he 
has described as counter productive and unrealistic. For example, while Soley sought to 
achieve harmonisation between north and south he argued with Sinn Fein that their 
activities were serving only to alienate the population of the Republic from the North. He 
also questioned them as to what they would do in the event o f a British withdrawal and 
concluded that first o f all the Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams, was simply bogged down in 
theory and secondly they had no realistic idea about how to deal with an aggrieved 
Protestant community thus reinforcing Soley’s belief that only a peaceful and consensual 
process of uhification and British withdrawal would be f e a s i b l e . ^ ^ o
At the Labour Party’s 1983 conference the now commonplace composite 
resolutions appeared, calling for British withdrawal, and on this occasion one (which called 
for an end to the loyalist veto) was moved by Tony Benn, much to the annoyance o f his 
fellow NEC members. The NEC had urged that the resolutions be remitted but Benn took 
the unprecedented step of defying the will o f the Committee, despite being a member, and 
moving one composite as a representative o f  Kensington CLP.^ i^ On the subject of 
Ireland the left still appeared to be in the ascendant at the conference. With the rise o f Sinn 
Fein and the ever growing influence o f the Labour Committee on Ireland, the troops out 
lobby were optimistic and although Tony Benn’s resolution was heavily defeated by 
5,142,000 votes to 356,000 they at least had the satisfaction of witnessing Don Concannon 
being slow handclapped towards the end o f his contribution until the chair finally switched 
the microphone off for over running his t i m e . 252 Debate on Ireland was undoubtedly
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beginning to reach into more and more areas o f the Labour movement, to an extent greater 
even than in 1981. In addition to the LCI, there emerged in late 1983 the ‘Ireland: Peace 
Through Democracy’ campaign which was a Parliamentary grouping (including Plaid 
Cymru as well as Labour MP’s) committed to achieving British withdrawal and one of 
whose main sponsors was Tony Benn.253 There also emerged the pro-unity but anti- 
Republican ‘Labour Campaign for Peace and Progress in Ireland’, which unlike the ‘Peace 
Through Democracy’ group did remain in existence for a number o f years as a persistent 
pressure group within the Labour movement.254 The campaign was sponsored by the 
Labour MP Sean Hughes and by Tom Pendry the ex-shadow spokesperson on Northern 
Ireland well known for his hostility towards the Provisionals. The group remained o f only 
limited influence maintaining a position o f sympathy for the Workers’ Party and eventually 
established a set o f moderate proposals including devolution, integrated education, 
demilitarisation and a Bill o f Rights.255 it is also important to note that fringe meetings on 
Ireland at the Party’s annual conference were also becoming more numerous and popularly 
attended during this period as the Northern Ireland conflict became one o f the left’s more 
exciting pet subjects along with anti-racism campaigns and the issue o f nuclear 
disarmament.
In November 1983 Don Concannon lost his place in the shadow cabinet, following 
the annual PLP vote, and was consequently replaced by Peter Archer as Kinnock’s choice 
for spokesperson on Northern Ireland. There had been no speculation that Archer would 
get the job and he was initially viewed with suspicion by the left because he came from the 
centre-right. He was a practising Methodist and he did have an impressive record as a legal
253 Tribune, 30 Sept. 1983.
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rights campaigner in addition to having previously been the chair o f the British section of 
Amnesty International.256 Archer’s immediate response when questioned on his views on 
Ireland was to declare that economic issues such as improving trade and combating 
unemployment were more important than the constitutional question.^^? Clive Soley 
immediately approached Archer to ensure that he was in agreement with his ideas on 
harmonisation and re-unification. Peter Archer has admitted that he was perfectly happy 
with Soley’s ideas but was in fact limited in his understanding o f the issues involved and 
consequently “to a great extent I was dependent on Clive.”258 To begin with many o f the 
debates on Northern Ireland, in the House o f Commons, were left to Clive Soley to lead for 
the opposition. In spite o f Archer’s lack o f experience on the subject, the next year was in 
fact to witness the Labour Party, at front bench level, develop some of its most original and 
radical policies on Northern Ireland thus far. Clive Soley remained the assistant 
spokesperson for the next year and came to be dubbed by David McKittrick, writing in the 
Irish Times, as ‘The Father o f Unity by Consent’. Soley made it his job to put the meat on 
the bones o f the ‘unity by consent’ policy. In spite o f the critics, such as the LCI, who said 
the policy was a contradiction and a reinforcement o f the Unionist veto Soley set out to try 
and make the policy appear a practicable and realisable goal. The Archer-Soley 
combination worked well because unlike people such as Mason and Concannon they did 
not irritate the left but always showed a willingness to listen, to discuss and to show 
flexibility and originality especially when dealing with matters o f legal and human rights. 
Years later Clare Short was to describe Clive Soley as “the best Shadow Minister Labour 
has ever had on Northern Ireland.”259 in addition to this the journalist, Kevin Toolis, has
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claimed that “many o f his [Clive Soley’s] ideas on joint economic initiatives have been 
taken up by the Northern Ireland Office”26o and Soley himself has complained that he 
probably has not received the credit he deserves for many of the ideas he developed and the 
influence they had in government c i r c l e s  2 6 1  Dublin was also happy with the Labour Party’s 
front bench team and as we look through the contributions that Soley and Archer made to 
the debate, it might also be argued that they were much more in tune in terms of  
anticipating the direction o f Anglo-Irish relations than they might have been given credit 
for, especially in the light o f the Hillsborough agreement signed in November 1985.
As for legal reforms, as part o f Labour’s all-Ireland harmonisation plans, the first 
suggestion was that o f an all-Ireland court proposed by Clive Soley in early 1 9 8 2 . 2 6 2  Then 
in late 1983 Clive Soley proposed the establishment o f an all-Ireland police force263 and, as 
with many o f his ideas, he did not set out a detailed plan of how this would be achieved or 
what the end result would exactly be, but floated the idea by envisaging “an all-Ireland 
police force recruited and trained on both sides o f the border and used where appropriate. 
I’m not suggesting it would be used on the Shankill on the first day, but on the other hand, 
you might want to use it in A r m a g h . ” 264 in the months ahead Soley was to develop his 
ideas for the merging o f the Irish judicial systems and the setting up o f all-Ireland law 
c o u r t s .2 6 5  As an example o f the aforementioned influence that Soley had even amongst his 
opponents, the right-wing Tory MP for Epping, Sir John Biggs-Davidson (who was to 
express such anger at Soley’s suggestion that the Tories were beginning to favour Irish 
unity), was to take up Soley’s idea and propose that the Garda should be used in certain
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areas within Northern Ireland.266 Although Soley always seemed to be one step ahead o f  
Archer with many ideas, Peter Archer usually sanctioned the suggestions albeit in a much 
more moderate style: on the police, Archer simply argued that the process should at least 
be initiated by closer RUC/Garda co-operation and when, in late 1983, it was disclosed that 
Labour were looking into the idea of joint sovereignty he complained that the matter had 
been “a little over d r a m a t i s e d ” . 2 6 ? Throughout 1984 Clive Soley concentrated on 
developing ideas upon which re-unification was to be achieved. David McKittrick stated 
that “Mr, Soley, John Hume once said with enthusiasm, had all on his own worked out a 
plan to unite Ireland. His plan might have a few holes in it but it was indeed a plan, such as 
no other politician has ever come up with... One o f the unusual things about Mr Soley has 
been that he arrived at his ideas through his own thought processes: it wasn’t the question 
of the Irish embassy in London or the SDLP talking him round to their point o f v i e w . ” 2 6 8  
Unlike most others who have held positions in Labour’s front bench Northern Ireland team, 
Soley appeared to argue his case with genuine conviction. Through Soley and right up to 
the early nineties. Labour’s case has been that Britain should not simply wait until the 
nationalist vote reaches 51% but that the British government should work, in conjunction 
with Dublin, to bring the Ulster Protestant community into co-operation with nationalist 
Ireland so that re-unification can be achieved peacefully and with sufficient Protestant 
acquiescence. On the argument about the loyalist veto Soley said that “there is no way that 
we can force them in [to a united Ireland] without a degree o f consent. A degree of 
consent. I’m not saying that I want Ian Paisley and Enoch Powell to come out and say we 
are in favour o f a united Ireland, we’ll never get that.” Winning such consent was to then
266 Ibid. 16 Oct. 1984.
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be achieved through “initiatives such as an all-Ireland Economic Development Council, 
links on Tourism, Trade and Education.” To this he added the idea that there should be 
joint citizenship for those who wished to retain their British passports and in addition “We 
would probably have some sort o f Anglo-Irish Council which could look after the human 
rights aspect.”269 Many on the left were still not convinced and Clare Short for example 
was to argue that the whole ‘unity by consent’ strategy “was obviously a ftidge, given that 
consent isn’t there, but still the aspiration o f re-uniftcation became part o f policy. Clive 
Soley then interpreted it to mean Labour working to build all sorts o f united institutions 
between North and South... till you reach the point where you have actually re-unified the 
countiy without anyone noticing.”27o The unity by ‘stealth’ accusation was often raised by 
the LCI in addition to which it would also be fair to say that no great consideration was 
given to Unionist opposition to such a surreptitious plan or the likely resistance and 
disruption they would employ in the event o f a Labour government embarking on such a 
project.
In the same fashion as Peter Archer, Neil Kinnock began by wanting to concentrate 
only on economic issues and the problem of unemployment in Northern Ireland^ i^ but also 
came to argue publicly for many o f the ideas that Soley was developing, although Kinnock 
became much more disposed to the idea o f some form of joint authority with Dublin as a 
prerequisite to re-unification.^?  ^ The New Ireland Forum report, which was finally made 
public on 2 May 1984, united the Labour leadership and elevated the Party’s Irish policy to 
greater political acceptability because the three options that the Irish parties advocated in 
the report, namely a unitary state, a federal/confederal state and joint authority, were
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precisely the lines along which Soley and Archer had been thinking. In fact Soley himself 
had sent a contribution on behalf o f the British Labour Party to the Forum. The New  
Ireland Forum report is o f immense historic and political importance, not least because it 
ushered in a sea change in British party political thinking on the Irish question which led in 
turn to the signing o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement o f November 1985, but also because it 
was to create such a divergence o f opinion between the two main British parties that it in 
fact set them on course for an eventual return to bipartisanship. As early as December 
1983 Clive Soley had argued that the government were beginning a fundamental shift: “I 
sense a growing change in the Conservative Party... What I suspect - or what I think - is 
that current Toiy policy is inevitably leaning towards a united Ireland.”2?3 What was even 
more significant was the Tory front bench’s failure to refute Soley’s claim and, indeed, Sir 
John Biggs-Davison took issue with the Secretary o f State for not opposing what the Tory- 
right considered an unthinkable suggestion.^?^ Peter Archer, prompted by the report to 
take up a more resolutely anti-partition line, declared that “No one would suggest that the 
people o f Ireland benefit from having two incomplete economies, two fuel, transport and 
agricultural policies, two systems o f law enforcement” and arguing that “It is impossible to 
recognise the Irish dimension without severing the British link.” ?^^  However in the House 
Commons debate two months later he cautioned pro-unity enthusiasts that “The shotgun 
wedding o f 1 million people with 3 million people without their consent would simply not 
be workable.”276 Neil Kinnock was positively enthusiastic about the New Ireland Forum 
and was foremost amongst those calling for a debate on the Forum report in the House of 
Commons. As early as November 1983 Kinnock met with Garret Fitzgerald and Dick
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spring and after discussing the Forum he made it clear that he wanted the final report fully 
debated in the Commons.^^  ^ when the opportunity finally arose, the Commons debate 
gave the Labour Party the chance to articulate their commitment to re-unification in the 
more favourable political atmosphere engendered by a conservative Irish government 
presenting a report which begged a considerable change in the British government’s 
direction and which had behind it a sympathetic international community, not least the 
United States. In the debate Peter Archer proposed that an ‘all-Ireland chamber’ be 
established, through which the Dublin and Westminster governments could maintain 
ongoing dialogue and Clive Soley took the opportunity to set out clearly and concisely the 
five main proposals which he had developed over the preceding year: 1) joint citizenship 2) 
a British-Irish Parliamentary council 3) an all-Ireland economic development committee 4) 
an all-Ireland police force and 5) an all-Ireland judicial system.^^  ^ In the face o f criticism 
that the Republic’s welfare benefits were below the standard of those in the North, Soley 
was to later add to his list o f demands the proposal that the social security systems o f North 
and South be gradually h a r m o n is e d .T h e  Commons debate also highlighted some of the 
divisions in Labour’s pro-unity camp. Joan Maynard made clear her differences with those 
such as Martin Flannery who took a cautious view of achieving Irish unity and she 
articulated the arguments o f the ‘troops out’ lobby, calling on the government to set a date 
for the withdrawal of the British army. Flannery made clear that he believed that such a 
policy would risk a bloodbath and that such a risk was not worth taking. He went on to 
throw a novel argument at the Tories by supposing that “If a powerful, imperialist Ireland 
had been the order o f the day many years ago and had subjugated and taken over a weak
Irish Times, 9 Nov, 1983. 
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England and Scotland and, ultimately due to the force of circumstances, had carved out 
Lancashire and attached it to Ireland, we should certainly not be sitting quiet. We should 
be struggling for a united England, just as the Irish are now struggling for united Ireland 
and we should respect them for it.”2 * 0  At a joint press conference with Dick Spring in the 
June, Neil Kinnock expressed his support for Irish unity with the greatest enthusiasm 
shown to date. (This was quite a development in itself, considering the fact that Michael 
Foot never publicly endorsed ‘unity by consent’). “What Kinnock said this week was, 
almost exactly, what Soley has been saying for the last few years.” He set out the exact 
same proposals that Soley had already outlined in the Commons, so that as was pointed out 
at the time “the Kinnock endorsement o f the Soley approach now means that Labour has a 
definite policy shared by the party conference and by the party leader. Its been a long time 
since that was the case.”2*i Considering that Kinnock took on the Labour leadership 
vowing to ditch the Party’s attachment to what he described as ‘impossiblism’, one might 
be justified in speculating that without the New Ireland Forum and the change in 
Conservative policy in trying to accommodate Dublin in seeking a solution, such a unified 
commitment to the ‘unity by consent’ policy would never have been achieved; after all, 
there is little in the world o f politics which appears quite as ‘impossible’ as the winning o f  
Ulster Protestant support for the idea o f a unitary Irish state. However, when Kinnock was 
pressed on a timetable for a Labour government attaining a united Ireland he stated that 
such a goal would not be achieved for “many, many decades.”2*2
During the mid-eighties a number o f civil and legal rights issues emerged, around 
which the left began to focus. Along with the issue o f banning o f plastic bullets, which was
2*0 Vol. 63 Cols 71-79 (2 July 1984).
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agreed as Party policy in 1982, there emerged three other contentious matters; the strip 
searching o f women prisoners in Armagh prison, the introduction o f ‘supergrass’ trials and 
the question o f the ‘Diplock’ non-jury courts (which were brought under greater public 
scrutiny following the acquittal o f three RUC Officers connected with a series o f ‘shoot to 
kill’ allegations in June 1984). First o f all strip searching became a focal point for women’s 
groups within the Labour movement; it was the first specifically female issue to emerge 
from the Irish conflict. The practice had been introduced in 1982 following the 
disappearance o f a set o f warders keys in Armagh prison and consequently become a major 
campaigning issue for Sinn Fein. To begin with the Labour leadership were indifferent 
about the issue and Don Concannon had told James Prior in early 1983 “I do not suggest 
for a moment that he should give up the powers o f strip searching in Armagh women’s 
prison, but is it necessary to continue planned searches o f that kind, as I am afraid that it is 
providing a cause which the IRA, Sinn Fein and others are looking?” *^^  in May 1984 the 
annual Labour Women’s conference voted in favour of a resolution condemning strip 
searching; they also voted to oppose the Diplock courts and ‘supergrass’ trials. *^  ^ MPs 
Harriet Harman and Clare Short visited Armagh prison to look into the practice in early 
1984. Jo Richardson, as the Party’s front bench spokesperson on womens’ affairs, also 
visited the prison in November 1984 and concluded that strip searching “is being carried 
out as a way o f harassing and humiliating Republican women prisoners. I can’t understand 
why else the Government would allow itself to have all this criticism heaped on its head 
with so little in return.” *^^  The campaign was given further legitimacy within the Labour 
movement with the NIC/ICTU decision in 1985 to pass a motion condemning strip
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searching and calling for the abolition o f the practice.^*  ^ In Peter Archer the Labour Party 
had a spokesperson who needed little persuasion by the left to take up such an issue; his 
human rights background meant that Archer was personally shocked at the practice and 
was certainly enthusiastic in his opposition to it.2*7 Within weeks o f gaining his front bench 
position he said o f strip searching that “I believe that it does more harm than good... If we 
are to believe what we hear the way they are conducted is a major mistake... It seems that it 
is provocative to a degree which outweighs any possible security use.” *^* Two years later 
Archer was still pursuing the issue by holding a private meeting with the junior minister for 
Northern Ireland, Nicholas Scott, to persuade him to scrap the practice, not least because 
he believed that it was damaging Britain’s international r e p u t a t io n .^ * ^  The left were able to 
motivate and draw sections o f the movement into taking an interest in the Irish question 
through an emotive human rights issue such as the strip searching o f women prisoners and 
throughout these years there were constant visits by women’s groups, black groups, 
Labour councillors and various left-wing delegations to Northern Ireland; most o f which 
were hosted by Sinn Fein.^ o^ The contentious legal matters of the Diplock courts and the 
‘supergrass’ trials were vigorously pursued by groups such as the LCI but the Party’s front 
bench line was always one o f just cautious criticism.
The PL? was already firmly committed to opposition to the PTA and many o f the 
new Labour MPs were especially enthusiastic about opposing the draconian legal measures 
and could do so without the accusation o f having supported the introduction o f the Act a 
decade earlier. When in early 1984 the Home Secretary, David Waddington, accused the
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Labour Party o f a sudden change o f mind on the PTA, Clare Short and Harriet Harman 
leapt to the defence o f the PLP. Harman stated “Will the Minister accept that it is not a 
sudden change o f mind? What was sudden was the passing o f the prevention o f terrorism 
laws, and since then we have been able to reflect on their effect. It is in the light o f that 
experience that many people who agreed with the laws when they were first put on the 
statute book have genuinely changed their m i n d s . ” 2 9 i Harman and Short were typical of  
the new, energetic, ambitious left-wingers who had recently arrived in the House and they 
pursued such issues with particular vigour. (Harman had previously been a legal officer 
with the National Council for Civil Liberties.) At the time, many speculated that an 
incoming Labour government faced with a serious terrorist threat would be unlikely to fulfil 
the commitment to repeal such legislation. Difficult though it is to speculate what a Labour 
government in the mid-eighties might or might not have done, ‘New’ Labour in the mid­
nineties had decided that in order to achieve acceptance by the British public as a 
responsible party fit for government it needed to drop its opposition to the PTA; included 
on Labour’s front bench by this time were Clare Short and Harriet Harman. However, 
whilst criticism o f their silence in a PTA supporting shadow cabinet might be justified, one 
o f the first measures taken by the Blair government in 1997 was the dropping o f the use of 
exclusion orders. As for the Emergency Provisions Act, Labour voted against its renewal 
for the first time in July 1984, although as Archer explained in the Commons, the Party did 
not seek repeal o f the EPA but were disappointed with the government’s decision not to 
act on the advice o f the Baker report which had, in April, recommended a comprehensive 
set o f reforms to the A c t .  2 ^ 2  A t  the annual conference in October 1984 a composite motion 
which called for the abolition o f the Diplock courts, for an end to ‘supergrass’ trials and for
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an end to strip searching was narrowly passed by 3,000,000 votes to 2,624,000 despite 
NEC demands that the resolution be remitted.293 Although this decision was reversed at 
the following years conference and the decision was never accepted by the leadership as 
official policy, it did seem to give Archer the freedom to criticise the government more so 
than previously. Archer had always made public his criticisms o f strip searching but by late 
1985 he was unequivocal in his attacks on the Northern Ireland legal system: “The 
‘supergrass’ system is almost universally abhorred in Northern Ireland. In combination 
with the absence o f  juries it greatly increases the possibility of unsafe convictions... As part 
of our programme to restore confidence and return normality to Northern Ireland the next 
Labour Government will end the system which allows convictions on the basis o f  
uncorroborated accomplice evidence in the non jury courts o f Northern I r e l a n d .  ” 2 9 4
After the 1984 conference the shadow cabinet elections produced a right-wing shift 
which saw Eric Heffer lose his place and Kinnock chose to move Clive Soley to home 
affairs and appointed Stuart Bell as Archer’s new assistant. Bell (also a barrister) was a 
centre-right MP and secretary o f the right-wing Manifesto Group of Labour MPs who had 
never previously been associated with Northern Ireland. Although some on the left saw 
this as a deliberate right-wing shift on the part o f the leadership, Clive Soley had actually 
requested that he be moved. In addition to this, it did appear initially that Bell was likely to 
embark upon a slightly different course; he told the BBC “I will be placing more emphasis 
on tact and diplomacy, not that he [Soley] did not, but I think that I would personally 
prefer a softer approach to the p r o b l e m . ” 295 Early in 1985 a further development helped to 
convince many that Kinnock was engineering a shift away from ‘unity by consent’. A joint
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PLP/NEC committee had been set up after conference to look again into Labour’s 
Northern Ireland policy; the committee was chaired by the pro-nationalist MP Joan 
Maynard but in a vote o f no confidence she was defeated by four votes to three and was 
consequently replaced by the moderate trade unionist Alex Kitson.296 Many, such as Kevin 
Toolis o f the Irish Times and Chris Ryder o f the Times were arguing that Labour were 
embarking on a new strategy o f opposing any increase in Dublin’s role and toning down the 
commitment to re-unification.297 This was not the case: first o f all, rather than reducing 
Dublin’s role Neil Kinnock, inspired by the NIF, was becoming evermore disposed to the 
idea of joint authority. During a visit to Londonderry in December 1984 he said that he 
could not envisage an internal settlement but he did favour “joint authority especially in the 
economic areas- on employment policy, efforts to stimulate employment; trade policy.”^^ * 
In an RTE inteiwiew he stated that he did not foresee an immediate executive role for 
Dublin but explained that “In a process o f gradualism we are talking o f a problem centuries 
old in existence and over a decade in intensity. There cannot be an executive role but there 
may be some kind o f an advisory one. I believe in growing oaks; this may be an acorn.” 
When asked directly on joint authority he said “joint activity precedes joint authority”.299 it 
is here that we can see the beginning o f the divergence of opinion between the two main 
British parties mentioned earlier and one can only speculate as to what extent Kinnock was 
aware o f the deal that was being hammered out between London and Dublin, but there is 
no doubt that both the substance and rhetoric emanating from the Labour front bench 
during this period indicated that they were anticipating the new role that would be given to 
Dublin. Despite Thatcher’s hard-line rhetoric it was known that the new Secretary of
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State, Douglas Hurd favoured fiirther Dublin involvement and throughout 1985 speculation 
continued to increase that such a such a deal was imminent.^ ®® Tony Benn argued, at the 
1984 annual conference, that London and Dublin were “trying to do some sort of deal that 
would safeguard the face o f the British Government but would begin to nudge the North 
into a new relationship.” ®^^ The Labour front bench team were well aware o f the direction 
in which the government were moving in. Peter Archer has stated that government 
ministers were keen to try and involve the Labour Party in what was going on and 
undoubtedly sought a return to bipartisanship; but Archer’s response was to try and keep 
his distance because although a divergence o f  opinion might have been developing around 
recognition o f the Irish dimension, Labour wanted to be seen to be maintaining a distinctive
position.2®2
Regardless o f developments on Labour’s front bench and the evident beginning o f  
the Party’s right-wing drift, amongst the rank and file the troops out/united Ireland 
sentiment continued to dominate what was a very different debate. The ongoing polemic, 
which was led by mainly Ken Livingstone and Tony Benn, was concerned not with how 
best to achieve re-unification or reconciliation but, being essentially based on an anti­
imperialist analysis, evolved around the idea o f British withdrawal as well as the related 
questions o f dealing with the ‘blood bath’ scenario, the suggestion that UN troops could 
replace British troops and the notion that the whole issue was cold war related, assuming 
that the British government’s overriding concern was the Republic’s refusal to enter 
NATO. Throughout 1984 Tony Benn was consistently arguing that “We should 
understand that the occupation o f Ireland is primarily a defence issue - it is like a curious
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cul-de-sac frontier o f NATO.” ®^^ Later in the year he told Marxism Today that “we have a 
long running war in Ireland where the real motive is not to protect the Protestant minority, 
but to maintain a NATO presence on that island. Because since the Republic is a neutral 
country any re-unification o f Ireland under the Irish constitution would mean that Ireland 
was no longer a member o f NATO.”204 Fanciful and speculative these accusations might 
have appeared, (they were not given much notice by the Labour leadership) Benn was no 
doubt convinced by certain soundings from the Tory back benches. In October 1984 
Michael Mates, the Tory chair o f the Inter-Party Committee on Irish Affairs, told a meeting 
in the Republic that Britain giving up control o f Northern Ireland would be difficult “but if 
enough wanted it we might give way.” In addition and most significantly he argued that 
only Irish insistence on retaining neutrality would prevent it: “There you would have a 
stumbling-block twice the size o f any other.”2®^ The theory was given greater validity 
when in 1985 the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed and Enoch Powell immediately stated 
his belief that the accord was the result o f a deal with the USA to achieve an expansion o f  
NATO bases in the Republic.^®  ^ Benn was to be joined by the Daily Mirror’s Joe Haines 
who as a one time adviser to Harold Wilson carried considerable weight in also arguing that 
the NATO issue “‘was an obstacle to withdrawal.’”2®? Ken Livingstone on the other hand 
was relatively dismissive o f this issue pointing out that “Now that NATO has got its 
listening post on Mount Gabriel, the military arguments for Britain remaining in the North 
are gone - Ireland is now effectively part o f NATO.” ®^* It was partly for this reason that 
he believed the Tories were prepared to sign the Anglo-Irish Agreement now that Northern 
Ireland was no longer o f such strategic importance with the Republic, as he argued, having
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become a full member o f the western alliance in all but name.^ ®^  j f  anything these 
contrasting arguments were more than the usual left-wing splits but rather an indication o f  
the left’s inability to deal with the changes developing in British party political attitudes to 
Ireland (North and South). On the question of deploying UN troops Tony Benn was 
completely on his own arguing that “If you are to deal with the problem, you have to have 
something to say about the risk that a blood bath might happen... In a way the UN fimction 
would be to cover a withdrawal and pave the way for something else.”^^® He believed that 
the idea would generate debate but in fact the overwhelming majority o f the left were 
hostile to the idea and over the years Benn gradually abandoned it.
During the mid-eighties a number o f trade unions started to break the tradition of 
silence on the Irish question and initiated a change in attitudes towards the ideas and 
aspirations o f Irish nationalism. The most important development was the decision by the 
National Union o f Railwaymen to adopt a resolution at their annual general meeting in 
1985 which stated that the union supported “the principle o f the reunification o f Ireland and 
urges discussion with the government o f the Irish Republic... it being understood that while 
every effort should be taken to secure reconciliation and consent, the Unionists o f Northern 
Ireland cannot be allowed a permanent veto on constitutional c h a n g e . I n  Jimmy Knapp 
they had a leader who was sympathetic to Irish nationalist aspirations, but as a Scot he was 
also sensitive to the problem of sectarianism having encountered sectarian tension in the 
west o f  Scotland. The NUR also did not have the problem o f a Northern Ireland 
membership and so could adopt such a position without fear o f  a backlash from loyalist 
railwaymen in the province. It was argued by some on the Labour left that the Northern
308 Livingstone, K. in Collins, M. (ed.) Ireland After Britain (1985) p,2I.
2®9 Tribune, 20 Dec. 1985 and Labour and Ireland, Vol. 2 No. 10 (Jan-March 1986), 
Labour and Ireland, Vol 2. N o .l (Autumn 1983).
Ibid. Vol. 2 No. 10 (Jan-March 1986).
108
Ireland trade union branches carried out a ‘loyalist veto’ of their own, preventing debate on
what they decided was not a trade union issue. As was explained in the last chapter some
unions had legitimate reasons for avoiding the issue. However, although the accusation
that many unions were dominated by loyalists was rather an exaggeration, the GMB was
put in the embarrassing position in 1983 o f being found guilty by the Fair Employment
Agency o f discriminating against Catholics in the Harland and Wolff shipyard. Although
the GMB had an arrangement with the employer whereby new recruits should be taken
from amongst the union’s unemployed membership, they were in fact allowing them to
employ new non-union workers ahead o f unemployed Catholic members o f the Union. The
GMB were consequently fined. i^  ^ Following the example set by the Associated Staffs for a
United Ireland, another new pressure group was established in December 1984, this time in
NALGO. Martin Sachs was the organiser o f the NALGO Campaign for a United Ireland
which was ultimately rather more successful than the ASUI. With NALGO their mainr
opponents in the union were the Conservative group, but o f greater significance was the 
fact that they did not have a Northern Ireland membership to hinder their campaign.^i^ The 
ASTMS, by contrast, was organised in both Northern Ireland and the Republic and so the 
Irish question was considered a particularly contentious and potentially divisive issue. The 
ASUI pressure group inside the ASTMS were not making the progress that they had hoped 
for and were arguing that at the organising committee for the 1985 annual conference the 
Northern Ireland region delegate tried to prevent having Ireland on the agenda and argued 
that if a troops out resolution was debated and passed by conference then “the security o f  
full time officials could not be guaranteed.”3i4 The nearest the ASUI came to achieving its
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objective o f winning the ASTMS over to a policy favouring Irish unity was at the union’s 
annual conference in May 1986. There were determined attempts to keep Ireland off the 
conference agenda with delegates arguing that resolutions on Ireland were contrary to rule 
32 (which prevented the union signing up to single issue campaigns) and amendments 
calling for troops out were indeed ruled out o f order. The motion which was finally passed 
stated that the conference “notes the Labour Party’s commitment to the reunification of 
Ireland, but because of the continuing suffering o f trade unionists of all denominations in 
the North o f Ireland, Conference instructs the NEC to: Encourage Divisions and branches 
to obtain information about the situation in Ireland” to “Promote open discussions on Irish 
issues” and also to “Organise day and weekend c o u r s e s ”  . 3 It must be said that part o f the 
reason for these minor successes by the pro-Irish unity lobby in the trade union movement 
was the fact that no such attempt had previously been made to change the unions’ policies 
on Ireland and so the first attempt was always likely to yield a few results; but ushering in a 
sea change was not what was taking place.
At the 1986 Labour Party annual conference the National Union o f Mineworkers 
became the first union to vote in favour o f the composite motion in favour o f British 
withdrawal fi'om Northern Ireland.3^6 This historic decision and the developments 
mentioned earlier in the movement were partly the result o f three or four years o f work by 
various pressure groups, most notably the Labour Committee on Ireland, who deliberately 
focused on the trade unions in the knowledge that their votes were vital if they were to 
change Labour Party policy on Ireland through the annual conferences. During the miners’ 
strike o f 1984-5 the union established contact with various support groups in Ireland and
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had the support of Sinn Fein who helped collect funds for the striking miners.31? Along 
with the Labour Committee on Ireland offering free membership to striking miners, there 
were also low level contacts being established by Sinn Fein and the Troops Out Movement 
with rank and file miners, miners’ wives and their supporters. For example, Birmingham 
Trades Council sent a delegation to Northern Ireland which included striking miners and 
part o f the visit included observing a ‘supergrass’ trial.3i* Such activities prompted Don 
Concannon (who was sponsored by the NUM) to condemn these developments arguing 
that “the only things they can teach miners is how to make bombs and kill policemen. 
Many o f them are nothing more than terrorists and they can do nothing to advance the 
cause o f the striking m i n e r s . ” 3 19 The politicisation that developed as a result o f the miners’ 
strike was evident in the new found relationships which were established with elements 
such as black groups and gay and lesbian groups. Along with these developments which 
would have been unlikely during the sixties and seventies, the new found interest in the 
Irish question on the part o f the NUM was also created partly as a result o f pressure 
groups, such as the LCI, looking to build on the empathy between the miners, who met 
such fierce state opposition during their year long strike, and the beleaguered northern Irish 
nationalist community. With the LCI deliberately trying to get matters such as RUC 
excesses, use o f plastic bullets, the PTA and strip searching on the agenda, they were able 
present the Irish problem to the unions as a matter o f state repression versus popular 
resistance. By 1987 Martin Collins o f the LCI was explaining that “Because these issues all 
now have a very big majority in the unions people are much more open about discussing 
other aspects o f the problem. We’ve managed to win a certain legitimacy for Ireland to be
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discussed; if you want to talk about Ireland it doesn’t mean you’re a terrorist.”32o They 
saw the civil liberties issues as a way o f securing a foot hold in the movement in order to 
try and place British withdrawal and Irish unity on the trade union agenda. However, 
despite understandable optimism the successes that they witnessed with the NUM and NUR 
were not to prove to be the launch pad for a major change throughout the rest o f the trade 
union movement which would translate into votes at the Labour Party conference. Even 
with the presence o f  groups such as the Associated Staffs for a United Ireland (who, 
despite persistent pressure, never achieved what was achieved in the NUM and NUR) over 
the coming years only minor changes took place in terms o f trade union policy on Ireland. 
If Neil Kinnock’s election as leader in 1983 signalled a steady shift towards the centre 
ground and an attempt to appeal to moderate opinion in the wider electorate, then these 
changes in the trade unions in the aftermath o f the miners’ strike must have appeared 
potentially problematic for future Labour Party conferences. But, as has been said, rather 
than this being the beginning o f a sea change in the unions, these minor changes were only 
as far as the LCI could really push the movement. The turbulent political environment 
which existed also provided a favourable atmosphere for the campaigners to promote 
radical ideas such as Irish unity which they felt would sit comfortably with the commitment
to unilateral nuclear disarmament, the demand for sanctions against South Africa and
ropposition to US interference in central America; policies which most trade unions already 
supported. The inner city riots o f 1981 and other events have already been mentioned in 
the last chapter as contributory factors in the changes in Labour attitudes to the Irish 
question. By the mid-1980s a heady political atmosphere still existed under the Thatcher 
government, with further inner city riots taking place in 1985 and following the bitter year
320 Fortnight, op cit.
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long miners’ strike the wider Labour and trade union movement appeared, in many ways, 
to be almost traumatised by the emotional strain o f the strike and its historic importance. 
With this in mind, it can be understood why a number o f unions, especially the NUM, were 
prepared look at adopting a more radical position on Northern Ireland in order to at least 
be seen to be taking a progressive and radically different line on Ireland as compared to the 
Thatcher government. But in the years ahead it would continue to be mainly the 
Constituency Labour Parties that were to vote for British withdrawal from Northern 
Ireland at the annual conferences.
A number o f other issues were forced into the debate amongst the Labour left as a 
consequence o f various new developments in Ireland. The first o f which was the matter o f 
the référendums in the Republic which included the vote in 1983 in favour o f an anti­
abortion amendment to the constitution and the 1986 vote to oppose the introduction of 
divorce. Many, including some on the far left especially in certain Trotskyite groups, 
pointed to these decisions as justification for Protestant opposition to Dublin involvement 
in the North and to any notion o f Irish re-unification. For example, after the 1986 vote 
against divorce some on the left such as Anne Dawson, writing in Labour Weekly, 
concluded “The Irish people have effectively voted for partition. They have said their 
specific fears and confusion over the introduction o f divorce are more important than the 
religious freedom of a minority on the island... Unionists can now legitimately ask why 
should they allow the republic’s government to have any say in their affairs.”32i Ken 
Livingstone had always tried to counter such arguments by stating “That misreads the 
situation. If you talk to Protestants in Northern Ireland, they share all those values 
[opposition to abortion and to homosexuality] o f the Catholics in Southern Ireland.” On the
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wider question o f Britain’s role in safeguarding Protestant rights he said “why should we as 
British people intervene in the politics o f the Irish people... I think that reflects the 
systematic racism o f the British Establishment, reflected among many people in this country 
towards the I r i s h . ” 322 To a certain extent he was trying to play down Protestant fears 
about the Republic in much the same way as Sinn Fein were doing, but his attitude to 
Britain’s relationship with Ireland was in stark contrast to that o f the Soley school o f  
thought which believed in the idea that Britain could play a progressive role in Ireland’s 
future.
Another development which highlighted the contrast in the two schools o f thought 
was the consistent findings o f opinion polls revealing that there was a majority in Britain 
which favoured British government withdrawal from Northern Ireland. A Daily 
Express/Mon opinion poll in May 1984 revealed that 53% of those questioned favoured 
British withdrawal from Northern Ireland^ ^^  and a LWT/Mori opinion poll in August 1984 
showed that were a referendum to be held on the constitutional fijture o f Northern Ireland 
53% o f those questioned in Britain would vote in favour o f ending the province’s inclusion 
in the United Kingdom. The LCI drew attention to these findings as often as possible, as 
did the likes o f Benn and Livingstone, the latter complaining that newspapers who were 
always “predicting the demise o f the Labour Party never find themselves able to give the 
same degree o f coverage to the findings o f the same opinion poll organisations which find 
year after year that two-thirds o f people in Britain would vote in a referendum to get out o f  
Ireland tomorrow.”324 Clearly a powerful argument had emerged to counter those who 
pointed to the majority in Northern Ireland who favoured the Union; it was now evident
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that a majority on the other side o f the water did not seem to favour the continuation o f the 
Union and some took up the argument with much the same feeling as Wilson a decade 
earlier, which was that the people o f Great Britain and their taxes were o f greater 
importance than the one million Protestants o f Ulster. Indeed when Concannon was 
pressed by Enoch Powell, during the heady days o f summer 1981, on whether Labour 
sought to remove the Protestant people’s guarantee that Ulster remain a part o f the UK he 
said “I believe that when I referred to the guarantee, I said that there were 50 million 
guarantors [in Britain] also looking for progress in Northern I r e l a n d . ” 325 As the eighties 
wore on it appeared that a unique situation was developing in British political history. 
Whilst a majority in Northern Ireland clearly favoured continuance o f the Union, such a 
clear majority did not now appear to exist in Britain. This had not been the case at the 
beginning o f the ‘troubles’ when only a very small minority favoured British withdrawal, 
but since the collapse o f the power-sharing Executive in 1974 a majority has developed 
which favours an end to British government involvement perhaps as an expression of 
despair precisely because o f the failure o f initiatives such as S u n n in g d a le .3 2 6  Whenever 
colonies o f the British Empire were relinquished in the past it was only as a result of 
demands for decolonisation by the subject peoples and by the international community, 
especially the US. The British people have always wanted to resist giving up a colony as 
was seen with the Falklands War o f 1982 which commanded overwhelming public support 
and the question o f Scottish independence which provokes very different language in 
British Party politics especially amongst the Tories who, whilst talking o f only maintaining 
Ulster within the Union if a majority wants it, dismiss Scottish devolution unequivocally
Hansard, Vol. 7 Col. 1038 (2 July 1981).
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because they fear it will precipitate the beginning o f the break up o f the UK just as they did 
with the Irish Home Rule Bills at the turn o f the century. For some on the left this was an 
important development, although for many it was just the result o f anti-Irish racism on the 
part o f the English people and not the expression o f concern for the future o f Ireland. Or 
as Clive Soley did in fact argue “the British people do not really recognise them as British. 
The British see them as Irish.”^^ ? However, neither Soley nor Archer or anyone else on 
Labour’s front bench ever took up the issue as reason enough to work towards 
disengagement from Northern Ireland simply on that basis, but remained committed to the 
notion that Britain was duty bound to work to find a solution and simply could not 
extricate itself from the situation until London and Dublin had managed to bring Protestant 
Ulster into an all-Ireland arrangement.
Over many years Labour leaders have, time and again, pointed to the importance o f  
the will o f  the British people as pre-eminent over those o f Northern Ireland; these include 
Harold Wilson after Sunningdale, James Callaghan during the hunger strikes, when he 
called for Ulster independence, and then during the eighties some in the Labour Party began 
to point to a similar sentiment beginning to emerge in the Conservative Party. Clive Soley 
had already made reference to it and in the run up to the Anglo-Irish Agreement Peter 
Archer, after less than two years in his job, made the following observation in a debate on 
direct rule: “It is not the case that the British Government want to run the affairs o f 
Northern Ireland. Those who insist that the Government are clinging to Northern Ireland 
as a miser clings to his gold are simply wrong. It is not an example o f a colonial power 
reluctant to let go. Indeed the reverse is true; the British Government do not want to rule 
Northern Ireland... There is no electoral advantage for the Government. Frankly they do
Hansard, Vol. 87 Col. 820 (26 Nov. 1985).
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not care about Archer presented this as an attack on the government and gave the
impression to the Unionists that he believed Labour would be more sympathetic by 
suggesting that Northern Ireland debates should not just be slotted in at the end o f a day’s 
parliamentary proceedings. It was not the case that Labour was any different, but 
nevertheless a new (although short lived) understanding emerged between the Labour Party 
and the Unionists which resulted in an opposition debate being given over to the Unionists 
to move a motion on the impending Dublin/London agreement. Meanwhile Martin 
Flannery, as chair o f Labour’s Parliamentary committee on Northern Ireland, articulated 
left-wing/back bench sentiment best when, in a change o f tactics, he also took up the issue 
of public opinion, arguing that “It is time the British people began to intervene or it is clear 
that no hope is emanating from the Northern Ireland Unionist parties... If a referendum 
were held, we would have to come out o f Northern Ireland straight away. At least 70 per 
cent, o f the British people would say that it was time that we came out. The British people 
were ready to intervene, but time has gone, and a sense o f helplessness pervades us.”329 Jt 
would be accurate to say that this sentiment does in fact run very deep and thet
intransigence o f the Unionists, as Callaghan argued in 1981, only helped to reinforce the 
resentment engendered by the assumption that Britain should continue to safeguard their 
interests indefinitely.
In spite o f the short-lived understanding between Labour and the Unionists at 
Westminster, throughout most o f 1985 there appeared to be little to indicate that Labour 
were to start their predicted opposition to any further Dublin involvement and to start 
watering down their commitment to Irish unity; in actual fact the front bench team seemed 
to be articulating the Party’s policy with as much vigour as during the Clive Soley era. The
328 Ibid. Vol. 82 Col. 978 (26 June 1985).
329 Ibid. Col. 1012.
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question o f the UDR which had never previously been raised by the Labour front bench, 
was taken up by Peter Archer at a public meeting in the February at which he said “the 
Government should seriously consider phasing out the Ulster Defence Regiment, which has 
clearly lost the trust o f the nationalist community with the result that its efficiency can only 
be limited.”33o It is worth noting that despite this, four months later two Scottish back 
bench Labour MPs, Harry Ewing and Ian Campbell, joined with Ian Paisley and others in 
signing an early day motion congratulating the UDR on its fifteen years in existence and for 
its “selfless devotion to duty.”331 i f  nothing else, this at least indicated the continuing 
presence of a quiet pro-Unionist minority. Stuart Bell continually spoke o f achieving unity 
through Dublin often in unusually idealistic terms; in July he told a meeting in Manchester 
“It is in the national interest that we have a united Ireland... The dream of Irish unity has 
lasted too long for it not to be made a reality. The dream however must come true in our 
lifetime, not from here to etemity.”332 His repeated calls for greater Dublin involvement 
seem to indicate that Labour were rightly anticipating that the forthcoming Westminster- 
Dublin deal would take matters in precisely that direction. He told Labour Weekly that “A 
future Labour government will create Irish unity through Dublin. To this end it will begin 
with the setting up o f joint committees with senior civil servants to develop the political, 
economic and social harmonisation programmes that will be necessary to re-unite the two 
parts o f Ireland in peace and prosperity.”333 it is also significant that at this juncture Clive 
Soley, whilst at the shadow Home Office, drew up contingency plans for what a Labour 
government should do to deal with unionist/Protestant opposition in the event o f the 
election of a Labour government committed to Irish re-unification. Included in the
Irish Times, 4 Feb. 1985.
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proposals for dealing with strikes, boycotts and paramilitary violence were the options of 
using the security forces against the loyalists and in the event o f Parliament going ahead 
with an Act o f Irish Unity he proposed tackling loyalist violence with Irish troops backed 
up by the British army.334 Such plans were not endorsed by the leadership but the ideas 
suggested in the document do present us with an insight into the thinking o f those who 
might be considered moderate united Irelanders but nevertheless were not unaware o f the 
possible violent upheaval such pro-nationalist policies may well engender. Stuart Bell also 
argued consistently for “A parliamentary tier” to be “added to the Anglo-Irish 
intergovernmental council which meets at ministerial level.”335 in conjunction with the 
Tory MP, Peter Temple Morris, and others Bell did indeed help to set up the British-Irish 
Interparliamentary Body.336 Such contributions from Bell even led some in the LCI to 
show a guarded enthusiasm for his early performance337 and the Tribune journalist Phil 
Kelly concluded that “Labour MPs who have been closely involved in Northern Ireland 
policy agreed that while Mr Bell’s contribution was delphic in parts, it represented a clear 
shift by the front bench towards backing for a united Ireland.”33« Even the Times expressed 
its dismay that the right-wing Stuart Bell had stuck to such a pro-nationalist agenda, 
agreeing in September 1986 to share a conference fringe meeting platform with Sinn Fein’s 
Tommy Carroll despite the Labour leadership’s disquiet.339 Bell has explained that such 
decisions were arrived at in order “to keep o f the platform others who were more friendly 
and who might give a false indication o f Labour’s position”.34o The idealism which 
characterised Labour’s contributions throughout 1985 was eventually to come to an end;
334 See Appendix A.
335 Ibid. 23 Nov. 1985.
336 Bell, S. Letter o f reply, Nov. 1996.
337 Ibid. 30 Nov. 1985.
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the run up to the signing o f the Hillsborough Agreement and a brief period immediately 
afterwards were to be the high point in Labour’s enthusiastic commitment to the notion of 
Irish re-unification during this particular Parliament,
Labour’s response to the government’s signing o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 
November 1985 was one o f unequivocal support. In some cases, so exuberant was the 
optimism of certain elements in the Party it appears, in retrospect, rather naive. Tribune 
declared that “It will take the Unionists a long time to accept it, but the Anglo-Irish 
agreement signed on Sunday means that a united Ireland is inevitable... Irish unity is being 
planned over a timespan o f decades” and they thanked Thatcher for initiating “the demise 
o f Unionism as a political f o r c e . Neil Kinnock pursued the argument that Labour had 
held the right position throughout, stating that “My party was the only party in Britain 
which gave the Forum the interest it deserved” and went on to lavish praise on Margaret 
Thatcher; “I do not underestimate her effort. I say without any taunt that it has involved a 
significant and welcome adjustment in her position over the last six y e a r s . ” 342 Stuart Bell 
declared that “The Hillsborough agreements shall provide a framework for a future Labour 
government to advance towards its own policy goal - that o f a united Ireland.” He also 
argued that Article 1 of the Agreement, which provided for change in the status o f 
Northern Ireland if majority consent was expressed, meant that “This kills at a stroke all 
talk of a Unionist veto.”343 it is evident that Hillsborough created a great deal o f confusion 
throughout the left with the LCI and the Bennite left arguing in direct contradiction to Bell 
that the agreement reinforced the loyalist veto. Confusion was aided by the delight at 
witnessing such intense Unionist opposition which was countered by the reality that this
341 Tribune, 22 Nov. 1985.
Hansard, Vol. 87 Col. 755 (26 Nov. 1985). 
343 Labour Weekly, 22 Nov. 1985.
120
was an agreement between the most right-wing government in post-war British history and 
a moderate/conservative Irish government. Some on the left took their lead from Sinn Fein 
and deduced that the deal was the brainchild of the SDLP designed to marginalise 
republicanism and bolster constitutional nationalism. Ken Livingstone’s immediate 
response was to argue that “the main reason behind the Agreement is an attempt to 
undermine electoral support for Sinn Fein.”344 Although a few MPs abstained in the vote 
on the accord in the House o f Commons, such as Clare Short, Kevin McNamara, Denis 
Canavan and Martin Flannery (who began the Parliamentary debate committed to opposing 
the accord), there were only fourteen Labour MPs who voted against; among them were 
the two Militants; Dave Nellist and Terry Fields, as well as the usual pro-republicans such 
as Tony Benn, Joan Maynard, Denis Skinner, Jeremy Corbyn and Ernie Roberts, but also 
Tam Dalyell.345 The Militants took a rather sceptical view but not for the same reasons as 
the pro-Sinn Fein left. First o f all they took a cynical view o f the two governments’ 
decision arguing that the British ruling class were in fact looking for a way to get out o f  
Ireland and took the broadly accurate view that the southern Irish parties had very little 
desire for a united Ireland because they would not want the responsibility o f trying to 
incorporate the one million Ulster Protêstants.346 However, as usual they were primarily 
concerned with the implications for the Irish working classes and Dave Nellist declared, in 
an article in Militant, that “This agreen^ent is a purely cosmetic exercise which is doomed 
to failure” arguing, in addition, that it offered nothing to the Catholic working class in 
addition to heightening the fears and anxieties o f the Protestant working class. He then 
goes on to argue for “a rational, sane, socialist united Ireland - freely and voluntarily
344 Tribune, 20 Dec. 1985.
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federated to a socialist B r i t a i n ” . 3 4 7  This, more than anything argued by the non-
Marxist/pro-Sinn Fein left, is an attempt at setting out an idealistic goal which bears little 
relation to the complex problem of an ethno-national conflict and also ignores the will o f  
the majority o f  nationalist Ireland which has never shown any enthusiasm for the idea o f a 
return to a formal link with Britain - federal or otherwise. Martin Flannery, o f Labour’s 
back bench Northern Ireland committee and a moderate pro-nationalist, also decided to 
take a similarly sceptical line arguing that “The agreement strengthens the border. It makes 
the policy o f a united Ireland more difficult because it gives the border a spurious 
legitimacy and almost entrenches it in international law.” He went on to make the novel 
demand for a United Kingdom wide referendum on the future o f Northern Ireland. 34» Tam 
Dalyell pursued the line that a solution from above would always fail; “As long as the 
British Army is there - 1 am not criticising the forces - this problem will go on and on. I 
would pull them out... if left to themselves, the Irish would sort something out, a 
reasonable, viable solution.”349 Dalyell presented the argument that the English are 
historically, simply incapable o f ruling Ireland and in contrast to Soley and later McNamara 
who believed in a British Labour government finding a solution, he was articulating a 
recurring theme on the left, namely that Britain should stand back from the situation, not 
because hers is an immoral imperialist presence but because the solution will be found much 
sooner if the two traditions find themselves in a position where they will have to come to an 
agreement precisely because the vacuum left by a British withdrawal will present them with 
a challenge that they cannot ignore not least for the sake o f the future o f  their own country. 
This was what Neil Kinnock was to describe as the ‘politics o f Pontius Pilate’ but then even 
Peter Aicher was to concede, a year later, that “One o f the few propositions which
347 Ibid. 6 Dec. 1985.
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commands universal acceptance in Ireland is that the English cannot govern.”35o jn 
anticipation o f the Hillsborough agreement, Peter Archer had already tried to pre-empt 
those on the left who were predicting a London/Dublin ‘sell out’ and declared that Labour 
must support any such deal because “We can’t be seen to be more Irish than the Irish.”35: 
In the Commons debate he presented a interesting and idealistic analysis o f the concept o f  
the nation state and the problem o f territorial claims over Northern Ireland. Archer was 
pro-European Union and has described himself as a world federalist; it is also important to 
note that he harboured considerable sympathy for the Workers’ Party whose analysis he 
believed represented common sense, the like o f which did not emanate from any o f the 
other Irish parties.352 in his Commons contribution he claimed that “the 19th century 
concept o f sovereignty is outmoded.” “I suspect that the assumption that every square foot 
of the earth’s surface must lie within the exclusive jurisdiction o f one nation state and that 
no other Government must presume to intervene may not prove to be appropriate to the 
way in which the human race wishes to order its affairs in the 21st century.”353 This could 
be interpreted as an allusion towards the idea o f joint sovereignty; this may or may not be 
the case but it at least represented a refreshing attempt at breaking out from the traditional 
arguments and dogmas.
The LCI specifically dismissed Archer’s jibe about being more Irish than the Irish 
(as well as the Tribune editorial) and argued that the accord “recognises in a formal and 
binding agreement, the subordination o f the Irish government to the interests of the British 
establishment... Margaret Thatcher has enlisted the Dublin government to help maintain the 
partition o f Ireland upon which both their interests depend.” As for Labour’s response in
349 Ibid. Vol. 87 Col. 940.
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Parliament they declared that “If the Labour leadership were seen to grasp the nettle of the 
Irish question by breaking with bipartisanship and arguing for unity; it has been spun 
disastrously off course by the Anglo-Irish Accord.”^^"^ This statement might at first appear 
typically over dramatic but in actual fact it would be accurate to say that Hillsborough did 
draw Labour away from its clear partisan position through supporting the accord, but it 
was the government which had begun to spin off its pro-Unionist course thereby shifting 
the centre ground on the Irish debate. Nevertheless people such as the LCI, Tony Benn 
and Ken Livingstone were in a very small minority in immediately expressing their 
opposition, even Clare Short initially gave a cautious welcome to the agreement: “My own 
view is that the treaty is o f historic importance. Unionism has been exposed in all its 
intransigence and unreasonableness.”^^  ^ One o f the problems with the Unionist reaction 
was that after five years o f Labour rethinking its position due to the hunger strikes, the 
electoral rise o f Sinn Fein and the New Ireland Forum, the 1974 UWC strike and the 
strength of Unionism as a popular political force had almost been forgotten in their quest to 
adopt a more nationalist agenda. Some on the left, as the Tribune editorial displayed, took 
the view that the Unionist response indicated that the initiative must have been a 
progressive development. However, the problem for those in the Party with a serious eye 
on power was how could a Labour government resist an ongoing Unionist campaign 
bearing in mind the humiliation o f 1974? Neil Kinnock was reminded o f the strength of 
loyalist feeling when he was met with anti-Hillsborough protests at the Harland and Wolff 
shipyard during a visit to Belfast three weeks after the agreement was signed.^^  ^ Although 
the official Labour position was that Hillsborough was a positive step forward, the initial
Labour and Ireland, No. 10. 
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euphoria finally gave way to a realisation that it had also once again exposed the depth of 
polarisation between the two traditions and was an indication o f just how far Labour could 
realistically expect to take their ideals in the face o f determined loyalist resistance should 
Labour be returned to government.
In the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement there was a marked increase in 
violence in Northern Ireland from all sides; something which Clare Short had accurately 
predicted. The consequence was that British party politics went through a phase o f despair 
and despondency. The Labour Party especially began to lose the idealism and enthusiasm 
of the previous years and with the approach o f  a general election began to adopt a more 
flexible approach towards the Ulster Unionists. The reaction o f Protestant Ulster certainly 
impressed and worried a great number o f people within the Labour m o v e m e n t . M a n y  on 
the left displayed considerable irritation and frustration at the show o f strength exhibited by 
the Unionists; Clare Short responded to Ian Paisley’s setting up o f the semi-paramilitary 
‘Ulster Resistance’ by calling on the government to shun the DUP for its incitement to 
violence in the same manner that it did with Sinn Fein. She even complained that, in 
addition, the DUP drew parliamentary salaries whilst Sinn Fein did not and so was doubly 
penalised.^^® The Labour front bench grew more suspicious o f the government’s real 
intentions especially when, a fortnight after the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, the 
Secretary o f State Tom King announced in Brussels that it indicated that “the Prime 
Minister o f the Republic o f Ireland... has in fact accepted that for all practical purposes and 
into perpetuity, there will never be a united Ireland.”^^  ^ Although Peter Archer 
immediately called for a statement in the House o f Commons from King, the damage had
Opinion polls revealed that less tlian 10% o f Protestants in Nortliern Ireland approved o f tlie 
Agreement. Cox, W.H. ‘Public Opinion and the Anglo-Irish Agreement’ Government and Opposition 
Vol. 22 (1987).
Belfast Telegraph, 28 Nov. 1986.
359 Ibid. 4 Dec. 1985.
125
already been done and o f course the opponents o f Hillsborough on the left appeared to 
have been vindicated. In the Commons Tony Benn accused the government o f trying to 
present the agreement in a favourable light to Dublin and to Washington in order to win 
their support, whereas King’s admission revealed that the agenda was still partitionist.^^o 
Archer was disappointed in the outcome o f the Accord and has conceded that different 
people and different parties had very different ideas about what it was supposed to achieve. 
His own hope had always been that somehow the two governments would work to bring 
people together on the ground in Northern Ireland on the ‘bread and butter’ issues o f jobs, 
housing and health, thus pushing the constitutional question to the periphery o f political 
debate.361 There had long been a sizeable, perhaps majority, element in the Labour 
movement that disliked seeing working class people so pre-occupied with the ‘national 
question’ and yearned to instead see them unite in struggling for social and economic 
improvements which would enhance their everyday lives. Nevertheless it was fanciful to 
say the least to believe that Hillsborough would do anything to change that, because for the 
Protestant community the agreement evidently pushed them fiirther back into their ‘laager’. 
If the Anglo-Irish Agreement was not necessarily going to take government policy in the 
direction that Labour had hoped, then as the months went by it became evident that the 
shadow front bench was certainly not going to do as Bell had at first claimed: “keeping a 
vigilant eye on the reluctant Tories across the eye of the house of commons” and to “chivvy 
the government towards implementation”.3^ 2 With the Labour Party annual conference in 
September 1985 throwing out the composite resolution calling for an end to the use of 
plastic bullets, an end to strip searching and scrapping o f the PTA after the NEC had called
Hansard, Vol. 88 Col. 300 (4 Dec. 1985). 
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for remittaP63 it did seem to appear that, along with the slow but steady right-wing shift 
taking place throughout the Party, the enthusiasm for tackling the Irish question was also 
gradually starting to wane.
It was during 1986 that speculation became rife that Kinnock’s determination to 
make the Party electable and ensure that a Labour government would be formed at some 
point in the coming months, that Labour’s position on Ireland was to be compromised. In 
July 1984 the Party had set up a joint NEC/PLP working party to revise Northern Ireland 
policy in preparation for the next general election and its political complexion and 
composition was rather more pro-Irish nationalist than the 1981 Study Group. Its 
membership included the front bench spokespersons and eight NEC members in addition to 
MPs Kevin McNamara, Derek Fatchett, Pat Duffy, Martin Flannery, Clare Short, Clive 
Soley and Lord Jock Stallard all o f whom were supportive o f the idea o f Irish re- 
unification.364 However, in March 1986 the Guardian reported that the joint working party 
was in fact proposing to “side step” the commitment to re-unification.365 in reply Peter 
Archer wrote to the paper to refute the claim and stated that Party commitment to re­
unification was as strong as ever but that the working party had a limited staff and so the 
final statement was not to be as comprehensive as h o p e d . I n  fact the working party had 
held few meetings since the previous summer and, if anything, the problem was that Ireland 
was simply slipping down the Party’s list o f priorities. Archer stated that the NEC wanted 
to abandon the policy review altogether in order to concentrate on what they saw as more 
important issues, but pressure from the front bench team persuaded them otherwise.^^? The 
discussions in the working party evolved around the question o f how to develop the current
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policy and give a clearer definition o f ‘consent’. For example the questions were raised; 
should there be a referendum of Northern Ireland or of all Ireland? Or, if not by 
referendum how was consent to be given. It was through these discussions that the left 
suggested that the policy statement should read Irish unity by a ‘significant’ degree o f  
consent. Clare Short and Kevin McNamara were in favour o f the change as was Peter 
Archer, but he has explained that along with the fact that Neil Kinnock and Stuart Bell 
were uncomfortable about the proposal the two factors which made the change unlikely 
were, first o f all, Alex Kitson’s chairmanship o f the working party, because he was 
vehemently opposed to any watering down o f the principle o f consent, and secondly the 
fact that most people did not want a fuss made over Northern Ireland policy so close to a 
general election.^^^
Despite Archer’s persistent denials o f any change in the Party’s attitude towards 
Unionism, it did seem apparent that Stuart Bell was being given (or was deciding to take) 
responsibility for sending out conciliatory signals to the Unionists. In July 1986 Bell 
delivered a speech in Cardiff in which he advocated the introduction o f a parliamentary 
grand committee on Northern Ireland (a long standing Unionist demand) and a standing 
committee to discuss legislation for the province. He also stated that “Labour would be 
studying ways to give some form o f devolution to Northern Ireland, but not along 
Stormont lines” and that they “would be looking at structures of local government to see 
how best people o f Northern Ireland could involve themselves in their own a f f a i r s .  ” 369  
(Extended local government was also a long standing Unionist demand.) The LCI were 
furious with what they believed was Bell’s unilateral decision “promising the Unionists a
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squalid deal to renegotiate the Anglo-Irish Accord in return for parliamentary votes.” ?^^  In 
reply to a letter o f complaint from the Irish historian, Liz Curtis, Peter Archer was at pains 
to make clear that BelPs speech did not “seek to reflect the Party’s Northern Ireland policy 
as a whole.”37i In spite o f the fact that a select committee for Northern Ireland had never 
previously been Party policy and McNamara was to oppose precisely just such a proposal 
by the government in 1994, both Archer and Bell have consistently denied that the floating 
of the idea in 1986 was a sop to the Unionists but was simply suggested as sensible addition 
to parliamentary procedure.3^ 2 in fact the Unionists had raised the issue in the past and no 
one on the Labour benches had said anything on the subject. When Enoch Powell (a lone 
Unionist MP in the House while the others abstained over the Hillsborough accord) called 
for a select committee just a couple o f months before the Cardiff speech Stuart Bell had 
simply replied that the other Unionist MPs should return to the House o f  Commons to 
discuss the matter. It has also been argued that there was a justified democratic argument 
for the introduction o f a select committee: “With the demise o f the [Northern Ireland] 
Assembly in 1986, however, the opportunity to scrutinise the six local departments reverted 
back to the subject Select Committees in London, each o f which could include Northern 
Ireland within the range o f a particular enquiry if its members so chose. This, however, 
was an offer most committees managed to refuse: in effect, the democratic deficit reopened 
and the scrutiny o f Northern Ireland matters was again sidelined at Westminster. ”373 The 
left’s fears were raised ftirther when on the morning o f 18 November 1986 Neil Kinnock, 
along with Bell and Archer, held a meeting at Westminster with Ian Paisley and James 
Molyneaux. No details o f the meeting were disclosed at the time although speculation was
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rife that a deal had been done. Stuart Bell was clearly looking to establish a new 
understanding with the Unionists; according to a paper prepared by Stuart Bell for the 
meeting, an offer was to be made to the Unionists that in the event o f Labour forming a 
government included in the Queen’s speech would be proposals for a Northern Ireland 
select committee, a standing committee to scrutinise Orders in Council and commitment to 
enhance the role o f local government in the province. Bell also spotted an advantage in the 
latter point stating that the beauty o f the local government proposals was “that they need 
not be discussed within the purview o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement and therefore impinge 
upon the susceptibilities o f the Unionist community...” The paper also gives a revealing 
insight into private advances made by the Labour front bench to the Unionists. For 
example they had already, according to Bell, given the Unionists reassurances on reforms to 
the workings o f the Secretariat at Maryfield, they had also agreed that there ought to be “a 
measure o f devolution for Northern Ireland” and “Molyneaux had been offered forms of 
local government to be worked out” for which he was to conduct his own r e s e a r c h . 3 7 4  xhis 
document is the only evidence to support the allegation that Labour sought a deal with the 
Unionists375 and both Archer and Bell have consistently claimed that “No deal was sought 
and no deal was o f f e r e d . ” 376 All that can fairly be concluded is that Kinnock wanted to size 
up the Unionists and ascertain what common ground existed between them and Labour. 
However Bell’s paper does stand as a fascinating insight into the lengths that the Labour 
Party was prepared to consider going to in order to come to an arrangement with the 
Unionists.
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No commitment had been made to the Unionists to revoke or to revise the Anglo- 
Irish Agreement, but then by the autumn o f 1986 enthusiasm for the accord had started to 
wane in the Party regardless o f Unionist opposition. During the debate on the dissolution 
o f the Northern Ireland Assembly there was once again an element o f despair in the mood 
on the Labour benches. Merlyn Rees had on one occasion, previously, asked the Secretary 
o f State how the government would respond if it became clear that a majority o f people in 
Northern Ireland favoured independence^^? (it was an option that neither the government 
nor the opposition wished to entertain). Nevertheless it is interesting to note the line of 
thought o f someone who has had such considerable involvement in Northern Ireland: in the 
dissolution debate he displayed his frustration at British attempts at finding a solution 
stating that integration was now a “pipe dream” but that devolution was now also a “pipe 
dream”.378 The confusion and despair was highlighted by Peter Archer’s contribution when 
he stated, in contrast to Rees, that “If there is to be peace it cannot be imposed by people 
from London or D u b l i n . ” 379 With the Unionists abstaining from Parliament (except for 
Enoch Powell) Clare Short did not hold back in articulating her anti-Unionist hostility. She 
said that “Their behaviour, their intransigence, their unreasonableness, their unwillingness 
to work with the [Hillsborough] agreement, have pushed the British people around that 
historical corner into a determination to withdraw from Northern Ireland.” The frustration 
was reminiscent o f 1974 or 1981 and Clare Short felt that this was a turning point, 
declaring “I want to put on record clearly my reading o f the current situation; I believe that 
history will vindicate this reading. The absolute unreasonableness o f the Northern Ireland 
Unionism, shown clearly over the Anglo-Irish agreement, means that from now the
Hansard, Vol. 88 Col. 1050 (12 Dec. 1985).
378 Ibid. Vol. 99 Col. 508 (12 June 1986).
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determination o f Britain to withdraw from Northern Ireland will grow.”38o Although Stuart 
Bell did state that he tended to be in agreement with this, one may argue that there was an 
element o f wishfiil thinking in Clare Short’s remarks and history has not entirely vindicated 
this reading as the British public continued to maintain what was basically a consistent 
disinterest. Short may also have been thinking o f her future plans with the Time To Go 
initiative (to be looked at in the next chapter) and this statement was perhaps more her 
hope rather than prediction. The periodical re-emergence o f the idea o f Ulster 
independence always produced curious contributions from individuals in the Labour Party. 
Following Rees’ statement, Stuart Bell took issue with the idea thus: “A majority for such a 
state would not be found within the six counties [at this point one would assume he would 
declare the majority in favour o f the Union, but no] because two o f those counties, Tyrone 
and Fermanagh, are already Republican in their majority. The forbearance o f those in the 
north who consider themselves part o f the Republic would be overstrained by the creation 
o f an independent Protestant state.”38i It should be born in mind that Bell was a relative 
novice on Irish politics and this statement is quite incredible in that its glaring mistake is 
that those majorities in Fermanagh and Tyrone have been opposed to the existence o f the 
Northern state ever since its inception. This goes to the very core o f the problem and Bell 
seems to ignore the fact that nationalist opposition exists whether the state is administered 
from Westminster, from a Unionist controlled Stormont or a Unionist controlled 
independent government. The one argument that could have been used is that 
independence would cut away the Republican argument that it is the British imperialist 
presence which is the cause of the problem. The problem with Bell’s position is that, once 
again, there seems to exist this feeling that a British Labour government could resolve the
380 Ibid. Col. 1252.
381 Ibid. Col. 1258.
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problem for the Irish rather than allowing self-determination to take precedent. This is 
perhaps why Rees, in sharp contrast to Bell’s novice status, has come to the conclusion 
Britain is perhaps spent in trying to find a resolution.
At the Labour Party’s annual conference in the September it was alleged in the Irish 
Times that along with Archer’s speech showing a distinct lack o f enthusiasm for the accord 
being used to achieve unity, Neil Kinnock had stated his disapproval o f Bell’s continued 
reference to Hillsborough as the key to achieving Irish re-unification.382 in a speech to the 
Cambridge Union shortly afterwards, Peter Archer stated, with a view to the Unionist 
audience, that “It does not follow that every discussion needs to be within the framework 
of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Nor, indeed, is the text itself carved in stone.” He went on 
to explain that at present the Unionists will not negotiate until the Agreement is repealed 
and the government and the SDLP will only negotiate in the context o f the Agreement: “In 
the event, no-one talks to anyone else.”383 Although the Irish Times reported that his only 
reference to unity was a suggestion that there could perhaps be an all-Ireland energy policy 
implying that the speech was intended to represent a move away from Irish unity in an 
attempt to appear more favourable to the Unionists;384 the fact is that he simply qualified 
how unity could be achieved. He did say also that there should be for all o f Ireland “a 
single transport policy, a single investment policy and a co-ordinated agricultural policy” 
and, in a statement typical o f his view o f the problem, made clear that “the transition from 
the unhappy present to the ideal future could best be realised in an Ireland which has 
achieved some form of unity, but not unity imposed by imperialism from either the east or 
the south.”385 In early December Stuart Bell then reiterated his advocacy o f a
Irish Times, 3 Oct. 1986.
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parliamentary select committee on Northern Ireland in a speech to the House o f 
Commons.386 Meanwhile in Dublin, Peter Archer declared that a future Labour 
government would be prepared to delete article 1 o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement.38? 
Although this was said in response to Haughey’s statement that a Fianna Fail government 
would be unhappy with the first article o f  the agreement, it nevertheless seemed to indicate 
an ongoing attempt by the front bench team to send out ambiguous sounding signals to in 
order to indicate their flexibility to the Unionists. Then, in late March 1987, Stuart Bell 
took matters alot further when he delivered a speech at Workington in which he pointed to 
the fact that there would be a review o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1988 but made clear 
that he believed the Agreement enhanced the Unionists’ constitutional position as it 
“excludes any likelihood o f a united Ireland down the wrong end o f a barrel o f a gun, it 
excludes victory for terrorist nationalism, as it excludes the creation o f a Cuban-style state 
friendly to Communism and hostile to Great Britain. It equally excludes the creation o f a 
new Republic with a Catholic constitution which infringes upon the rights o f a Protestant 
community in the North.” In addition to offering improvements to local government in 
Northern Ireland, he even went as far as to suggest that “we would frilly expect the 
Unionists to support Labour on a Queen’s Speech if there were to be a hung 
parliament.”388 The Times^^  ^ was the only British paper to report the speech and 
consequently the leadership covered th0; whole issue in a shroud o f confusion. Kinnock 
blamed the whole affair on media distortion and indeed Stuart Bell still maintains that he 
said little o f any great significance but the Times simply “wanted to make some kind o f
Hansard, Vol 106 Col. 128 (4 Dec. 1986),
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sensational announcement on its front page by a journalist on the make ”39o However the 
Belfast Telegraph also reported Bell’s speech which was clearly directed at the Unionists: 
“We say to them that they should clearly let us have specifically what their objections are 
and what it is they specifically want to see on the Agreement... We are making an offer they 
should find attractive and should not be able to refuse.’’^ ^^  Although Peter Archer has said 
that he was never fully aware o f what Bell was up to and has made the admission that “I 
used to wonder if there was something going on that I didn’t know about.”392 Nevertheless 
he then appeared on television to refute the idea that Labour were preparing to do a deal 
with the Unionists altogether and later said that “I still haven’t actually sorted out what 
Stuart said he was going to say in his hand out, as against what he did say, as against what 
he said afterwards he had said, and what everybody thought he had meant. Its all a bit o f a 
jumble.”393 It certainly had become a bit o f a jumble, which suited the Labour leadership: 
the Unionists were getting the message from Bell that a deal was in the offing, but Kinnock 
and Archer were continuing to make clear to everyone else that policy had not changed and 
no deals were to be done. Clare Short was very much concerned with what Bell had been 
saying as was John Hume who said in response to Stuart Bell’s speech that he had already 
been given assurances by Neil Kinnock on Labour’s commitment to the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement.394 But it must also be accepted that any Labour opposition is bound to keep 
an open mind to the possibilities o f a hung parliament in the event o f a general election but 
more importantly the situation at this particular time was one o f real disappointment in the 
outcome of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Peter Archer pointed out, in what was reported as 
a ‘Unionist friendly speech’, the undeniable fact that “With the Agreement already twelve
390 Bell, S. Letter o f reply, Nov. 1996.
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months old, little has emerged to win the approval o f the Nationalist community, or to 
foster the hope that grievances can be redressed by constitutional politics. Nor has 
anything emerged to win over Unionists from their bitter o p p o s i t i o n . ” 39s
Meanwhile the joint NEC/PLP working party on Northern Ireland had also run into 
difficulties by the end o f 1986. The working party did have a paper ready for the 1986 
conference but was held back by the NEC allegedly because there were already too many 
other reports on the conference agenda^^  ^ and the report was consequently not made 
available to rank and file members. Perhaps because o f this, speculation grew that there 
was something either politically embarrassing in the report or that it was at odds with the 
drift towards a more conciliatory attitude towards the Unionists. A well publicised and 
highly damaging leak appeared in the Times in February 1987 alleging that the latter case 
was in fact correct. The article by Philip Webster alleged that the leadership, along with 
Stuart Bell and Peter Archer, were trying to block a proposal introduced by Clare Short 
and Kevin McNamara to have the unionist veto removed so that the final NEC/PLP 
working party document, entitled ‘New Rights, New Prosperity and New Hope for 
Northern Ireland’, would have a commitment to Irish re-unification without requiring the 
consent o f the majority in Northern Ireland.39? Shortly afterwards Clare Short’s response 
indicated that the revelations were broadly correct: she described the article as “a distorted 
and malicious, but very well informed story” and admitted that the document did include 
the revised phrase “a significant degree o f consenf’^ s^ rather than majority consent. Due to 
the accuracy o f the leak it was strongly suspected that Stuart Bell was responsible^^  ^ and 
Peter Archer has himself since stated his belief that Stuart Bell very probably was
395 Archer, P. Speech to the Union Society, Cambridge, 15 Oct. 1986.
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responsible for the leak/^^ One reason for this was that Bell was very much a Kinnock 
loyalist and the Labour leader was determinedly opposed to any changing o f  the ‘unity by 
consent’ policy; it is therefore probably fair to conclude that Bell was doing everything he 
could to make matters easy for his leader and avoid any embarrassment for him. Neil 
Kinnock made clear that he did not want any changes made to the policy; he said that “The 
elastic proposition o f significant evidence o f consent is something that can only mislead 
without informing.”4oi In a radio interview Clare Short explained her interpretation o f the 
requirement o f unity by a ‘significant degree’ o f consent as meaning a vague display of 
support for re-unification by “A lot o f people in Britain and a lot o f people in the whole 
country o f I r e l a n d . ’ ’ ^^^ Clare Short exhibited a great deal o f suspicion about the tactics o f  
the leadership stating that after the leak “Suddenly, it was announced that the draft could 
not propose any change o f policy without the agreement o f conference. Some o f us felt we 
had been conned.”'*®^ Indeed the committee had prepared a draft document which was in 
fact written by Peter Archer^o  ^and stated that a future Labour government “will work hard 
for a significant degree o f consent because we realise that without it we would be 
bequeathing to the people o f Ireland a continuing legacy o f bitterness, o f violence and of 
a n a r c h y Most people on the committee appear to have been happy with this especially 
those such as McNamara, Clare Short and Clive S o l e y . However, the working party’s 
remit, as laid down by the NEC Home Policy Committee a year earlier was “To prepare a
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draft statement... but to avoid seeking to change the basic policy o f the Party on 
u n i f i c a t i o n . ” 407 The NEC consequently pointed to this as reason for not allowing any 
radical changes so that the final document did not include the wording “significant degree 
of consent” and even the sentence “we respect and understand the wishes o f people in 
Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom” (which was included in the revised 
draft at the end of February as a watering down of the loyalist veto) was replaced in the 
final document with the original wording “we respect and support the wishes o f the people 
of Northern I r e l a n d . . . ” 4^8 This proved to mark the high point o f the left’s campaign to have 
what it saw as the unionist veto removed from Labour Party policy; it was their last chance 
before a general election and the way they had been defeated caused great resentment. 
Clare Short described the situation thus: “The Times leak caused enormous trouble. I 
understand that the crucial words that would shift our policy forward are to be deleted 
from the document. This would mean that, without any discussion or debate. The Times 
leaker has got what he wants. The second question raised is why one leak in The Times is 
enough to make it unthinkable that our policy should be c h a n g e d . ” 409
The controversy over the new policy document only helped to convince those who 
believed the Labour leadership were deliberately tiying to smooth the way for a deal with 
the Unionists in the event o f a hung parliament. The Times continued to keep up the 
pressure and just two months before the general election devoted its editorial to an outright 
attack on Peter Archer who they claimed had managed a fudge on policy in order to “keep 
lines open to the Unionist MPs” but went on to argue that Labour had a hidden agenda 
which was that when in government “re-unification will proceed as discreetly as
4^7 Labour Party, Home Policy Committee, Miijute 2 2 ,1 0  Feb. 1986.
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possible.”4io in actual fact Peter Archer said at about the same time that “If there were a 
plot going on about Labour’s policy on Northern Ireland and I wasn’t a party to it I would 
have something fairly strong to say to e v e r y b o d y . K e v i n  McNamara was at pains to 
point out to Neil Kinnock that he and Clare Short had “not combined about anything”, 
there was no plot and that he had never discussed matters or made plans with Clare Short 
prior to attending meetings o f the NEC/PLP joint committee.^i^ The reality was that the 
main concern in the run up to the general election was that it would be best to ensure that 
Northern Ireland did not become a major issue and on the advice o f Peter Mandelson the 
election campaign was not to include any policy statements or otherwise on the Ulster 
q u e s t i o n . 4 ^ 3  Archer was certainly more sympathetic to Irish nationalism than Stuart Bell 
and the latter was much more interested in ensuring that matters went the way Neil 
Kinnock wanted. Nevertheless he has insisted that although it was considered important 
that the principle o f consent remained integral to Party policy “it should not be inferred 
from this that Neil Kinnock was paving the way for a deal with the Unionists. He never 
contemplated any such action.”4i4 This is almost certainly accurate: Neil Kinnock knew 
what he could and could not do with his Party and having seen the minor revolts over the 
PTA and the bad light that the 1979 deal to increase Northern Ireland MPs was now seen 
in, he knew only to well that too large a percentage of his back benchers would resist a deal 
with the Unionists in the event o f a hung parliament. In any event the Party went into the 
1987 general election with a manifesto which had a policy commitment on Northern Ireland 
which was o f very little difference to that o f 1983. On the constitutional issue the policy of
410 Times, 10 April 1987.
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‘unity by consent’ remained intact but on legal issues there were some curious omissions. 
Although there was a clear commitment to abolish strip searching there was no mention o f  
the PTA, the Diplock courts, the supergrass trials or the matter of employment 
discrimination.415 These omissions were a disappointment for the left because over the 
previous year or two it appeared that important gains had been made. In December 1986 
Peter Archer had come out firmly in favour o f introducing the idea o f having three judges 
sitting in the Diplock courts^i  ^and yet the final manifesto made no mention whatsoever of 
the Northern Ireland legal system. Finally the latest issue to be brought to the fore as a 
result o f pressure from the left, and the LCI in particular, was that o f employment 
discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland. The McBride Principles were 
produced in 1984 as a set of guidelines to tackle discrimination and won considerable 
support among major businesses in the US. The McBride campaign made discrimination a 
mainstream political issue which Bell and Archer were more than happy to take up during 
1986417 yut again no mention was made of this issue in the Party’s election manifesto. As 
at the beginning o f Neil Kinnock’s leadership Ireland was still, by the time o f the 1987 
general election, simply not a political issue o f any great consequence. One can speculate 
that Labour were simply continuing to respond to events and developments in Ireland so 
that just as in 1981 re-unification might never have become policy without the hunger 
strikes, so in the mid-eighties it might be accurate to suppose that without the New Ireland 
Forum report and the signing o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement Neil Kinnock may very well 
have decided that ‘unity by consent’ would have to be jettisoned. But, the Hillsborough 
Agreement provided Labour with the opportunity to continue to advocate ‘unity by
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Irish Times, 3 Dec. 1986.
Labour and Ireland,NQ. 13 (1986).
140
consent’ as a policy which could be interpreted as now being enshrined in this 
internationally recognised and almost universally supported treaty.
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Chapter 4; * Enniskillen and the Decline of 
the Left* Labour Party Policy 1987-92
After the 1987 general election defeat the Labour Party did not enter into 
recriminations and blame laying, as with the defeats o f 1979 and 1983, but instead the 
leadership re-doubled its determination to continue with the process o f trying to bring the 
Party back to the centre ground. Although victory had not been expected, Kinnock had 
hoped to have gained more in terms o f making in-roads into the Tory south and so it was 
believed that the changes in policy and image during the preceding four years had evidently 
not gone far enough. Over the next seven years dramatic changes were to take place 
throughout the British party political system: Thatcherism was to come to an end but the 
British left both inside and outside the Labour Party was to become marginalised to the 
extent that for the first time in post war Britain they had almost become an irrelevance. It 
is in this context and the context o f major global political changes that the maturing o f the 
debate on the Irish question in the Labour movement (and not least in Ireland itselQ needs 
to be analysed. The outbreak o f hostilities in Yugoslavia, the collapse o f the Soviet Union, 
the end of apartheid in South Afiica and the beginnings o f a peace process between the 
Israelis and the PLO all contributed to a slow and subtle change in the way that the Irish 
problem was understood and dealt with both in Britain and in Ireland. The Balkan crisis 
and conflicts in former Soviet states assisted in changing the perception o f the Irish problem 
from one o f  nationalism versus imperialism to one o f an ethno-national conflict, albeit with 
a native/settler d i m e n s io n .^ i ^  Many o f the contentious issues which the left had always 
championed, began to fade from mainstream political debate, for example nuclear 
disarmament, resisting the Tory trade union laws, demanding sanctions against South
418 Tliis is explored in detail by O’Leary, B. & McGarry, J. and Dixon, P. (Debate) in Irish Political 
Studies Vol. 11 (1996) pp. 130-159.
142
Africa, gay rights, racism and the question o f black sections in the Labour Party. Needless 
to say, international developments removed many o f these questions but Thatcher’s 
resignation in November 1990 also brought to an end the sharp left/right divide which had 
characterised British political debate for the previous decade. For this reason a return to 
bipartisanship appeared increasingly imminent and, but for the fact that Labour had the 
most unashamedly nationalist Northern Ireland spokesperson in its history, it would not be 
unfair to speculate that Labour’s distinctive pro-unity policy would have been jettisoned 
prior to the 1992 general election.
Despite the direction in which Neil Kinnock undoubtedly wanted to take the party, 
his choice for the post o f shadow Northern Ireland Secretary was not one o f his favoured 
‘soft left’ individuals but the long standing pro-united Ireland stalwart, Kevin McNamara. 
The appointment certainly raised a few eyebrows; the Times stated that “The decision came 
as a surprise, as the post was supposed to go to Mr Clive Soley, one o f  the stars of  
Labour’s middle ranks.”4i9 Fortnight editor, Robin Wilson, claimed that McNamara was in 
actual fact Kinnock’s third choice, but did not make clear who was supposed to have been 
the first or second choice.42o Either way, it would appear that Kinnock would have been 
happy to keep Archer in the job, but after he failed to win election to the shadow cabinet 
the post was left vacant while the rest o f the shadow appointments were made. Then on 14 
July, after a day’s deliberations, Kinnock finally chose McNamara.^^i In actual fact the 
appointment was probably less a political decision and more an indication o f the low 
priority Northern Ireland was in Kinnock’s mind as well as being a job that few in the 
shadow cabinet wanted. During the furore which followed the Enniskillen bombing four
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months later Neil Kinnock wrote a letter to BBC reporter John Cole to refute his allegation 
that Kevin McNamara was appointed precisely because he favoured a united Ireland. 
Kinnock argued that McNamara was not a united Ireland zealot and the reasoning behind 
his appointment was that he had extensive knowledge and experience in the field o f Irish 
politics and Northern Ireland in particular. ^ 2 2  Kevin McNamara’s explanation for 
Kinnock’s decision was that he wanted someone who would would help improve the 
Labour Party’s relations with the Irish community in Britain, the Irish government and the 
SDLP. Secondly, whilst installing someone who was well qualified to work with the 
representatives o f constitutional nationalism, his task was also to try and end any 
association between the Labour Party and Sinn Fein.423 This was a task which McNamara 
stuck to throughout his years as Labour’s spokesperson. In addition to Archer’s departure, 
Stuart Bell gave up the job of assistant spokesperson because, as he explained, he needed 
to devote more time to constituency matters; most notably the Cleveland child abuse 
scandal.424 The appointment o f a successor for the post o f assistant spokesperson was left 
until some months later. In Northern Ireland itself the development was anything but 
unimportant and McNamara was quick to argue that the fact that he himself was a Roman 
Catholic was o f no consequence. Meanwhile Frank Millar, secretary o f the Ulster Unionist 
Party, nevertheless described the move as “unhelpful” and added wryly that it “certainly 
lays to rest the theory that the Labour Party was going to give us total integration.”425 
Despite McNamara’s desire to reassure Unionists that his political and religious 
background mattered little, he told Labour and Ireland “I hope that the Irish community 
will see the significance o f Neil Kinnock’s appointment. For the first time, a Labour leader
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has got a Northern Ireland spokesperson... who has spent most o f his career trying to 
change party policy to one of active support for a united Ireland. I am the first person of an 
Irish nationalist background to be a senior spokesperson on any s u b j e c t . ” 426 Although the 
fact was that, in all probability, the appointment had nothing to do with Kinnock’s political 
convictions the left desperately wanted to believe otherwise: Clare Short declared “we got 
the appointment o f Kevin McNamara which is symbolically significant. Kevin has never, 
throughout his time as an MP, compromised on his republicanism.” Being well aware o f  the 
party’s right-wing direction, she then said optimistically “The willingness o f the Party 
leadership in the shape it’s now in to appoint Kevin, seems to me to be a symbol that w e’re 
gaining ground.”427
A few months later the Labour Party suddenly embarked upon an unprecedented 
and embarrassingly public debate on its attitude to the violence and political conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Earlier in the decade the Labour Party’s, and in particular the Labour 
left’s, fickleness on the Irish question was highlighted by the swift conversion to the idea o f  
a united Ireland as a consequence o f the emotion precipitated by the hunger strikes and 
then by the softening of the front bench’s pro-nationalist rhetoric as a result of the resolute 
popular Unionist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In November 1987 an event in 
Northern Ireland made a similarly powerful impression on left-wing thinking: the IRA’s 
Enniskillen bombing which killed eleven people, led to an hysteria which almost completely 
reversed all the achievements Sinn Fein had made in courting the Labour left over the 
previous four or five years and virtually silenced the pro-republican lobby within the Party, 
with the notable exception o f the newly elected MP for Brent East, Ken Livingstone. The 
Party was almost completely unanimous in its condemnation o f the IRA and Sinn Fein with
Labour and Ireland, No. 18 (Oct-Dec 1987). 
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the revulsion being extended to almost all sections o f the movement including Militant who 
described the IRA’s action as a deliberate provocation to the Protestant working class 
designed to precipitate civil war. 428 The bitter wrangling and personal abuse which took 
place in the weeks after the bombing were entirely the result o f Livingstone’s determination 
to pursue his arguments in the face o f equally determined political and public hostility. The 
Sunday Times and the Times led the campaign against Livingstone with the latter describing 
an LBC radio interview in which he stated that he would be re-doubling his efforts to forge 
links with Sinn Fein and argued that “I don’t think anybody seriously thinks they [the IRA] 
won’t get their own way. As with all other colonial situations we have been involved in 
eventually Britain will go.”429 Although Ken Livingstone continually argued that his 
comments had been taken out o f context and that he had in fact condemned the b o m b in g ,4 3 o  
in the highly charged atmosphere which existed the newspaper reports were taken at face 
value and he came in for attack from numerous quarters including elements on the left both 
inside and outside the Party. The relative consensus that had existed within the Labour 
movement since 1981, namely support Tor Irish nationalism and a desire to see a united 
Ireland, appeared to be beginning to break down.
The bitter arguing went on for ^eeks and gave what still stands as one o f the best 
insights into the deep divisions which existed within the British left on the Irish question in 
terms o f their attitude to political violence and their interpretation o f the politics and history 
of Northern Ireland. Neil Kinnock led what were often personal attacks on Livingstone. 
Immediately after the Enniskillen bombing (but before Livingstone’s radio interview) 
Kinnock, for the first time, unequivocally condemned those in the Labour Party who were
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maintaining links with Sinn Fein and called upon Hackney Council Labour Group to 
withdraw an invitation they had made to Sinn Fein’s Alex Maskey.^^i Kinnock had always 
maintained a deep disliking for the Provisional but this was a definite shift in his position. 
Ten months earlier a row had blown up after a Labour Party NEC delegation, which 
included Peter Archer and Stuart Bell, met with a group o f Sinn Fein councillors in 
Northern Ireland.432 Tom King was amongst those who criticised the Labour Party but 
Neil Kinnock came to their defence arguing that “as part o f a general series o f meetings 
from all parties in Northern Ireland, as long as they are duly elected, it is appropriate for us 
to meet with all parties.”433 Nevertheless, after Livingstone’s comments the Labour 
leadership rounded on the maverick MP with Roy Hattersley condemning Livingstone and 
claiming that his comments had cost Labour a Wandsworth council by-election which 
would have secured Labour control o f the borough. It should also be noted that this 
followed a shadow cabinet/NEC meeting on 20 November which discussed a report 
presenting evidence that the ‘loony left’ image had cost Labour literally millions o f votes at 
the general election.434 The Irish Times quoted a source ‘close to the Labour leadership’ 
saying that “Mr. Livingstone’s concern for Ireland has been more about the London Labour 
Party than about peace in Ireland.”435 What this refers to is the belief that existed in the 
Labour mainstream that in London there existed something o f a party within the Party and 
the people who gained positions o f power and influence within it did so by championing 
and promoting the most controversial political issues whether they be gay rights, black 
sections or indeed support for the Irish republican cause. A Times editorial chose to belittle
4 3 1 /m /j  Times, 13 & 14 Nov. 1987.
432 Alex Maskey was amongst tlie Sinn Fein representatives with whom tlie NEC had made prior 
arrangements to meet. ‘List o f Representatives Meeting Labour Party NEC Delegation to Northern 
Ireland, 15-16 Jan. 1987’, PDl: 914: Jan 87.
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Livingstone’s motives even further by suggesting that within this section o f the Party there 
is a “need to shock the bourgeoisie” and “Anyone who can outrage the majority of the 
electorate, particularly the middle classes, and become a hated figure in the ‘Tory media’, is 
alright with them.”436
At a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting on 18 November, Ireland was the main 
issue up for discussion and Neil Kinnock took the opportunity to argue that those who 
equate the British presence in Northern Ireland with “colonialism show a fundamental, 
permafrost ignorance about the nature o f Northern Ireland.’ He described the IRA as ‘a 
few hundred armed gangsters.”^^ ? It should be remembered that as always Kinnock was 
very media conscious and the tabloid depiction o f the Provisional as a criminal/Mafia style 
organisation controlled by ‘godfathers’ was a popular misconception o f the time. 
Livingstone remained defiant and after the Labour Chief Whip, Derek Foster warned him 
about toning down his public statements he replied to the suggestion that he was likely to 
have the Labour Whip withdrawn “You don’t remove the whip from someone who came 
fourth in the national executive committee elections.”438 The leadership was furious and at 
an NEC meeting on 25 November Kinnock rounded on Livingstone and with equal 
arrogance told him “You have a right to speak and you have a right to be wrong. And you 
exercise both rights extensively. I believe you have suggested that someone who comes 
fourth in the NEC elections cannot be disciplined. This is rather an elitist view for someone 
who considers himself a democrat.”439 With Kinnock, this type o f arrogant speech was 
often used when dealing with the left and feeling confident after defeating Militant 
infiltration he no doubt felt Livingstone was little more than a nuisance to be dealt with
436 Times, 17 Nov. 1987.
Guardian, 19 Nov. 1987. 
438 Times, 25 Nov. 1987.
Irish Times, 26 Nov. 1987.
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equal contempt. In addition, Kevin McNamara was making the point that it was time for 
the Party to start actively promoting the SDLP (in line with Kinnock’s strategy) as a way of 
opposing Sinn Fein. This was a suggestion which found a large and sympathetic audience 
in the Party especially in the mood o f the time. McNamara also expressed his frustration at 
the fact that the whole affair had distracted attention from the recently published report by 
the Standing Advisory Committee on Human Rights on reforms to deal with employment 
discrimination in Northern Ireland/^^o This was a crucially important issue as far as 
McNamara was concerned and the kind o f matter on which he felt the Party should be 
campaigning, not least because it was a subject o f great difficulty and international 
embarrassment for the Thatcher government. When the NEC finally voted on a resolution 
which condemned the Enniskillen bombing, condemned Sinn Fein and reiterated support for 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement, only Ken Livingstone, Denis Skinner and Linda Douglas o f the 
Young Socialists voted a g a in s t . '^ ^ i  g p h e  of this and the reaction o f the Labour Co­
ordinating Committee (to be looked at further on) the Campaign Group o f far-left Labour 
MPs, in a show of defiance, voted to adopt a clear policy favouring Irish re-unification and 
British withdrawal, just days after the NEC meeting.'*'^  ^ At the following week’s 
Parliamentary Labour Party meeting on Northern Ireland Ken Livingstone was criticised by 
a wide spectrum o f opinion including Martin Flannery, Clare Short and Merlyn Rees who 
said “I didn’t come fourth in the National Executive Elections but I will speak my mind. I 
will say that the basic tenet o f the Labour Party is the ballot box and will always be” and 
complained that “Politicians are great ones at allovring others to die for their own daft 
causes.”'^ '*^ Ken Livingstone responded by taking up the argument about British public
440 Guardian, 26 Nov. 1987.
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attitudes and pointed to the various opinion polls which since 1971 have indicated that the 
majority o f people in Britain favour withdrawal from Northern Ireland.444 However, 
although this was an accurate and awkward fact for the leadership with the last poll in the 
Daily Express showing a 61% majority supporting troops out, the timing was unwise for 
Livingstone because after the Enniskillen bombing a Marplan opinion poll revealed, for the 
first time, only a minority o f 40% were now in favour o f withdrawal.445
Despite the damaging high profile media coverage the leadership were at least 
encouraged by developments within the left pressure group, the Labour Co-ordinating 
Committee. The LCC was a broad group on the left which was not so closely associated 
with the Bennite hard left, as was Labour Left Liaison, but increasingly moved towards the 
Kinnockite soft lefi;. In January 1986 Peter Hain drew up a policy statement which was 
endorsed by the Committee and which stated “There will be a commitment to British 
withdrawal from Ireland within the lifetime o f  the next Labour Government, the dissolution 
o f the Union and its replacement by a freely negotiated structure for the whole o f Ireland in 
which the rights of each section o f the community will be g u a r a n t e e d . ” 446 On 15 November 
1987 the LCC held a conference which voted by 70 votes to 54447 in favour o f ditching its 
policy o f British withdrawal in favour o f ‘unity by consent’ and Livingstone was 
unceremoniously voted off the executive after bitter personal attacks on both Peter Hain 
and Ken Livingstone for their statements on Ireland. For example executive member Sean 
Rodgers, Chairman o f the Labour Campaign for Peace and Progress in Ireland and closely 
associated with the Workers’ Party, denounced Livingstone as having blood on his hands at 
the meeting.448 The Labour left was entering a phase o f relative crisis in the aftermath of
444 Guardian, 3 Dec. 1987.
445 Troops Out, Vol. 12 No. 3 (Jan. 1989). See also Labour and Ireland, No. 21 (Juii-Sept. 1988).
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the general election and despite a ‘Left Unity’ statement by Tribune which had the support 
of both the Labour Co-ordinating Committee and Labour Left Liaison^^  ^ a struggle was 
developing within the various left groups to decide whether they would throw their lot in 
with the ‘Kinnockite’ soft left or retain their distinct campaigning identity. A Guardian 
editorial seemed to suggest that over the last five years there had been a silent majority 
opposed to the pro-republican direction o f the Party and argued that “the left Labour 
activists... have equivocated on Ireland too long and have therefore allowed the 
Livingstones and the Corbyns to hijack policy in favour of Sinn Fein” and went on to call 
on the rest o f the Labour left to follow the “encouraging” example o f the LCC.^ o^ 
Although, for a long time, two distinct pro-united Ireland groups had existed namely the 
McNamara or Clive Soley ‘unity by consent’ school o f thought and the pro-Sinn Fein 
elements (with only Clare Short managing to bridge the gap between the two), the crisis 
within the left was exacerbated by Enniskillen with the consequence that the pro-Sinn Fein 
elements were forced into a position o f isolation from which they have never recovered and 
the great majority o f the Party chose to revert to what was almost the pre-1981 attitude of 
sympathy for the idea of Irish unity but no sympathy for republicanism with its use o f  
violence. The change in attitudes was aided by the fact that the leaders o f the Republic’s 
three main left-wing parties, namely the Irish Labour Party, the Workers’ Party and the 
Democratic Socialist Party, sent a joint letter to the British Labour leadership calling for all 
links between the Labour Party and Sinn Fein to be broken Certainly Enniskillen had
helped to revive the impression among the Labour left that the Provisionals were an out o f  
touch Baader-MeinhofF type o f organisation who were behaving in a way that appeared
449 Ibid.
450 Guardian, 17 Nov. 1987. 
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wholly inappropriate in the light o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the recognition given to 
the Irish dimension through improved relations with Dublin. Shortly after Enniskillen, 
Jonathan Moore wrote in Fortnight that (as has already been argued) Labour left support 
for Sinn Fein was a very new development anyway and was partly prompted by the 
Provisionals shift towards socialism and its new found interest in electoral politics, but by 
now “The real problem that Livingstone and the Labour Committee on Ireland face is that, 
having tied their colours - and those o f  the withdrawal movement - so firmly to the Sinn 
Fein mast, the efficacy o f their arguments is greatly affected by events such as Enniskillen. 
Rather than being associated with any set o f principles, sections o f the Labour left have 
wedded themselves to Provisional republicanism. Tactically, this may prove to be the 
critical mistake on the part o f  those advocating British withdrawal from I r e l a n d . ” 4S 2  gg the 
consensus that had existed had changed; ‘unity by consent’ was not yet under threat but 
support for the Provisionals continued to exist only amongst a very small minority, whilst 
following McNamara’s lead many in the Party, indeed the majority, saw the SDLP and 
Dublin as Labour’s natural allies on the question o f Northern Ireland; indeed McNamara 
himself never once met with Sinn Fein at any time in his role as shadow spokesperson. 
Instead o f McNamara’s appointment ushering in a new shift o f emphasis towards a more 
clearly nationalist agenda, within six months the Party had shifted in the opposite direction 
and despite the optimism of the LCI and others the shift was much more deep rooted and 
set to last a lot longer than anybody anticipated. The days when career minded soft left 
MPs such as Harriet Harman thought it wise to proclaim their belief in a united Ireland 
were certainly over.
4 5 2 Fortnight, Dec. 1987.
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As the furore over Enniskillen died down Kevin McNamara continued to try and get 
the employment discrimination issue at the top o f the political agenda. Although Archer 
and Bell had first taken up the matter in 1986 after the launch o f the ‘McBride Principles’, 
McNamara brought new vigour and enthusiasm to the debate and relished the fact that this 
was the kind o f campaign around which he thought he could unite the entire Labour 
movement. He described the matter o f religious discrimination in employment as “the last 
of the great issues still unresolved since the civil rights marches o f 1 9 6 9 .”453 in 1994, after 
Kevin McNamara lost his shadow post, Frank Miller o f the Irish Times (one time Ulster 
Unionist Party secretary and not known for praising McNamara) said o f him that he would 
be best remembered for his campaign against employment discrimination on “which many 
people in the North believe his tenacity outstripped that of the SDLP and the Irish 
government o f the d a y .  ”454 Debate on the left and on Ireland in particular had been rather 
muted and despondent in the months immediately following the general election, but the 
one issue that the LCI also tried hard to pursue was the question o f religious discrimination 
within Northern Ireland. The government were responding to the McBride campaign and 
the pressures from the US and the Irish Republic so that in October 1988 the Standing 
Advisory Committee on Human Rights published its report on employment discrimination, 
commissioned by the government, which was highly critical o f the Fair Employment 
Agency and its failure to achieve affirmative action to redress the ongoing problem. On 28 
November the LCI organised a conference on the subject which attracted 300 delegates and 
heard contributions from Kevin McNamara, Ken Livingstone, Clare Short and Sean 
McBride h im s e lf .4 5 5  in line with the SDLP, McNamara stopped short o f actually
453 7mA Post, 2 July 1988.
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supporting the ‘McBride Principles’ but nevertheless enjoyed the difficulties that the 
government was having and pressed the Secretary o f State in October 1987 to declare what 
the cost was to public fiinds o f British government campaigning and lobbying in the USA to 
oppose the ‘McBride P r i n c i p l e s ’ . 456 The reasons for not supporting the McBride campaign 
were different for McNamara and the SDLP. The SDLP were fearful that having such 
restrictive demands placed on employers might in fact deter inward investment whereas 
McNamara was privately very sympathetic to the McBride principles but would not 
publicly support them for fear o f alienating the Unionists and once again draw the 
accusation that he was an IRA ‘fellow traveller’ because Sinn Fein had thrown their full 
weight behind the McBride c a m p a ig n .4 5 7  in response to the SACHR report, the Secretary 
of State announced that a white paper was to be published on fair employment which was 
to appear in May 1988. In December 1987 McNamara called on the government to bring 
forward the proposed white paper and set a target of reducing the Catholic/Protestant 
unemployment ratio o f two and a half to one to one and a half to one within five years.458 
Despite this the leadership, including McNamara, did not go as far as the LCI and others 
wanted and at Labour’s 1987 annual conference a resolution demanding a policy designed 
to reverse employment discrimination on religious grounds was defeated by 2,435,000 
votes to 3,337,000, with the T&GWU vote going against the motion at the request o f its 
Northern Ireland r e g io n .4 5 9
Whilst McNamara would not go as far as publicly calling for the McBride Principles 
form the basis o f any change in the law, he was clearly enthused by the McBride campaign 
which brought such pressure to bear on the government and maintained discrimination in
Hansard, Vol. 121 Cols. 471-2W (30 Oct. 1987). 
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the mainstream political debate. Labour felt they might be able to force concessions from 
the government with, for example, the call for employment discrimination claims in 
Northern Ireland to be heard by the industrial tribunals. 46o This was unsuccessfijl but was 
essentially designed to keep up the pressure on the Tories whilst they were preparing the 
White Paper. At the 1988 conference the 1987 decision was overturned with an anti- 
discrimination resolution being overwhelmingly carried despite NEC opposition^^i (this was 
aided by the fact that it was exactly twenty years since the first major civil rights march). 
Throughout 1988 McNamara continued to try and harry the government as they took the 
Fair Employment (NI) Bill through its parliamentary stages. When the Bill was debated in 
the Commons in July 1988 he pursued the argument that the government needed to act in 
the interests o f the Northern Ireland economy, now that eight American States had adopted 
the Principles and he took advantage of the precedent that Short Brothers had set having 
made a specific commitment to improve employment opportunities for Catholics in order to 
reassure a concerned US army. He told the government that this was because it had the 
choice o f losing a $60 million aircraft order or agree to anti-discriminatory measures which 
ought already to be legally r e q u i r e d .462 There was a stark difference in the manner in which 
McNamara pursued the government on this issue as compared to the manner in which 
Labour’s policy o f ‘unity by consent’ was being articulated; in actual fact the Irish unity 
policy was now hardly ever mentioned by the front bench team in the House o f Commons 
and if it was it was often done so very briefly and almost apologetically. In fact the left- 
wing MP Diane Abbott said at a meeting in south Wales that she could just about 
remember the names o f Labour’s Northern Ireland front bench team because their
Irish Post, 23 Jan. 1988.
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performance had been “so u n m e m o r a b l e ” .463 There was a feeling on the left that Labour 
should have taken a tougher line towards the government during the passage o f the Bill. 
Although the PLP voted against the Bill on the second reading, this was because they were 
unhappy at the fact that there was a lack o f detail as regards the various codes and 
regulations.464 During the committee stages that followed, Labour made a number o f  
amendments to strengthen affirmative action programmes and to make improvements in the 
setting o f targets and timetables; finally the Labour Party voted for the Bill on the third 
reading in May 1989.4^5 However the Labour Party ultimately felt tricked by the 
government; they had been told that the Lords would make fiiither amendments in line with 
Labour’s concerns but no such amendments were ever made.466
The left were fortunate to be given the opportunity for one last lease o f life due to 
the fact that 1988 was the twentieth anniversary o f the first civil rights marches and 1989 
marked twenty years since British troops were deployed in Northern Ireland. The Labour 
Committee on Ireland planned a year o f activity with the aim o f bringing the question of 
British withdrawal into mainstream party political debate and keeping it there. The Time 
To Go charter was launched by Clare Short at a press conference held at Westminster at 
the end o f June 1988.46? They were able to present a slick looking campaign complete with 
a consumer fi-iendly logo and boasted the support o f A.J.P. Taylor as well as personalities 
such as Emma Thompson, Robbie Coltrane, Alexei Sayle and Pete Townshend. When 
Clare Short stated that “The ingredients for a political settlement are beginning to surface,” 
pointing to the Sinn Fein/SDLP talks which had been taking place for some months and the
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more pragmatic language o f people such as Jim Molyneaux and Ken Maginnis/68 the LCI 
were actually unaware as to what extent the shift in the Northern Ireland political debate 
towards the search for a political settlement, leading ultimately to the ceasefires, would 
actually undermine the withdrawal movement and the pro-republican elements within the 
Labour Party. Yes, the ingredients for a political settlement were beginning to emerge but 
no, the Labour movement was not going to rally to the ‘troops out’ cry as if it was going to 
be the catalyst in the search for a solution. In fact it was precisely because the Sinn 
Fein/SDLP talks and the later talks organised by Peter Brooke did hold out a fragile and 
slim prospect o f finding a solution that the limited interest that Time To Go did engender 
was not sustained or built upon: many in the Labour movement were not now prepared to 
jeopardise the prospect o f peace which the talks held out by supporting an idea which 
purported to be in the interests o f peace but which many felt was the remnant o f an 
outdated form of slogan politics. Although Clare Short argued that the initiative was 
designed to stimulate intelligent debate and to end the situation in which those “who 
advocate withdrawal are instantly accused o f being covert supporters o f the IRA,”469 in the 
wake o f Enniskillen it was unlikely that that situation was going to change. The Labour 
Campaign for Peace and Progress in Ireland opposed Time To Go because they said that 
the only political organisation in Ireland which supported the campaign was what they 
called the ‘quasi-fascist’ Provisionals.^?® It is also a fact that although they were arguing 
that Time To Go was designed to help mature the debate, Clare Short was essentially 
espousing the traditional nationalist position, displaying a rather naive optimism and a 
condescending attitude towards Unionists. During a Radio 4 interview, prior to the general 
election, she argued that the goal o f a united Ireland was realisable if you could “keep
468 24 June 1988.
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enough sensible Unionists behaving s e n s i b l y . ”47i in a Tribune interview she stated that she 
believed Irish unity could be achieved by winning simply “the maximum possible consent” 
and that “When you talk to Unionists, they all know that it’s going to happen one day. 
When they believe a British Government’s really going to do it, vast numbers o f them will 
want to negotiate their place in that friture.” “There is a danger o f a Loyalist backlash... but 
if they know the Government means it, it will fizzle out.” ?^? The idea that the major 
stumbling block to a united Ireland - one million unionists’ opposition - would not 
ultimately present a problem, is precisely the kind o f argument which made Time To Go 
appear somewhat limited in terms o f its appeal and its contribution to the debate.
Time To Go deliberately planned to target the trade union movement, just as the 
LCI had tried to do, knowing that if the big push to change Labour Party policy in 1989 
was to be successful the trade union vote would have to swing behind the Time To Go 
initiative. Since the NUR adopted a policy favouring British withdrawal in 1985 very little 
movement had taken place in the trade unions on the Irish question. The only significant 
shifts in the LCI’s favour was first o f all the decision by NALGO, four months before the 
Enniskillen bombing, to support Irish reunification at its annual conference. This was the 
consequence of over two years of pressure by the NALGO Campaign for a United Ireland. 
The adopted resolution stated “This conference recognises that the only just and lasting 
solution to the problems in Ireland lies in a united and independent Ireland established by 
peaceful means. This conference believes that the people o f Ireland must be allowed to 
determine their own future. ”4?3 NALGO was the largest public sector union but without a
Post, 30 July 1988.
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Northern Ireland membership was able to have this slightly ambiguous statement passed 
with little fuss or controversy. There was no commitment to British withdrawal but the 
wording suggested that the British presence represented a denial o f Irish self-determination. 
The policy adopted also listed various demands such as abolition of the Diplock courts as 
well as ending the use o f plastic bullets, strip searching and the repeal o f the Prevention o f  
Terrorism and Emergency Provisions Acts. This policy did in fact remain intact right up 
until NALGO was absorbed into the large Unison public sector union established in 1994. 
Secondly, the small media union the Association of Cinematography and Television 
Technicians voted in favour o f British withdrawal from Northern Ireland at its annual 
meeting in April 1988.474 months later the NUR overturned its commitment to British 
withdrawal from Northern Ireland which had been adopted at the 1985 annual conference. 
This decision was evidence that the troops out lobby was not on the brink o f a sea change 
in the movement but in fact was only ever going to achieve limited success in convincing 
the trade unions that they ought to go one step further than the official Labour Party policy 
of ‘unity by consent’, which was essentially what the NUR adopted in 1988 as opposed to 
its previous troops out position. In the run up to the 1988 conference Jimmy Knapp, the 
NUR leader, had begun to express his doubts about the troop withdrawal policy. At the 
union’s 1987 annual conference he was much more vociferous in his opposition to the idea 
of British withdrawal arguing that such a move would mean the union turning its back on a 
political solution and handing victory to the armed struggle. He supported the amendment 
which opposed immediate withdrawal and which pointed to “the chaos and bloodshed 
which followed the hasty withdrawals from India and the Belgian Congo.” Yet even this 
amendment was defeated and the troops out motion was passed. This prompted Jimmy
474 Troops Out, Vol. No. 8 (June 1988).
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Knapp to draw upon his background in the west o f Scotland and argue that a precipitate 
British withdrawal would result in a violent conflict with thousands o f Protestants leaving 
Scotland to go and fight in Ulster.475 in 1988 Jimmy Knapp finally got the policy he 
wanted. One can speculate as to what extent this was a personal victory for him or 
whether or not the change was the result o f the general upheaval and rethink which took 
place throughout the left following the Enniskillen bombing. The motion adopted at the 
1988 NUR conference stated its support for the principle o f Irish unity but stated “We 
understand however, that the complex situation in the North o f Ireland is unlikely to be 
peacefully resolved by short-term proposals for the withdrawal o f the British presence... 
We therefore endorse the policy o f the Labour Party o f support for the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement... and the achievement o f Irish unification by c o n s e n t . ” 476 xhis was a setback 
for Time To Go coming, as it did, at the same time as its launch; but over the next two 
years the initiative was to eventually gain the support o f a number o f trade unions including 
the NUR.
In the short term and in terms providing a focus for the many disparate left groups, 
which involved extensive debate and activism. Time To Go was relatively successfijl. 
Various Time To Go or Year o f Action committees were set up around the country 
involving people from both inside and outside the Labour Party and although a great deal 
o f energy was spent in organising public meetings (which usually included that peculiar 
phenomena o f the British left in the eighties namely ‘workshops’) and demonstrations, 
trying to apply pressure to achieve a change in Labour Party policy was almost forgotten. 
Meanwhile the activities o f some o f the ‘troops out’ die-hards in the Party began to appear 
more and more desperate and in the case o f Tony Benn’s Northern Ireland (Termination of
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British Jurisdiction) Bill the thinking appeared simply wishfijl, setting as it did 1 January 
1 9 9 0  for British withdrawal. The bill had the support of the Campaign group o f Labour 
MPs and was sponsored by the usual ten or so MPs including Ken Livingstone, Jeremy 
Corbyn and Denis Skinner but it was slammed by Kevin McNamara as “stupid and 
l o o n e y . ” 477 Then, again ignoring the criticism that he had previously attracted from the left, 
Tony Benn wrote to the secretary-general o f the United Nations urging UN intervention in 
Northern Ireland early in August 1 9 8 8 .4 7 »  An increasingly hostile division developed 
between McNamara and the small ‘troops out’ rump; for example when Ken Livingstone 
accused Sir Patrick Mayhew (as Attorney-General) o f being an accomplice to murder, after 
his announcement that the RUG officers involved in the Stalker/Shoot-to-kill affair were 
not to be prosecuted, Livingstone’s consequent expulsion from the House o f Commons 
was opposed by just nineteen back benchers whereas McNamara happily expressed his 
satisfaction at the d e c is io n .4 7 9  The Time To Go initiative was just the sort o f campaign to 
which McNamara would have previously lent his support but the final Charter had the 
support o f just nineteen Labour MPs which did include a couple o f surprises such as Dale 
Campbell-Savours and Joan Ruddock, but many o f those who signed the 1 9 7 9  declaration 
of commitment to British withdrawal such as McNamara, Martin Flannery, Ernie Roberts 
and Jock Stallard as well as Frank Dobson, Clive Soley and Jo Richardson thought better 
o f the idea on this occasion.4»® The two Militant Labour MPs, Terry Fields and Dave 
Nellist, also refused to support Time To Go. The Militant view, as always, was based on 
their class analysis and although they did support eventual troop withdrawal, they believed 
in trying to build a movement in Ireland which would cut across the sectarian divide and
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would ultimately lead to Catholic and Protestant uniting to demand British withdrawal.48i 
This was in actual fact rather similar to the 1981 Labour Party NEC statement on Northern 
Ireland which also used the language o f class politics. But by 1988, whilst the Time To Go 
initiative might have appeared rather simplistic, the Militant class analysis was looking 
rather naive as the wider debate was beginning to recognise the importance o f trying to 
accommodate and deal with the two competing national identities rather than supposing 
that economic or class factors were the key to the problem.
In addition to Jim Marshall, Mo Mowlam was added to the Labour Party’s front 
bench team in the summer of 1988 and was given responsibility for welfare and women's 
issues in Northern I r e la n d . 4 8 2  in September the shadow team launched what the Guardian 
described as “Labour’s most detailed policy on Ireland yet.” *^^  The ‘Towards a United 
Ireland’484 document was essentially a more detailed and updated version o f the 1981 NEC 
statement although on this occasion there was no mention o f setting up a Party o f Labour 
in Northern Ireland. Detailed it may well have been, but it was essentially the same ‘unity 
by consent’ policy drawn up seven years earlier. Although Kevin McNamara had wanted 
to see the requirement o f unionist consent watered down in the 1987 document, the 1988 
policy statement made clearer than ever that “The constitutional step o f unification will be 
taken only with the consent o f a majority o f the people o f Northern Ireland.”^^  ^ Despite 
being such a detailed document, that detail was essentially concerned with harmonisation 
and other steps designed to bring about unity, no attempt was made at considering other 
options or at proposing structures through which political progress and dialogue could be
Militant, 26 Aug. 1988.
Labour and Ireland,'Ho. 21 (Jun-Sept. 1988).
483 Guardian, 22 Sept. 1988.
484 McNamara, K., Marshall, J. & Mowlam, M. Towards a United Ireland, Reform and Harmonisation: A 
Dual Strategy fo r  Irish Unification (1988).
485 Ibid. p.8.
162
developed between the two traditions north and south. Such was McNamara’s belief in re­
unification that he argued against British withdrawal precisely because “there would be no 
guarantee that the outcome would be a united Ireland,” the concern was that “Whilst 
unification must involve withdrawal, precipitate withdrawal might preclude unification. ”486 
At the launch o f the document it was evident that the Labour leader was essentially in 
agreement with McNamara in believing that Britain was obliged to take responsibility for 
finding a solution to the Irish problem. Kinnock stated that “Too many people look at 
Northern Ireland and turn away, saying the problems are intractable. That is the politics of 
despair. Others say Britain should wash its hands o f Northern Ireland. That is the politics 
of Pontius Pilate.”487 McNamara later described those calling for British withdrawal as 
“neo-imperialists” and argued that the consequence of troop withdrawal would be 
repartition, a new sectarian state in the north east o f Ulster and Belfast would become a 
Beirut.488 Ironically this is precisely what his opponents in the CLR had been arguing for 
years. The supposition by the troops out elements in the Labour Party that British 
withdrawal quite simply meant Irish unity was challenged by the CLR who believed that the 
result o f British withdrawal “would not be a united Ireland but an independent Protestant 
dominated state in the North.”489 Considering that the UDA, through its New Ulster 
Political Research Group, developed a policy in the early eighties which proposed an 
independent Ulster state49® clearly the very real prospect of such an outcome could no 
longer be ignored, not least by Kevin McNamara who no doubt considered that such an 
outcome would be a disaster for the nationalist community. McNamara’s position seemed 
to be that what might naturally develop as an agreed arrangement between the two
486 Ibid. p.2.
Belafast Telegraph, 21 Sept. 1988.
488 7mA Times, 1 Oct. 1988.
489 CLR Beyond Our Ken (1983)
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traditions north and south, once Britain had left, might not be the outcome that he 
considered best for the Irish people. His position was that having created the problem, 
Britain had a moral obligation to resolve the situation. It is this position which clearly sets 
McNamara apart from those such as Wilson, Callaghan and others in the Labour movement 
who have felt a frustration with the Unionists that has led them to conclude that Britain 
simply cannot resolve the problem for them. Such was McNamara’s hostility to Unionism 
that he would not contemplate ideas such as Ulster independence (which Callaghan once 
proposed) precisely because although it would ftilfil one republican demand, namely British 
withdrawal, it risked re-establishing Unionist hegemony in a new Ulster state.
The ‘Towards a United Ireland’ document was evidence that there had been no 
major developments in Labour policy; the limited ‘shopping list’ o f options that appeared in 
the 1981 NEC report had been reduced to just one. The option o f devolution before 
moving to re-unification as contained in the 1981 statement was still included but there was 
veiy little detail and the idea appeared to be proposed with reservations about its success to 
the extent that the document almost seemed to threaten that “In the event o f a failure by 
political parties in Northern Ireland to agree a basis for internal devolution, a Labour 
government will reserve the right to review means for strengthening the institutional and 
representative provisions o f the [Anglo-Irish] Agreement with a view to providing for 
alternative structures o f government... The authority o f the Secretary o f State and Northern 
Ireland Ministers, and their control o f  decision-making, will be e n h a n c e d . ” 4 9 i  It is well 
worth noting that shortly after the ‘Towards a United Ireland’ document appeared the 
newly merged Labour ‘87 group (whiclj was made up o f the old NILE, the United Labour 
Party, the Labour Party o f Northern Ireland and included elements from a nationalist
491 McNamara, K. et al op cit. pp. 17-18.
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background such as Paddy Devlin) published its plans for devolution for Northern 
I r e l a n d , 4 9 2  Robin Wilson (Fortnight editor) pointed to the contradiction in Labour front 
bench thinking and the limited development o f the now seven year old policy: “The 
fundamental problem is that the paper marries two conflicting view points. On the one 
hand it endorses the classical civil rights stance. [Labour’s programme o f internal reforms] 
Yet two pages later it supports the republican alternative - based precisely on the 
‘irreformability’ claim: ‘We recognise that the National Question, and hence the Border, is 
central to the ‘Troubles’ and that only the resolution of the question can bring peace.’ ”493 
Bew and Dixon also take issue with this apparent contradiction describing it as “an attempt 
by Labour to combine the ‘reformist’ and ‘republican’ positions on Northern Ireland” so 
that “Labour’s policy can be interpreted to mean all things to all people. The party 
spokesperson can emphasise Labour’s republicanism or reformism depending on the 
disposition o f audience being a d d r e s s e d . ” 4 9 4  This, in fact, is precisely what did happen; 
Neil Kinnock made various statements emphasising different policy ideas as seemed 
appropriate. Relations with some Unionists did improve over the next few months: Ken 
Maginnis said at a fringe meeting organised by the Labour Campaign for Peace and 
Progress in Northern Ireland at the 1988 annual conference that devolution could be 
achieved on the basis o f some type o f power s h a r i n g . 4 9 5  Then when Neil Kinnock visited 
Enniskillen later in the year he only met with Unionists including Ken M a g i n n i s . 4 9 6
The principle o f self-determination also did not appear to be an important factor in 
the thinking behind the document - indeed the word did not appear at all - and the idea of
492 Flackes, W.D. & Sydney Elliott Northern Ireland: a Political Directory 1968-88 (1989) pp.56 & 168. 
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Northern self rule (what Protestants consider their right to self-determination) did certainly 
not appear to be an option even in the context o f an all-Ireland arrangement. The thrust of 
the document was aimed at securing a united Ireland as an end in itself to be achieved 
under the paternal guidance o f the British government. In a Fortnight editorial Robin 
Wilson also argued that “Labour should realise that ‘working for consent’ for Irish unity 
can not be done by ‘harmonisation’ o f structures, over the heads o f actual unionists and 
nationalists, in the way its policy suggests: by enhancing insecurity this approach would be 
self-defeating... Nor are democratic institutions for Northern Ireland a barrier to unity: as 
Brendan O’Leary o f the LSE has remarked, if unionists and nationalists can’t share power 
in Northern Ireland - and recent developments in the councils are an encouraging pointer 
that they can - then they won’t be able to share it in Ireland as a whole.”^^ ? The statement 
stressed that “The Labour Party does not seek to achieve unification by stealth”498 and 
went on to explain at length the plans that the Party had to harmonise north and south in 
terms o f the economy, social security, education, the legal system and security arguing that 
whilst the Tories have been accused o f a policy o f surreptitious economic disengagement 
Labour were making their plans clear for all to see. Gone was Clive Soley’s idea o f an all- 
Ireland police force but much was made o f the new dimension o f the Single European Act 
and the argument that closer European integration will also help bring the two parts of 
Ireland together in economic and.social terms anyway. The Dublin government was 
enthusiastic about the document as were all the other southern parties but Sinn Fein were 
critical as were the DUP with Peter Robinson accusing Kevin McNamara o f being intent 
upon simply trying to erode the ‘Britishness’ o f  Northern Ireland.499 Nevertheless it did
Fortnight, July/August 1989.
498 McNamara, K. et al, op cit. p. 10. 
Irish Times, 22 Sept. 1988.
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appear that the document had reconfirmed the Labour Party as the party committed to Irish 
nationalist goals and as Dublin’s ally so that the idea o f Labour returning to the position it 
held in the 1970s appeared (albeit superficially) more remote than ever.
During the late eighties security and the question o f combating terrorism came very 
much to the fore again, most notably following the Gibraltar shootings, the Ballygawly 
coach bombing and a steady rise in both republican violence and loyalist assassinations 
generally. As always Labour found the question o f security a difficult and problematic 
matter; they had to try and strike a balance between being seen to oppose violence and also 
upholding civil liberties. First o f all the Gibraltar shootings prompted sixty Labour MPs to 
sign an early day motion (considerably more than the dozen or so that would normally 
make a stand on such issues) which denounced the event as “tantamount to capital 
punishment without trial.”5oo Then, following a dramatic increase in republican violence 
during the summer o f 1988, demands for the re-introduction o f internment were met with 
unanimous opposition from the Labour benches with Roy Hattersley as Home Affairs 
spokesperson unequivocally opposing such a move not least because o f the adverse 
international reaction which would follow, most especially in the United States.^oi The 
government did respond with a number o f measures including the Elected Authorities (NI) 
Bill and the Criminal Evidence (NI) Order. Although the PLP found little of contention 
with either bill they did oppose the anti-violence oath in the former and the ending o f the 
right to silence in the latter. The Labour Party was united in its opposition to the Criminal 
Evidence (NI) Order because o f the removal o f the right to silence and consequently voted 
against the government.^o: With the Elected Authorities (NI) Bill the second reading saw
500 T fQ o p s Out, Vol. 11 No.7 (May 1988).
501 Guardian, 25 Aug. 1988.
Hansard, Vol. 140 Cols 191-221 (8 Nov. 1988).
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Kevin McNamara and Tony Benn make speeches criticising the anti-violence oath as just an 
attempt to be seen to be doing something and futile because Sinn Fein would make the oath 
but still support the IRA anyway, but the PLP finally abstained on the Bill after failing to 
have the anti-violence oath amended because they were at least happy with the measures 
which extended the franchise in district council e l e c t i o n s . 503 When Douglas Hurd 
announced on October 19 that restrictions were to be placed on the IB A and BBC when 
broadcasting statements by Sinn Fein and other spokespersons for terrorism again the PLP 
was united in its opposition to the government. In the House o f Commons Roy Hattersley 
denounced the ban as ill conceived and draconian whilst Clare Short, who contributed a 
great deal to the debate pointing out that Tory contributions had consistently talked only of 
republican violence and argued that the decision was clearly political and the inclusion of 
the UDA in the ban was most probably an after thought designed to make the ban appear 
even handed. 5^ 4 Then, ironically, the one Parliamentary measure the government 
introduced which created a split in Labour’s ranks was the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Bill which had its second reading in December 1988. The PTA 
was the one repressive law which Labour had stood firm in opposing since 1983 and just a 
month prior to the new Bill’s second reading the European Court o f Human Rights had 
ruled that the Act’s power to detain suspects for seven days was in contravention of  
Europe’s human rights convention. For this reason it is all the more a curious landmark in 
the PLP’s attitude towards repressive legislation in Northern Ireland that Kinnock and 
Hattersley decided on abstention in the vote on the bill because it included new measures to 
tackle paramilitary funding and racketeering. The decision to abstain led to two shadow 
spokespersons resigning their posts, namely Clare Short (employment) and Andrew
503 Ibid, Vol. 143 Col. 113 (5 Dec. 1988).
504 Ibid, Vol. 139 Cols 1073-1155 (2 Nov. 1988).
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Bennett (higher education). Despite what Clare Short described in her resignation letter as 
Neil Kinnock’s “constant threats and denunciations”505 a revolt took place which 
culminated in 43 Labour MPs defying the whips and voting against the Bill. o^  ^ The shadow 
Northern Ireland team abstained as did the long standing opponent o f the PTA Clive Soley. 
The leadership argued that they could oppose, and therefore maybe amend, the more 
draconian measures such as exclusion orders and seven day detentions in the committee 
stage, so that after these tactics had in fact failed the PLP did in fact vote against the 
government after the third reading in J a n u a r y . T h e  initial split may perhaps have been 
more significant as an example o f Kinnock’s desire to stamp his authority on the PLP than a 
sea change in the Party’s attitude to the PTA. Nevertheless the fact that so many refused 
to stand with Clare Short and the others on what they saw as a matter o f principle, 
regardless o f the leadership’s Parliamentary tactics, was a pointer towards a future 
softening o f Labour’s stand on these coercive measures.
Throughout 1989 the LCI, the Troops Out Movement and the pro-united Ireland 
elements in the Labour movement generally were hoping for a greater response to the 
twentieth anniversary o f British troop deployment than they did in fact get. In addition the 
year also witnessed the left within the Labour Party forced into its most marginalised 
position since the beginning o f the decade. Tony Benn and others tried to revive the left’s 
fortunes through the setting up o f the Socialist Movement which was designed to bring 
together various leftist elements from both inside and outside the Labour Party by way o f a 
series o f Socialist Conferences held throughout the year. There can be no question about 
the fact that from the first Time To Go conference in November 1988 through to the Time
505 Times, 1 Dec. 1988.
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To Go Show in June 1989 the left did mobilise its forces well during the year. A great deal 
of debate and discussion was generated through the various local Year o f Action or Time 
To Go committees which sprang up around the country^o  ^ (the choice o f name depended 
upon whether or not the local elements wished to be associated with the national Time To 
Go organisers). About thirty Time To Go committees had been established by the time of 
the August march and carnival in London’s Finsbury Park.509 In addition, various concerts, 
meetings and public debates took place around the country and a fifteen minute film by Ken 
Loach explaining the Time To Go argument was shown on BBC 2. An unquestionable 
momentum and enthusiasm did gather pace throughout the movement so that by the end of  
the year Richard Vize o f the LCI could proclaim triumphantly that “In one year Time To 
Go! has captured the imagination o f a new generation o f campaigners and has significantly 
broadened support for British withdrawal from Ireland. By its approach o f combining an 
argument for the principle o f disengagement with an open ended commitment to discuss 
‘how?’. Time To Go! has enabled more hesitant supporters to become actively involved 
and greatly increased the movement’s accessibility.’’^ ®^ The reality was in fact very 
different and in a refreshingly honest self-examination Geoff Bell writing in the Troops Out 
Movement’s monthly bulletin in September 1989 stated that o f the two objectives set out at 
the beginning o f the year, namely the broadening o f the withdrawal movement and the 
bringing together o f the disparate groups including the LCI, TOM and the Irish in Britain 
Representation Group, neither was ultimately achieved: “There are different explanations 
for these failures, but surely any sober assessment o f the last twelve months must agree 
there is a deep sense o f a lost opportunity.”5 One problem was that internal stresses and
Labour and Ireland, Nos. 22-26.
509 Ibid, No. 25 (1989).
510 Ibid. No. 26.
511 Troops Out, Vol. 12 No. 10 (1989).
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strains were created within the well established organisations as they tried to co-operate 
with each other whilst slowly realising that the gains that were being made were in fact 
rather shallow with various elements joining the band wagon only up until the August 
before returning to their favoured issues and campaigns. Many had wanted to see, and 
believed they could achieve, a movement as large and influential as CND or the Anti- 
Apartheid Movement, The problem was for the LCI was that they were divided over 
whether to focus on such a strategy or focus on their founding aim o f trying to achieve a 
change in Labour Party policy as an internal pressure group; they tried to straddle the two 
horses at once so that ultimately neither objective was achieved. By the end o f the year 
most in the LCI had decided that they should return to simply focusing on the Labour 
Party. In 1988 the LCI had been happy to boast that the annual Bloody Sunday march held 
in London in January was the largest in a decade with an estimated 5,000 marchers in 
attendance5i2 by the end o f 1989 the LCI decided to pull out o f the Committee for British 
Withdrawal which organised the annual march each year in conjunction with TOM and 
refused to support what it said had become “merely a republican parade.” The decision 
was ratified at the LCI annual general meeting^i  ^ and although in later years they did return 
to supporting the annual march (they could ill afford not to especially during the Bloody 
Sunday anniversary year o f 1992), all hope o f building a new unified movement following 
the Year o f Action had gone.
Within the trade unions the impact o f the Time To Go initiative was also relatively 
disappointing. A number o f unions did decide to sponsor Time To Go but they were the 
same unions that had already been sympathetic to Irish unity and the achievements made in 
terms o f making in-roads and winning over new converts in the trade union movement were
Labour and Ireland, No. 20 (March-May 1988).
5^ 3 Troops Out, Vol. 13 No.6 (1990). (Letter from North West London LCI.)
171
negligible. At the 1988 Labour Party annual conference the composite resolution calling 
for British withdrawal was supported by the National Communications Union and the small 
media union the ACTT.5^4 This had only a minimal impact on the overall conference vote 
and what was o f greater importance to Time To Go at this time was for trade unions to 
come forward and fully endorse the initiative with affiliation. The first unions to do so 
were NALGO and the long standing supporters o f British withdrawal, the BFAWU (Bakers 
Union) who both affiliated to Time To Go in April 1989.515 Time To Go campaigners held 
fringe meetings at most o f the trade union's conferences during 1989 and 1990 in an 
attempt to win support and secure sponsorship for the initiative. The national executive 
council o f the National Union o f Public Employees had resisted previous attempts to win 
the union over to a position o f favouring Irish unity and supporting Time To Go but in May 
1990 the union’s annual conference in Blackpool voted in favour o f a motion which 
advocated withdrawal o f British troops and a commitment to support the Time To Go 
initiative. The motion also recognised the problem o f employment discrimination against 
Catholics in Northern Ireland, but this had been expected because, although the union had 
members in both parts o f Ireland, their Northern Ireland region secretary was Inez 
McCormack; a nationalist and one o f the four founding signatories o f the McBride 
Principles. The conference decision created a great deal o f controversy for the union and 
the NUPE offices in Belfast became the target o f  loyalist bomb threats. As a result the 
union executive agreed to put out a statement which played down the conference decision 
and stated “We are not in favour o f troops out tomorrow and the Executive Council 
accepts that the intent o f the resolution is to engage in a serious debate and is also 
concerned about the attempt to limit that debate to simplistic slogans rather than a political
Labour and Ireland, No. 23 (Jan. 1989). 
515 Ibid. No. 25 (July-Aug. 1989).
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p r o c e s s . ” 5 i 6  Following this the NUR also took the decision to sponsor Time To Go. A  
year later ASLEF, the other rail union who had for years resisted any radical Irish policy 
being adopted, took the same decision and also declared its support for the withdrawal o f  
British t r o o p s .517 However this was as far as the Time To Go trade union campaign was 
going to go and despite the enormous importance attached to winning over the big 
industrial unions, in this they were singularly unsuccessful.
It is very difficult to get a precise and clear picture o f what was happening in the 
trade union movement on the Irish question. There were no definite trends or patterns 
except that the industrial unions were not willing to support the ideas o f Irish unity or 
withdrawal o f British troops whereas some public sector unions were and the rail unions 
without having members in Ireland were also. Nevertheless the explanation for this is not 
that British industrial workers were more sympathetic to loyalism and the public sector and 
rail workers were more sympathetic to nationalism. The reasons for the varying positions 
were more often than not the result o f the small core o f executive members and national 
leaders being in some cases supportive o f taking a radical line, or that a determined 
pressure group were able to achieve success because of an indifferent leadership. For 
example the leadership o f the BFAWU and the ACTT happened to be sympathetic towards 
Irish nationalism and Neil Milligan the ASLEF leader was arguing for a policy o f support 
for Irish unity long before the union took up such a position in June 1991.5*8 The 
importance o f trade union sensitivity over their Northern Ireland membership cannot be 
overstated. Clare Short considered it the equivalent of the wider unionist veto on the 
constitutional question, arguing that “We’ve got this real malfunction in the trade unions
5*6 Britain and Ireland Human Rights Centre, op cit.
5*7 Ibid.
5*8 Milligan was an individual supporter o f Time To Go; Irish Post, 29 July 1989. So to was Peter 
Heatlifield, the general secretaiy o f tlie NUM, who was one of tlie initial sponsors o f the Time To Go 
charter; Labour and Ireland, No. 22 (Oct-Nov. 1988).
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because a lot of them allow a veto to their Northern Ireland branches, and because of  
discrimination in employment, they tend to be Unionist dominated.”^^  ^ The Transport and 
General Workers Union was one union that Time To Go put a lot o f work into and placed 
a lot o f hope because o f all the big industrial unions it was considered the most left-wing 
and carried the largest block vote at the Labour Party conference with over a million 
members. At the T&GWU biennial conference held at Brighton in July 1989 a highly 
acrimonious debate resulted in a motion in support for Time To Go being defeated after an 
impassioned plea from John Freeman, the secretary o f the union's Northern Ireland region, 
to reject Time To Go and support the neutral position o f the NIC/ICTU.^^® John Freeman 
was no Unionist and had always opposed the idea o f organising the Labour Party in 
Northern Ireland but he was sensitive to the sectarianism in the province and was no doubt 
aware o f  the unease which would exist among unionist minded members in Northern 
Ireland.
The reality was that regardless o f what was done to build on the Time To Go 
campaign the left were facing an up hill struggle within the Labour movement anyway and 
the intense activity which surrounded the campaign belied the fact that interest in the troops 
out cause was very much in decline. During the week o f the Time To Go anniversary 
march and carnival Merlyn Rees made a call for the scrapping o f the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, in addition to which James Callaghan later added that any future agreement 
must “come from within Northern Ireland.”^^  ^ This was not 1981 and the call for 
recognition o f nationalist grievances had been made persistently over the previous eight 
years but was now losing its impact and failing to interest a leadership which felt it was
Tribune^ 2 Dec. 1988.
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finally beginning to turn the comer in terms o f political respectability and therefore 
electability. At the 1989 Labour Party annual conference the Time To Go campaigners 
were placing a lot o f hope upon the outcome o f the vote on the British withdrawal 
composite, but the signs were not good when the NEC elections resulted in Ken 
Livingstone's removal from the constituencies s e c t i o n .^22 During the debate Kevin 
McNamara dismissed the supporters o f ‘troops out' and o f Sinn Fein as ignoring the will of 
the majority north and south and he felt confident enough to argue that “Those who believe 
that violence is an acceptable policy response and those who flirt with the paramilitaries 
have no place in this party... I believe that the NEC constituency results demonstrate this 
p o in t ." ^ 2 3  The appearance o f McNamara apparently displaying such satisfaction at 
Livingstone's defeat led to a noisy and hostile response with McNamara being slow hand- 
clapped and heckled. Nevertheless, the outcome o f the vote was another disappointment 
for Time To Go with 600,000 voting in favour o f the British withdrawal composite and 
5,308,000 a g a i n s t . 524
The failure o f Time To Go does seem to mark the turning point in Labour Party and 
left-wing attitudes in general to the Irish question. Unlike 1985, when the Labour 
leadership were continually making pronouncements on Ireland in the midst o f the 
optimism which surrounded the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the years that led up to the 1992 
general election witnessed conspicuous silence on the part o f Neil Kinnock and the rest of 
the shadow cabinet. It would appear that the Labour leader's input into Party activity on 
the Northern Ireland issue was to amount to an annual trip to the province for a couple o f 
days each December which usually amounted to a few meetings with local political figures
522 Guardian, 3 Oct. 1989.
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and security chiefs and a brief, safe and carefully worded statement which usually said more 
about security and the fight against terrorism than anything else. In a visit to Enniskillen in 
December 1988 Kinnock and McNamara met with the Unionist MP Ken Maginnis and a 
number o f Unionist councillors, but met with no nationalists o f any s h a d e . 2^5 In 1989 the 
Labour leader met with John Hume in Derry and on this occasion he made an unusually 
specific statement on constitutional policy declaring that “of all the options, devolution 
offered the best opportunity and I'd like to see it coming together with the appropriate 
democratic powers to local councils across Northern Ireland, because it is one o f the ways 
o f demonstrating that democracy is alive and well."526 Regardless o f the fact that this new­
found emphasis on devolution was contrary to the spirit if not the letter o f  current policy, 
what is o f concern is the erratic nature o f Kinnock’s contributions to the Irish debate. 
Contemporary observers attached little significance to such statements but in the light of  
Kinnock’s 1985 pronouncements on joint authority it seems that the Labour leader viewed 
‘unity by consent' as a distant and vague aspiration rather than a policy to be pursued once 
taking office so that he could advocate whatever he deemed suitable at any given moment 
and on this occasion it was to be devolution. Even Kevin McNamara has admitted that 
Kinnock displayed an element o f naivity on this occasion forgetting the historic significance 
of local government in Northern Ireland as the one layer o f government in which the worst 
cases o f anti-Catholic discrimination had taken place.52? Kinnock's December 1990 trip to 
the province included a visit to the Parachute Regiment at the Palace Barracks, Hollywood 
and following meetings with heads o f the security forces, including the commanding officer 
of the British army in the province, he stated his support for the Secretary o f State, Peter 
Brooke, in his attempts to achieve all-party talks and he praised the government in general
525 Ibid. 20 Dec. 1988.
526 Ibid. 22 Dec. 1989.
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for “sustaining a very positive and practical role” in developing Anglo-Irish relations.52» In 
December 1991, during his now regular visit to Northern Ireland, the Labour leader along 
with Kevin McNamara again issued a statement which contained very little o f any 
significance except to say that (in spite o f a campaign to make ‘Ireland: an Election Issue’ 
launched by TOM and others in April 1991) “it would be very foolish to make Northern 
Ireland a political issue in a general election.”529 This in itself, despite appearing 
insignificant, spoke volumes about Labour attitudes to the Irish problem and underlined the 
ongoing tendency towards bipartisanship not least because there appeared little point in 
trying to find new ground upon which to fight the Tories especially not the contentious 
ground o f Northern Irish policy. Despite the official Party policy and Kevin McNamara’s 
presence as shadow spokesperson, for all intents and purposes Neil Kinnock seemed to be 
carrying out a policy o f bipartisanship, saying little apart from condemnations o f violence 
and expressing hope for the talks process. More worrying for the left was the fact that its 
steady decline in the Labour Party was becoming an ever more rapid decline with policies 
such as unilateral disarmament being abandoned in 1989 with surprisingly little resistance 
from the left. The situation reached an all time low when in October 1990, for the first time 
since 1979, the Labour Party conference did not debate the constitutional question o f 
Northern Ireland because there were simply not enough resolutions on the subject.^^o In 
addition to this, evidence from an opinion poll carried out in 1990 amongst members o f the 
Labour Party and voters in general, revealed that 52% of general voters questioned said 
that they favoured the withdrawal o f British troops from Northern Ireland (a consistent 
trend) whilst 63% of the members o f the Labour Party questioned also favoured
527 McNamara, K. Interview, Nov. 1997.
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withdrawal.551 However in 1984 opinion polls revealed that almost 60% o f general voters 
questioned favoured British troop withdrawal and 70% o f Labour voters said that they 
favoured withdrawal.552 The drop in support for British withdrawal among general voters 
and the fact that Labour members support for withdrawal was so much lower than among 
Labour voters just six years earlier was also an indictment o f the Time To Go initiative 
which had clearly failed to generate the momentum it believed that it could to alter Party 
policy in favour o f a clear commitment to withdraw from Northern Ireland.
Since 1988 the Party had been working on a major policy review which had 
immediately aroused the suspicions o f the left because it appeared imminent that Kinnock 
was going to water down many existing policies in a way that would be difficult to prevent 
unless conference was prepared to throw out the entire review in October 1989. An early 
draft o f the policy review, which appeared in October 1988, contained nothing on Ireland 
but the final report, ‘Meet the Challenge Make the Change’, which was published in the 
summer o f 1989, contained a fairly detailed restatement o f existing Northern Ireland policy. 
A commitment was included to strengthen legislation designed to tackle religious 
discrimination in employment and the pledges on ending strip searching, banning plastic 
bullets, repealing the PTA, amending the EPA and reforming the Diplock Courts by 
providing three judges rather than one, were all restated.553 Various attempts were made 
by the left to amend the Northern Ireland statement; Tony Benn had proposed deleting the 
whole section and inserting “Labour will terminate British jurisdiction over Northern 
Ireland within the lifetime o f a full parliament to allow the Irish people to determine their 
own fiiture” but this was defeated by 21 votes to 5 with Benn, Livingstone, Skinner, Hanna
531 Seyd, P. & Whiteley, P. Labour’s  Grass Roots: The Politics o f  Party Membership (1992)
532 Cox, W.H. ‘Public Opinion and tlie Anglo-Irish Agreement’ Government and Opposition Vol. 22 
(1987) Figures taken from Jowell & Airey British Social Attitudes 1984 report.
533 Labour Party, M eet the Challenge M ake the Change (1989) p.58.
178
Sell and Sam McCluskie voting in favour. Clare Short later suggested that the commitment 
that “any change in the status of Northern Ireland could only come about by the consent of 
a majority o f the people o f Northern Ireland” should be deleted. This was also defeated, on 
this occasion by 18 votes to 8, with Short, Benn, Skinner, Sell, McCluskie, David Blunkett, 
Colm O’Kane o f COHSE and Ted O’Brien o f SOGAT voting in favour o f the deletion.554 
The report also contained the commitment to introduce a devolved power sharing 
government and details o f the proposed harmonisation o f the two Irish states (contradictory 
though this might o f course seem), but the shortened final document, ‘Looking to the 
Future’ which appeared in the summer o f 1990, was reduced to just twenty lines and had 
neither o f these two commitments.555 The 1992 general election manifesto had an even 
briefer statement on Northern Ireland and again, at a joint PLP/NEC meeting on the 
drafting o f the manifesto in the March, Tony Benn moved that the statement be replaced 
with a declaration o f intent to end British jurisdiction;556 once again he was heavily 
defeated. Ten years earlier Benn’s arguments had carried a certain moral weight as he was 
the leading critic o f the discredited Callaghan government, but after thirteen years o f Tory 
rule, two election defeats in which the electorate had recoiled from what appeared to be a 
party lacking in responsibility and a changing political climate in terms o f the Northern 
Ireland debate, the ‘troops out’ argument appeared rather out o f date and out o f tune with 
the atmosphere engendered by the Brooke talks which began in April 1991.
Labour Party thinking on trying to achieve a resolution to the Northern Ireland 
conflict evolved around policy ideas and rarely, if ever, proposed the idea o f trying to 
achieve a negotiated settlement based upon fostering all party talks. When Peter Brooke
554 Labour and Ireland, No.25 (August 1989).
555 Labour Party, Looking to the Future (1990) p.43.
556 Benn, T. End o f  an Era (1992) p.56.
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made his speech after 100 days as the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 
November 1989, he proposed that he would like to eventually see all party talks which 
would include Sinn Fein and, most controversially o f all argued that the British could not 
secure a military defeat o f the IRA. Although many on the Labour benches (for example 
Martin Flannery, chair o f the Northern Ireland Committee) were enthusiastic about the 
statement, Kevin McNamara appeared to be wrong footed and his immediate reaction was 
to denounce Brooke. He said that his comments were “ill timed” and “conveyed the wrong 
message”; they could only “assist the ‘one last push’ mentality o f the paramilitaries.” He 
explained to Tribune that “At a time when Provisional Sinn Fein’s political standing is 
lower than it has ever been, and on the anniversary o f the Enniskillen bombing, to come 
along and give a degree o f respectability, and the oxygen o f publicity, to them is quite 
a m a z i n g . ” 5 5 7  However there was consistency in McNamara’s response; he had always held 
a deeply hostile attitude towards the Provisional and saw the advancement o f Irish 
nationalism as being achieved through Dublin, the SDLP and the Labour Party, but did not 
see a role for Sinn Fein and, unlike some o f his less nationalistic predecessors, maintained a 
commitment not to meet or even have secret contacts with Sinn Fein.538 On certain 
occasions his criticisms o f the Provisionals could have come from the mouths o f the DUP. 
For example he has said that “their objective is a military dictatorship throughout 
Ireland”559 and because they are organised mainly within the six counties “In that sense, a 
former Irish Attorney General, John Kelly, was correct when he once described the IRA as 
a ‘British terrorist organisation’”.54o For this reason it was not altogether unsurprising that 
he reacted as he did, whereas Clare Short argued that “All he (Peter Brooke) said was the
557 Tribune, 10 Nov. 1989.
558 McNamara, K. Speech to St. Mary’s University College, Twickenham, 14 May 1998.
559 McNamara, K. Speech to Bradford University Labour Students, 3 Nov. 1989.
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truth, but if the Government will use its influence to invite those who support Sinn Fein to 
declare a ceasefire and come to the negotiating table, it will create the space for real efforts 
to end the conflict in Northern I r e l a n d  ”54i But as McNamara was always well aware o f the 
Unionists’ suspicions o f him he was determined to ensure that at least they could never 
describe him as what they term an ‘IRA fellow traveller’ and so this opportunity to attack 
the government on what could be construed as their going soft on Sinn Fein was not to be 
missed. McNamara has freely admitted that whilst he clearly has nationalist sympathies and 
is from an Irish Catholic background he therefore deliberately kept his distance from Sinn 
Fein for two tactical reasons: first off all he did not want to add to Unionists reasons for 
distrusting him (of which there were enough already) and, secondly, because he wanted to 
be seen to be pursuing a united Ireland and opposing the Prevention o f Terrorism Act 
because he considered it to be the right thing to do and not because he was being persuaded 
by or influenced by Irish r e p u b l i c a n s .542
With the rising importance o f the question o f the future o f the European Union in 
the political debate, John Hume’s long standing argument that closer integration would help 
to reduce the significance o f the Northern Ireland border began to be taken more seriously. 
In 1989 Kevin McNamara seemed to be in agreement with Hume, predicting that “as a 
result o f the single market, the border will become less and less relevant and the benefits 
and necessity o f co-operation between the two parts of the island will become more 
apparent. As a result o f this process. Unionist objections to a united Ireland would have 
less and less f o r c e . ” 54 3  in mid-1990 Kevin McNamara appeared to have adopted a more 
cautious line on the theory arguing that “The assumption that the single European market
541 Tribune, 10 Nov. 1989
542 McNamara, K. Interview, Nov. 1997.
543  McNamara, K. Speech to Bradford University Labour Students, 3 Nov. 1989.
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after 1992 will eventually bring about a united Ireland is not merely mistaken; its passivity 
is also d a n g e r o u s . ” 544 This apparently innocuous statement actually presents an insight into 
McNamara’s thinking for two reasons. First o f all it begs the question, if McNamara 
considers such an attitude to be ‘dangerously passive’, just how ‘pro-active’ would he have 
been in pursuing unity? And secondly, if taking a passive or less pro-active attitude to 
trying to make the border irrelevant can be described as ‘dangerous’, then this begs the 
question who does it endanger and why? The answer is that his thinking appears to have 
been continually geared towards achieving unity as the pre-eminent objective and so, 
despite viewing the Single European Act as a chance to advance this objective, he was 
perhaps simply warning o f the danger o f missing such an opportunity. Certainly his 
intention was to be determinedly pro-active with his economic harmonisation plans, arguing 
more and more as time went on that partition was not so much wrong because it denied 
self-determination (the republican argument) but that it is illogical in terms o f economic 
planning. For example in late 1991 he complained that it was ludicrous for Ireland to have 
an economic development agency covering 1 and a half million people in the North 
competing with another covering 3 and a half million people in the South on an island on 
the periphery o f E u r o p e . 545 This was unquestionably a logical argument and McNamara 
appears fully committed to all-Ireland economic planning even though he recognised that 
“Unionists will not stop being Unionists simply because of 1992.”546 This goes to the core 
of the Irish unity policy because if after a Labour government had done all it can to 
harmonise the two regions o f Ireland - in terms o f the economy, policing, the legal system 
and even social security - and the political divisions still remain, then constitutional 
reunification will remain an elusive goal. McNamara did say on one occasion that “The
544 Tribune, 15 June 1990.
545 McNamara, K. Speech to PLP Nortliern Ireland Back bench Committee, Brighton, 1 Oct. 1991.
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romantic vision o f a united Ireland is e x h a u s t e d . ” 54? This was perhaps recognition o f the 
reality that ‘Unionists will not stop being Unionists’ but nevertheless he never fully 
explained what his vision o f a united Ireland was or how the two national identities could 
practically be accommodated in a unitary Irish state. At the same meeting at which 
McNamara made this statement, his political advisor to be, namely Brendan O’Leary made 
clear that “European economic integration is not a necessary condition o f Irish unity” 
pointing out that “Divergent economies can be politically integrated, as is happening in 
Germany, and integrated economies can diverge politically”. “There is, in other words, no 
compelling logical reason to suppose that the economic integration o f the two political 
units on the island o f Ireland through the institutions o f the European Community has 
definite implications for the national conflicts within and between those two units.”548
There is, o f course, a well established internationalist tradition in the Labour 
movement which opposes nationalism and national boundaries and it is this tradition which 
came to the fore as the Labour Party shifted from its opposition to the European 
Community to an almost positive enthusiasm for the European idea. Amongst them was 
the one time Labour Party spokesperson on Northern Ireland, Peter Archer, who has 
described himself as a ‘world federalist’ and argued that, in spite o f developments such as 
the break up o f Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, this was not a trend which he favoured. 
He opposed this rising nationalism in Europe and argued that it made administrative sense 
for larger states to be established, which was why he even opposed any rapid moves 
towards Scottish devolution.549 The argument that the improved global transport and 
communications networks mean that larger administrative areas are required makes perfect
546 McNamara, K. Speech to the Irish Labour Party Seminar, 9 June 1990.
547McNamara, K. Speech to Exeter University Debating Society, 15 Jan. I99I.
548 Tribune, 3 August 1990.
549 Archer, P. Interview, Dec. 1996.
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sense and this is part o f the logic behind the European Union; but the political problem of 
nationalism remains and continues to present problems in Spain, Belgium and throughout 
Eastern Europe. McNamara himself argued that it was the existence o f militant Irish 
nationalism and the ongoing campaign by the Provisional IRA which heightened the 
significance o f the border creating a “semi-militarised frontier”. The conclusion that he 
made on the Single European Act was once again a rather paternalistic argument that 
“without a governmental commitment to extend and enhance cross-border co-operation, 
there is no argument that it will take place. In crude terms, an argument is sometimes made 
that 1992 means the two parts o f Ireland must swim together or sink together.” “It is 
precisely because one cannot rely on the instinct o f self-preservation that an active role is 
demanded from both g o v e r n m e n t s . ” 55o This theory has in fact proved to be wrong: the 
Republic’s economy has grown remarkably throughout the mid-nineties. The significance 
of the statement is, once again, its rather condescending tone and the presumption that a 
British Labour government would have to pursue such a task because the Northern Ireland 
parties could not be relied upon to see the sense in such a policy. It is also important to 
consider that if one argues, as McNamara did, that ‘Unionist objections to a united Ireland 
would have less and less force’ following economic convergence after 1992, if one looks at 
the Basque region o f Spain which enjoys a healthy economic relationship with the rest o f  
the country, with Bilbao in particular maintaining impressive prosperity, with no borders or 
frontiers to hinder trade, yet the Basque nationalist demand for separation has not been 
dampened and continues to exist as a formidable political force regardless o f economic 
arrangements.
550 McNamra, K. op cit.
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The changing political climate, aided by Peter Brooke with his more pragmatic 
approach, had a detrimental effect on the left-wing pressure groups. With the exception of 
the 1992 Bloody Sunday twentieth anniversary march, street demonstrations went into 
rapid decline and the LCI began declining both in numbers and influence with the last 
edition o f ‘Labour and Ireland’ appearing in May 1990. In the 1988 NEC elections the first 
three members elected by the CLPs, namely David Blunkett, Tony Benn and Ken 
Livingstone, all favoured Irish re-unification,551 but by 1991 only Blunkett remained and he 
was hardly forceful in his advocacy o f Irish unity. However, in addition to this a number of 
further developments took place which signalled a worrying new trend in the Labour 
movement for the LCI and others. In February 1991 Harry Barnes, who had become vice 
chair o f Labour’s back bench committee on Northern Ireland, helped to organise and was 
established as chair o f the British branch o f New Consensus. 552 At the initial launch o f the 
British branch he stated that “This is the first attempt to bring together people from all 
political persuasions to set up a broad-based and individual member organisation that will 
challenge simplistic slogans such as Time To Go! and promote an alternative that can help 
bring peace to Northern Ireland.”553 The fact that such an individual - so critical o f Time 
To Go - could become vice chair o f the Party’s back bench committee, was indicative o f  
the extent o f  the changes taking place within the Labour Party. He also came to represent 
the Peace Train organisation in Britain and hosted a Peace Train delegation to Westminster 
in July 1991 which met with a number o f sympathetic Labour MPs which included Kevin 
McNamara. 554 Harry Barnes had maintained a keen interest in Irish affairs and had 
consistently opposed the PTA, but he was one o f a small new generation o f people in the
551 Tribune, 1 Oct. 1988.
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185
Labour Party who were somewhat sympathetic to left-wing opponents o f Irish 
republicanism and was himself associated with the Workers’ Party. He represented an anti­
nationalist left situated somewhere between the Militant Tendency and the Worker’s Party 
and took it upon himself to call for devolution and a Bill o f Rights for Northern Ireland in 
the House o f Commons. He was a leading left-wing opponent o f the imperialist analysis of 
the problem and he discerned “that some on the left on the ‘mainland’ are abandoning this 
time-warped analysis, eschewing romanticised republicanism and paramilitarism in favour 
of a class analysis.” But his pro-partitionist view meant that this British version o f the 
Workers’ Party’s analysis was unlikely to gain much sympathy because his argument that 
“In a nutshell what is needed is an internal settlement” ignored one o f the key developments 
of the past decade, namely recognition o f the Irish dimension. In response to left-wing 
sympathies with the nationalist community Barnes claimed that “Protestant workers have 
often played a progressive role in the past and there is no reason why they should not do so 
again”555 and so was to frequently argue during the debates on the governments Fair 
Employment Bill, that Protestants also suffered discrimination in certain areas.556 
Paradoxically he was then to join up with three left-wing Labour MPs to vote against the 
renewal o f direct rule, because o f his belief in devolution, in defiance o f the official PLP 
position.557 In addition to this, Barnes maintained left-wing respect by, for example, tabling 
a motion along with Jeremy Corbyn in early 1992 calling for a review o f the Widgery 
Tribunal which had exonerated the Parachute regiment after Bloody Sunday twenty years 
earlier.558 New Consensus and the Peace Train organisation were resented by Sinn Fein 
because they were presented as a non-unionist/non-political peace movement but received
555 Fortnight, April 1990 (Article by Hany Barnes). 
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considerable funding from the Northern Ireland Office. The fact that they received such 
sympathy from Labour MPs was equally worrying for the LCI which was at this stage 
struggling for survival let alone hoping to achieve such a high profile and well publicised 
meeting at the House o f Commons.
A further development which indicated the changing attitude amongst many in the 
Labour movement was the increased profile o f the Campaign for Labour Representation. 
The CLR had o f course been very vocal in the early eighties and had the support o f a 
couple o f key figures such as Dick Barry and Frank Allaun who became the Honorary 
President o f the CLR, but only in 1990 did they finally reach centre stage with a composite 
resolution agreed for the October Party conference. Considering that there had been too 
few resolutions to present a troops out composite, the CLR saw this as a major coup. Prior 
to this the best that had been achieved in terms o f publicity was the contesting o f the 
Fulham by-election in 1986 by the self-styled South Belfast Labour Party. Boyd Black 
stood as the Democratic Rights for Northern Ireland candidate against the official Labour 
candidate Nick Raynsford (who curiously enough was, in later years, to become an 
outspoken advocate o f the CLR’s case) but received a dismal vote. The case for organising 
the Labour Party in the North was then given a boost by the fact that in 1989 the North 
Down Conservative Association finally received official recognition by the Tory Party; a 
sharp contrast to Walworth Road’s attitude towards the SBLP and the other Labour 
organisations in Northern Ireland. Neither the two Militant MPs or Harry Barnes 
supported the CLR but by the late eighties the organisation had an important supporter in 
the shape o f the Vauxhall MP Kate Hoey. Kate Hoey was an Antrim born Protestant who 
had been involved with the ‘troops out’ supporting International Marxist Group whilst a 
student and was a leading activist in the Anti-Internment League, but went on to join the
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Labour Party. She initially supported the Alliance Party in Northern Ireland, and went on 
to became a resolute opponent o f the Labour Party’s Irish unity policy, maintaining a firmly 
unionist position on the Northern Ireland question.559 i f  it was argued that McNamara’s 
Catholicism made him a liability in trying to present Labour’s policy to the Unionists, then 
Kate Hoey was not the best choice for an organisation which claimed that it was not 
integrationist but in fact sought a Labour Party for Northern Ireland to combat and bridge 
the religious divide. Larry Whitty, the Party’s general secretary said in early 1990 that they 
were considering allowing people who apply from Northern Ireland to become members of 
the Labour Party, but that the strongest objection to this came form the SDLP and the Irish 
Labour Party.56o Labour’s headquarters at Walworth Road immediately responded by 
denying this, but Kate Hoey was able to claim that Larry Whitty (in a letter to one o f her 
colleagues) had confirmed that, indeed, the situation was under review. 561 in addition to 
this, the fact that the Tories showed such sympathy towards their Ulster integrationists 
gave the CLR a powerful new argument for the Labour Party to challenge the Tories in the 
province rather than let them take the integrationist initiative. During conference week 
Roger Stott, an assistant front bench spokesperson on Northern Ireland, also began to 
waver on the subject, replying to the question o f extending Party membership to the 
province he said, in a radio interview “There clearly is a groundswell o f opinion in Northern 
Ireland that we should do so. There are many people in the trade union movement... who 
believe that the Labour Party ought to organise in Northern Ireland and some o f the 
arguments are very persuasive. Namely that if we become the next government, which we 
will, and we are governing Northern Ireland, then the people o f Northern Ireland should
559 CLR Bulletin, Sept. 1993.
560 Ibid. 16 May 1990.
561 Belfast Telegraph, 16 May 1990.
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have the opportunity to either vote for us or not vote for us.”56z (Roger Stott was to be 
part o f the front bench team which three years later wrote a highly contentious document 
vehemently criticising the CLR’s aims; to be looked in the next chapter).
In the end the 1990 annual conference voted overwhelmingly to oppose the motion 
calling for the British Labour Party to be organised in Northern Ireland^^  ^ and Kate Hoey 
responded by immediately announcing that the campaign to extend Labour Party 
membership to the province would continue. Ted O’Brien o f SOGAT (an unashamed 
nationalist) spoke for the NEC in opposition to the composite resolution stating that “We 
sent a team o f people to Northern Ireland to talk to the trade unions and other parties there 
and there was no support whatever for the Labour Party to be set up in Northern Ireland 
because it would be seen as linking them forever - I wish we talked about the six counties 
rather than Northern Ireland - with Westminster.”564 He was heckled from the floor during 
his speech and although the CLR campaigners were well known for their vocal and 
disruptive reputation. Party managers, it seems, were simply not willing to travel over to 
Belfast and start to embroil themselves in Ulster politics. It is worth noting that most fringe 
meetings at which Kevin McNamara was present were invariably disrupted by CLR 
heckling and its members were usually seen outside the Party’s annual conference waving 
10 pound notes at delegates demanding that they should be entitled to membership o f the 
Labour Party. The CLR’s members have been variously described as “an unpleasant 
bunch”565 to quote Frank Millar o f the Irish Times or at least “sharply polemical”^^  ^ to 
quote the more polite Jonathan Moore. Whilst Kate Hoey argued, after the conference 
decision, that “We were told there was no support among trade unionists. I know there is.
562 BBC Radio Ulster, 5 Oct. 1990.
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I have been approached by alot o f delegates and trade union members...” McNamara 
himself dismissed the whole idea as a “straight integrationist move” and said “The trade 
unions are against it because that would bring the constitutional issue onto the shop floor, 
with all the divisions that would create, and which they have sought to remove over the 
past years.”567 At the 1991 Party conference another CLR resolution was again defeated^^s 
with Eddie Hague arguing on behalf o f the NEC that extending Party organisation to 
Northern Ireland would result in Labour becoming identifled with the Unionist 
community.569 Whilst attempting to analyse the Labour movement and its attitude to these 
issues one must accept that a majority among the Party’s membership had very little interest 
in Ireland and very little enthusiasm for Northern Irish politics. With this in mind one can 
understand that the CLR was always going to find sympathy among those who were 
agnostic on the Irish question when presented with the suggestion that the Party they are so 
committed to, be organised in Ulster. The fact that the CLR were not particularly 
successful must therefore be, to a large extent, a consequence o f the fact that an alliance 
developed between the pro-nationalists in the Party such as Short and McNamara and those 
in the leadership (many o f whom were also agnostic on Ireland) who believed that 
organising in Northern Ireland would prove a costly and disastrous experiment which 
would serve no worthwhile purpose other than to distract the Party from achieving its 
primary aim o f winning enough votes in Britain in order to ensure the return o f a Labour 
government. One can speculate that it was for this reason that the NEC asked a pro­
nationalist such as Ted O’Brien to speak in the debate on the CLR composite motion,
567/n s/, Times, 6 Oct. 1991. 
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whereas in a debate on British withdrawal such an individual would almost certainly not be 
asked to speak.
In July 1990 Nelson Mandela, during a visit to Dublin, suggested that the British 
government ought to be able to begin negotiations with the IRA at some point. Bishop 
Desmond Tutu argued much the same during a visit to Ireland a year later and so the 
consequence was that these statements were used by many on the left to demand that both 
the government and the Labour Party adopt a more flexible attitude towards the question 
of talks with Sinn Fein. Peter Brooke’s initiative for all party talks had undoubtedly helped 
to create a new positive climate and the debate on Northern Ireland certainly began to 
change and begin moving away from the tribalism and sloganism of the past. Despite this 
Kevin McNamara continued to project an inflexible position; refusing to move on his 
opposition to Sinn Fein’s inclusion in talks and also developing an apparently changed view 
on the Anglo-Irish relationship which drew criticism from the LCI. In a speech shortly 
before the Brooke talks got under way, he lavished praise on the Secretary o f State and 
arguing that “Increasingly the complexities o f the relationship between Britain and Ireland 
and the reasons for the intractability o f the Northern question have come to light. It is no 
longer enough to blame Britain, nationalist Ireland has accepted its own responsibilities for 
the present state o f affairs.”57o McNamara’s position was also attracting criticism from the 
LCI mainly because the Labour Party appeared impotent and unable to influence 
developments in a way which frjrthered the ‘unity by consent’ policy. However McNamara 
must be credited with the fact that he was recognising and responding to the changes in 
Southern nationalism. He was well aware o f the new found pragmatism and flexibility 
within constitutional Irish nationalism with, for example, their willingness to debate the
Ireland Agenda, No. 2, Summer 1991.
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existence o f articles 2 and 3 o f the Irish constitution. However he criticised Sinn Fein who 
he said had “remained immune” from this “major re-evaluation o f nationalist thinking”.57i 
Because the Labour front bench so vehemently opposed Sinn Fein’s inclusion there was 
virtually no difference between their’s and the government’s position on the talks so that 
bipartisanship was effectively once again in operation in the House o f Commons. Kevin 
McNamara explained that his opposition to Sinn Fein’s inclusion in talks was based on two 
factors. First o f all they refused to renounce violence and secondly “The simplistic analysis 
of the republican movement according to which the conflict in Northern Ireland arises from 
the British manipulation o f the unionist community purely in order to serve British interests, 
reveals that they do not understand the problem. If you cannot understand the problem you 
cannot be part o f the solution.”572 This was an unprecedented position for a leading 
politician to take and is evidence o f McNamara’s unbridled contempt for a party which 
nevertheless represented more than a third o f Northern Ireland’s nationalist community. 
However, a month later, after the Brooke talks had finally got underway, he welcomed the 
involvement o f the Dublin government because he argued that Southern nationalism was a 
dimension in the conflict and so had to be included in the talks; the logic being that “It is 
vital that those who are part o f the problem are involve in the solution.” ?^^  This apparent 
contradiction was the result o f the new climate created by the Brooke talks which caught 
people such as McNamara somewhere between trying to think in terms o f a solution from 
above and trying to consider the possibilities involved in talks among the parties ‘on the 
ground’. The Labour Party, for the last decade, had concentrated on devising a policy for 
Northern Ireland rather than thinking in terms o f creating the conditions for talks and
571 McNamara, K. Speech to Sir John Deane’s School Northwhich, Cheshire, 26 April 1991.
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facilitating those talks with a view to looking for common ground between the parties on 
which to build a settlement on the basis o f self-determination. Even as Brooke was 
working to achieve a talks process throughout 1991, the Labour Party front bench team 
were considering a plan to introduce joint sovereignty for Northern I r e l a n d . 5?4
The Brooke initiative was not achieving the breakthrough that had been hoped for 
by the end o f 1991 and calls from the left for Sinn Fein to be included became a source of 
great irritation for Kevin McNamara. When Bemie Grant called for the government to 
include Sinn Fein in the talks his comments received widespread publicity and he argued 
that they had the support o f a great number o f people in the Labour Party. McNamara 
reiterated his long standing position o f opposition to any negotiations with any party 
supporting violence to which Grant replied that really he was “not on top o f the 
situation.”575 As the 1992 general election approached speculation developed that, as the 
opinion polls were indicating that the election o f a Labour government was imminent, 
Kevin McNamara would be removed rather than be given the Northern Ireland Office job. 
No such problem arose with Don Concannon in 1983 or with Peter Archer in 1987 but it 
was reported that gossip was rife even at the 1991 annual Labour conference that 
McNamara would be removed in the event o f a Labour victory.5?6 Regardless o f what may 
have been said by leading Labour figures, the speculation grew partly out o f the fact that it 
simply appeared unlikely, in the wake o f Peter Brooke’s carefiilly built talks process, that a 
Labour government would be prepared to jeopardise what may be the beginnings o f real 
progress towards a political settlement by keeping someone in the post who was so 
obviously disliked and distrusted by the Unionists. McNamara was well aware o f this and
574 Labour Party, ‘Options for a Labour Government In Nortliern Ireland’ (November 1991). See next 
Chapter.
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so, in spite o f his association with Irish nationalism and the SDLP, he continued to make 
sure he kept his distance from Sinn Fein never once meeting with them and replying, when 
asked if as Secretary o f State he would talk to Sinn Fein, “No. No democratic socialist can 
have any truck with people whose argument is not through the ballot box and persuasion 
but is through the bomb and the bullet. We have made that very, very clear and Neil 
Kinnock has made that very, very c l e a r . ” ^ ? ?  This did little to reassure Unionists especially 
in the light o f his stated desire to bring the very existence o f the Northern Ireland Office to 
an end. After a year in his shadow post McNamara told Ella Shanahan o f the Irish Times 
that he wished to be the last ever Secretary o f State for Northern I r e l a n d . 578 Then in 
November 1990 he said that “I have to make a confession, I am the only shadow secretary 
o f state in Westminster who wants to exchange shadow office for the real thing with the 
express intention o f ensuring that the office is eventually abolished. I would consider it a 
major success, if I, or which ever o f my colleagues is appointed to the office o f Secretary of 
State, could one day inform the Cabinet that the post is no longer n e c e s s a r y . ” 579 i n  addition 
to this, there was also the continuing ambiguity over what exactly ‘unity by consent’ meant. 
In 1987, when first appointed spokesperson, McNamara said, in a letter to ihe Independent, 
“Labour’s policy is one o f unification by consent - as everyone who is interested knows - 1 
am trying to ‘coax’ that consent from people o f both traditions in Northern I r e l a n d . ” 58o As 
the argument developed over the coming years as to whether a British government should 
be a ‘persuader’ for a united Ireland, the word coax appears a lot stronger than persuade 
so ensuring another reason for Unionist hostility to the prospect o f a Labour victory. 
Explaining what a Labour government would do for Northern Ireland, McNamara said
577 Ibid. 4 Jan. 1991.
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shortly before the election “We cannot impose unity, but we can set in motion the policies 
which will ensure that unity is freely accepted/’^ si What sort o f policies could alter the 
unionist community’s present position were still not exactly clear; after four years as Party 
spokesperson all that had been done was the reiteration o f Clive Soley’s harmonisation 
plans. As for achieving a situation in which ‘unity is freely accepted’ Bew and Dixon 
suggested that the opposite would have been a more likely eventuality: “Faced by a British- 
Irish-SDLP consensus, with the prospect o f both chairs o f the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental conference being in favour o f Irish unity, the unionists are likely to feel 
that their backs are against the wall. Their siege mentality will be reinforced and the 
prospects for power-sharing correspondingly reduced. In such a climate o f increased 
tension, the ability o f Labour to implement a comprehensive reform strategy, even if it has 
the will, may well be undermined.”582 Such statements by McNamara did o f course create 
great anxiety amongst Unionists although they did find a degree o f  reassurance in the 
Labour leader. Neil Kinnock told journalists at a meeting at the Irish Embassy that a 
Labour government would not use the talks process to pursue Irish reunification - “That 
isn’t the objective. The first objective is to achieve the political, economic and civil security 
that will enable people to take new perspectives.” *^^  John Taylor, who said o f McNamara 
“He’s seen as an Irish republican... His presence will greatly damage the prospects o f the 
talks,”584 asked him directly in the House o f Commons about Neil Kinnock’s statement, 
challenging him to declare that he also did not view the talks process as a means to 
achieving reunification. McNamara replied “We believe that the long term future o f  
Northern Ireland lies in unity with the rest o f the island.” McNamara could not shift from
58^  Tribune, 4 Oct. 1991.
582 Bew, P. & Dixon, P. op cit. p. 161.
Irish Times, 28 Feb. 1992.
584 Times, 7 April 1992.
195
his time honoured position but it should be made clear that the tone and mood o f this 
Northern Ireland debate was by no means confrontational but rather it was a display of 
consensus and bipartisanship (in fact Seamus Mallon complained that in seeking to achieve 
harmony the debate was downright bland).585
Neil Kinnock simply did not want Ireland to become a party political issue in the 
run up to an election; indeed Paul Dixon has argued that it is evident that bipartisanship has 
re-emerged whenever an election has approached precisely because the electoral benefit to 
the Labour Party in taking a partisan stand on Northern Ireland is almost non existent.586 
The difference between McNamara and Kinnock was becoming increasingly clear and both 
Ian Paisley and Jim Molyneaux stated publicly that following a Labour victory they would 
be seeking negotiations directly with the Labour leader rather than with McNamara.58? 
Times journalist Edward Gorman stated that, having spoken to certain Unionists, “In a 
hung parliament his head would be at the top o f their list in a deal with Labour.” James 
Molyneaux explained that “It’s not just because o f a distrust o f Mr. McNamara’s policies. 
There are certain other reasons which it wouldn’t be fair to state publicly. Just put it under 
the heading o f trust and confidence.”588 Speculation about Kevin McNamara’s future 
continued right up to the election. Ralph Atkins in Fortnight had already thrown up the 
idea that he would be replaced by either Frank Dobson, Michael Meacher or Martin 
O’Neill.589 Frank Dobson had a history o f sympathy for the Irish nationalist cause but both 
he and Michael Meacher had taken very little interest in Ulster politics in recent years. 
Since the election it has still been rumoured that Martin O’Neill would indeed have been
Hansard, Vol.205 Cols 503-9 (5 March 1992),
586 Dixon, P. ‘Britain, Bipartisanship and Northern Ireland’ in Contemporary Record Vo\.9  N o .l. 
Irish Times, 6 April 1992.
588 Times, 7 April 1992.
589 Feb. 1992.
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given the Northern Ireland job.^ o^ It is difficult to speculate what might or might not have 
happened if Labour had been called on to form a government. If there had been a hung 
parliament o f course Kinnock would have seen the sense in appointing a Secretary o f State 
who would have made matters easier for him in terms of ensuring Unionist support for a 
Labour administration. Although many have pointed to the fact that Kinnock and 
McNamara were indeed close personal friends, it was also a fact that McNamara was not 
an elected member o f the shadow cabinet and so could not argue that he was entitled to a 
cabinet post. In addition to this, just what Molyneaux’s ‘certain other reasons’ were one 
can only guess, but what is, o f course, known now is that for a long period before the 
election Kevin McNamara and his advisors were working on a plan to introduce an Anglo- 
Irish joint authority to take over the administration o f Northern I r e l a n d .^ ^ i  The details of  
the plan were not leaked until after the election and so the issues involved and the 
implications o f the plan will be looked at in the next chapter. Suffice to say that in the 
context o f the debate on the 1992 election the Unionists’ fears were more than well 
founded and puzzling though the differing signals about devolution from Kinnock and 
eventual unity from McNamara may have been, the very fact that there was also a team 
working on a completely new idea for joint authority makes a clear and conclusive analysis 
of Labour thinking during this period extremely difficult. The one conclusion that can be 
made is that as ever, the Labour Party was and still is a broad church with various factions 
pulling in different directions. By 1992 McNamara was evidently wanting to take the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement to what he saw as its inevitable conclusion, namely joint authority, 
but his position was looking increasingly out o f step with the leadership. Tony Benn and
Irish Post, 4 July 1992.
591 The first leak o f tlie ‘Options for a Labour Goveniment in Northern Ireland’ document appeared in the 
Irish Times, 12 June 1992. For tlie more detailed proposals drawn up by the advisory team see O’Leary, 
B., Lyne, T., Marshall, J. & Rowtliom, B. Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993).
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others were still committed to troops out, Kate Hoey and Harry Barnes had different 
agendas altogether; but with the hard left in drastic decline, the Kinnockite soft-left and 
centre-right were in the ascendant and were to remain so throughout the coming years 
ensuring that Labour was, in spite o f McNamara’s plans, firmly on the road back to 
bipartisanship.
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Chapter 5; *New Labour, Old Bipartisanship* 
Labour Policy 1992-97
The post-1992 general election period witnessed dramatic changes in both the 
Northern Irish political debate and British party politics. In the immediate aftermath o f the 
Tories’ fourth consecutive victory the outlook appeared bleak for Labour which by 
September 1992 had seen Party membership drop to an all time low o f 2 6 1 ,0 0 0 .^ ^^  The 
Party continued to move to the right and with the left becoming increasingly marginalised 
Militant finally decided, in March 1993, to end its policy o f entryism, leave the Labour 
Party and field its own candidates in e l e c t i o n s . T h e  right-ward drift became ever more 
evident in the debate on the Irish question. Ten years earlier the LCI was campaigning to 
strengthen Labour’s commitment to a united Ireland as well as seeking to have the loyalist 
veto removed from the policy. In 1992, with the LCI in steady decline, the pro-nationalists 
in the Party were simply hoping to achieve the minimum objective o f retaining the ‘unity by 
consent’ policy intact and ensuring that Kevin McNamara kept his position as spokesperson 
on Northern Ireland. In many instances their energies were being distracted by having to 
deal with the growing demand for the Labour Party to be organised in Northern Ireland. 
The right-wing drift was enhancing the confidence o f those such as Kate Hoey to persist 
with a demand which was hardly even heard ten years previously. Following Neil 
Kinnock’s resignation the Party elected John Smith as leader: a man who had similarly 
never made Ireland a high priority. Individuals who had once deemed it wise to speak out 
on Irish affairs and declare their pro-nationalist sympathies such as Harriet Harman, David 
Blunkett, Frank Dobson and even Clare Short became conspicuously reticent on the Irish 
question. If ten years earlier it was considered popular within the Labour movement to
Guardian, 4 Sept. 1992. 
Ibid. 26 March 1993.
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take a pro-nationalist line on Ireland, those who had serious front bench ambitions (which 
the aforementioned four certainly did) now believed that such an attitude could seriously 
harm their plans for future government posts. Whilst the British party political scene 
generally shifted into the centre-right ground, the debate on Northern Ireland was 
continually maturing both inside and outside o f Northern Ireland and a new word was to 
enter the debate, namely ‘peace’. The reason for this, as is so often the case with Ireland, 
was that international developments were changing peoples’ attitudes to the problem. The 
progress that was made in the Middle East and in South Africa led to a change in thinking 
with the feeling developing that if such achievements could be made there, then they could 
be made in Northern Ireland. The problem for the left was that in this new climate and in 
the new-found international desire to seek common ground upon which to agree a lasting 
‘settlement’ (another new word to enter the debate) the old slogans o f ‘united Ireland’ and 
‘troops out’ appeared more and more simplistic and out o f date.
The most prominent pro-nationalist grouping in the Labour movement during this 
period was to be the Labour Party Irish Society. There had been unofficial Irish Sections in 
the Party for years, with Clare Short as President, but the LPIS was a well organised 
grouping with a moderate image which eventually won official recognition by the Labour 
Party. The LPIS, whose membership overlapped considerably with the LCI, said shortly 
after the 1992 election “It is fair to say that an attitude of indifference and even hostility 
towards Irish activists has changed into a constructive dialogue between activists and the 
party l e a d e r s h i p . ” ^^^ This rather optimistic statement was said at a time when Labour was 
actually without a leader, but John Smith had told the LPIS just days before his election as 
leader that Labour “would conduct a fundamental reappraisal o f the means by which we
Irish Post, 18 July 1992.
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can achieve this objective [unity by c o n s e n t ] . I n  spite of this, and the high profile and 
respectable image the LPIS managed to maintain, they were not ultimately able to prevent 
the right-wing drift affecting Labour’s position on Northern Ireland. At almost the exact 
same time that the LPIS won its official recognition, Kate Hoey and Nick Raynsford 
launched Democracy Now! (the name was taken from the East German opposition group) 
as a Parliamentary based pressure group designed to win the Labour leadership over to the 
idea o f having the Labour Party contest elections in Northern Ireland. It is also worth 
noting that Democracy Now also, on certain occasions, used a gaelicised version o f their 
name: Daonlahas Anois. Hoey claimed that she had the support o f 40 MPs and asked at 
the launch o f the new group “Should we not be seeking a mandate fi*om the people o f 
Northern Ireland if we are going to be governing them?” Kevin McNamara responded by 
arguing that “It is a mirage believing that if UK parties organised in Northern Ireland the 
problems would disappear.” ®^® The SDLP took exception to Hoey’s complaint that there 
was no progressive socialist party in Northern Ireland for people to join. SDLP chairman, 
Mark Durkan, stated that the party was socialist and was “an affiliated bonafide member of 
the Socialist International and the Confederation o f Socialist Parties in the EC.”^^'^  (A 
point which Kevin McNamara also frequently made.) Kate Hoey and Nick Raynsford, 
another Labour MP who became prominent in Democracy Now (he was converted to the 
cause after the Fulham by-election when Boyd Black as a ‘Democratic Rights for Northern 
Ireland’ candidate had stood against him), immediately responded to the election o f John 
Smith as Party leader by writing to him to urge a change in policy and to allow Labour 
Party candidates to contest elections in Northern I r e l a n d . This set the tone for the next
595 Ibid.
596 Guardian, 15 July 1992. 
Irish News, 16 July 1992. 
Irish Post, 25 July 1992.
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few years; the LPIS and Democracy Now opposed each other in the same way that the 
CLR and LCI had done during the eighties. The difference was that whilst the LPIS 
presented a more moderate and leadership friendly image, Democracy Now sought to 
achieve the exact same objective (thus breaking with the marginal image o f  the CLR) but 
was far more successful precisely because it was based within the PLP.
One o f the consequences o f the new, high profile. Democracy Now campaign was 
that it added to the speculation about Kevin McNamara’s position as the Party’s Northern 
Ireland spokesperson. The fact that there had already been so much speculation about his 
position in the run up to the general election made him all the more susceptible to a 
whispering campaign by those whose confidence had been enhanced by the emergence o f  
Democracy Now. In late July 1992 both the LCI and the LPIS publicly welcomed 
McNamara’s reappointment to the shadow cabinet by John Smith as Northern Ireland 
spokesperson. Bill O’Brien replaced Jim Marshall in the front bench team, joining up with 
Roger Stott as McNamara’s assistants.599 Then at Labour’s annual conference a composite 
resolution was moved by the LPIS which re-committed the Party to ‘unity by consent’. 
Speaking on behalf o f the LPIS, Siobhan Crozier took the opportunity to attack 
Democracy Now, arguing that “On principle, we oppose the notion o f a British Labour and 
Unionist Party.”®®® Having coined this phrase they used it to great effect in trying to 
convince the rank and file that any move towards Labour organising in Northern Ireland 
would advance the cause o f unionism and not socialism. The composite motion went on to 
argue for a review o f “all aspects o f the relationships between Britain and Ireland, the 
Republic o f Ireland and Northern Ireland and between Nationalists and Unionists in 
Northern Ireland” and to “examine new institutional and constitutional approaches and
599 Ibid. 1 & 8  Aug. 1992. 
Irish Times, 3 Oct. 1992.
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relationships.” But, too few resolutions calling for Labour to be organised in the North 
were submitted for the subject to be debated.®®^  It would have appeared that Democracy 
Now’s initial impact was in fact negligible with their supporters and the CLR’s supporters 
making only their usual vocal impact at a few conference fringe meetings.
Kevin McNamara’s position appeared secure under John Smith. Although he was 
not popular with people such as Kate Hoey and Nick Raynsford he maintained good 
relations with New Consensus because he was determined to be seen to be opposed to 
republican violence. When the Secretary o f State announced a ban on the UDA McNamara 
gave the decision his full support.®®^  He continued to support the demand for a Bill of  
Rights and for the government to tackle even further the problem of employment 
discrimination. In June 1992 McNamara took the opportunity to continue to put pressure 
on the government on this question despite the passing of the 1989 Fair Employment (NI) 
Act. During a debate on direct rule he took issue with the government’s record on the 
subject but was accused by John Taylor o f being concerned only with discrimination against 
Catholics, in reply to which McNamara claimed that he was equally concerned about 
discrimination against Protestants.®®  ^ In November he supported the NIO announcement 
that they were to introduce a system o f goals and timetables to boost Catholic employment 
in the Northern Ireland civil service and in the same month the LCI successfully lobbied a
conference o f Labour MEPs to support Neil Blaney’s (Donegal MEP) resolution on
<
employment discrimination in Northern Ireland. The Labour MEP, Christine Crawley, led 
the campaign to get Blaney’s resolution passed which called for the European Commission 
to investigate discrimination and to set up a special EC committee to tackle the problem in
Irish Post, 10 Oct. 1992.
®®2 Labour Party News Release, 10 Aug. 1992 p29(Lab)A]. 
Hansard, Vol. 209, Cols 1060-61(18 June 1992).
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Northern Ireland.®®"^  On the constitutional question, rather than moderating his views in the 
light o f the speculation about his front bench position, McNamara was at pains to tell a 
meeting o f Socialist MEPs at a meeting in Londonderry that Labour was not trying to 
move towards a return to bipartisanship with the Tories but was committed as ever to the 
policy o f unification with consent. He went on to say that Labour differed greatly from the 
Tories in so far as that they were more concerned with civil liberties and with the 
accountability o f the RUC, especially on the question o f the use o f lethal force, and argued 
- significantly - that if the talks between the Northern Ireland parties were not proving 
fruitful then the British government should develop better co-operation with Dublin in 
order to fill the political vacuum.®®^  This came shortly after the Irish News had attacked the 
Labour leader after a visit to Belfast and accused the Party o f maintaining bipartisanship, 
claiming that “There is a cosy understanding between the two major parties in Britain that it 
is essential that the Northern Ireland problem is somehow ‘above politics’.” John Smith had 
reiterated the government’s position on all party talks, stating that Sinn Fein could not be 
included without a clear renunciation o f violence. However he also took up the argument, 
sometimes used by Neil Kinnock and others in the Labour Party, that the most important 
issue in Northern Ireland was its economic problems, unemployment and “the lack o f social 
opportunity”. He pledged a future Labour to restore the Province’s manufacturing 
sector.®®® John Smith was particularly agnostic on the Irish question and although the Irish 
News ’ criticisms o f him might have some validity they certainly could not be applied to 
McNamara. The ‘economic solution’ argument was favoured by those who believed the 
materialist analysis that unemployment was the main reason for paramilitary recruitment
Irish Post, 14 Nov. 1992. 
®®5 Guardian, 15 Jan. 1993, 
606 Irish Mews, 19 Dec. 1992.
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rather than political motivation. Kevin McNamara was not so enthusiastic about the 
argument (although he did o f course argue for economic improvements in line with general 
Labour Party policy) and his political advisor Brendan O’Leary has stated that he “regularly 
criticised the merits o f economic explanations o f the conflict advanced within the Labour 
Party, and criticised naive economic prescriptions for its resolution, a position not regularly 
taken by advisers to social democratic parties.”®®^ It would be fair to say that John Smith 
was displaying an element o f naivity on the subject. However his position was not 
untypical for a British socialist and Peter Archer also favoured this argument as did Harry 
Barnes; both o f whom were sympathetic to the Workers’ Party. This position was indeed 
consistent with certain liberal and Marxist®®* analyses of various ethno-national conflicts 
which tend to play down the significance o f national identity and explain the violence as the 
consequence o f economic deprivation; “Thus the relative lack o f class and ethnic conflict in 
Western industrial societies is sometimes ascribed to prosperity and the ability o f Western 
regimes to provide increasing economic benefits to their citizens. ”®®9
The situation throughout the Labour movement on the Northern Irish question 
during this period could be said to be, once again, in a state o f flux. Part o f the reason for 
this was the emergence o f Democracy Now but this was itself the result o f other 
developments. The fact that Kate Hoey embarked on this course, having been an MP for 
years without ever entering the debate on Northern Ireland either in the House of 
Commons or elsewhere,®^® is an indication that it was the new political climate which gave
®®^  O’Leaiy, B. & McGarry, J. ‘Proving Our Points on Northern Ireland (and Giving Reading Lessons to 
Dr. Dixon)’ in Irish Political Studies Vo\. 11 (1996) p. 145.
®®8 The Militants also took a similar view; sqq  M ilitant 1981-91.
®®9 McGariy, J. & 0 ’Leary, B. Explaining Northern Ireland  (1995) p. 266. Also pp. 265-307 ‘Mammon 
and Utility: Liberal Economic Reasoning’ in which such analyses are opposed as being an inadequate 
explanation for etlmo-national conflict.
®^® This is freely admitted by Hoey in ‘New Labour New Union’; an article written for the Ulster Review, 
Issue 19, Spring 1996.
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Hoey and others the confidence to come out and take up such a position. Another reason 
for this may well be the warm reception that New Consensus received from the Labour 
Party but then even this development was symptomatic o f the deep rooted decline in the 
left and the previously high profile elements within it, for example the pro-Sinn Fein figures 
such as Ken Livingstone and Tony Benn, who had been in trouble since Enniskillen, and the 
‘troops out’ lobby including the LCI and Time To Go. Democracy Now held a conference 
in October 1992 at which it was announced that a petition o f 800 signatures calling for 
Northern Ireland citizens to be allowed to join the Labour Party, was signed by 29 MPs 
including Peter Shore, Bryan Gould, Austin Mitchell, Kim Howells and Keith Vaz as well 
as the general secretary o f the NUT, Doug McAvoy.®" This ever increasing high profile o f  
Democracy Now led to bitter rivalry within the ‘Ulster Labour’ camp with the CLR 
accusing Hoey and the others o f pursuing a unionist agenda, whilst asserting that the CLR 
supported the LPIS and the ‘unity by consent’ policy. The South Belfast Labour Party also 
rushed to distance itself from Democracy Now and to declare its anti-unionist 
credentials.®*  ^ What was clearly frustrating for the CLR was that they had decided to 
embark on a strategy o f adopting a Labour left position o f supporting Irish unity in order to 
shake off its anti-nationalist image and win the support o f the British Labour movement to 
its cause. In fact Boyd Black had left; the CLR precisely because o f the group’s decision to 
support the Irish unity policy. To begin with in 1981 when the ‘unity by consent’ policy 
was first adopted, the CLR immediately denounced it as an unattainable nationalist 
slogan.®*  ^ The CLR then spent years in the political wilderness having been denounced as 
pursuing a hidden unionist agenda only to now find themselves supporting Irish unity and 
being marginalised by a grouping which they themselves were denouncing as tiying “to
®**/m/j Post, 31 Oct. 1992. (Letter from Democracy Now secretary, James Winston).
®*2 Ibid. 21 Nov. 1992. (Letters from CLR secretary, David Morrison and SBCLP secretary, Joe Keenan).
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create just another sectarian Unionist Party.”®*^* However Democracy Now were 
completely dismissive o f the CLR and in early 1993 were given a boost by the fact that in a 
postal ballot the AEEU (Northern Ireland region) voted by 3,587 to 2,823 to have the 
Labour Party contest elections in the region. Kevin McNamara’s response was to argue 
that because there was only a 28% turn out this meant that only 16% o f the union in the 
region voted in favour despite the AEEU having an overwhelming Protestant membership 
in Northern Ireland.®*5
Developments such as this and the ongoing Democracy Now campaign prompted 
McNamara and his front bench team to produce a lengthy document, in July 1993 
provocatively entitled ‘Oranges or Lemons?’®*® to set out their opposition to the ideas of 
political integration and extension o f the Labour Party to Northern Ireland. The general 
thrust o f the document was that all the different groups, from Democracy Now to the 
South Belfast Labour Party, have an integrationist (and therefore unionist) agenda. Labour 
in Northern Ireland would fail as did the NILP and that to further Labour’s ‘unity by 
consent’ policy support should be given to the Irish Labour Party and to the SDLP rather 
than oppose them with a rival British Labour Party. At the launch o f  the document Kevin 
McNamara played on the idea that adopting an integrationist/unionist agenda would cost 
Labour many Irish votes; “The strength o f our electoral support among the Irish in Britain 
is based, in large part, on the Labour Party’s historic recognition o f the Irish people’s right 
to self determination and the Conservative Party’s historic association with coercion of 
Ireland and support for the Union and Unionists.”®*^  This is particularly questionable;
®*^  Times, 20 Aug 1981 & Labour Weekly, 9 Jan. 1981.
®*‘*/m /i Post op. cit.
®*5 Ibid. 13 Feb. 1993.
®*® McNamara, K., Stott, R. & O’Brien, B. Oranges or Lemons? Should Labour Organise in Northern 
Ireland? (1993).
Irish Post, 31 July 1993.
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whether or not the Irish in Britain vote Labour for these reasons is certainly debatable 
considering that the majority o f the Britain’s Irish community are mainly working class and 
constitute the type o f social grouping that would vote for the Labour Party regardless of  
ethnic origin. What is without doubt is that Labour, nevertheless, had every reason to keep 
one eye on the Irish vote because, as an Irish 7//wej/M0RI poll conducted shortly before 
the 1992 election revealed, 49% o f the Irish in Britain questioned said they would vote 
Labour as against only 28% who said that they would vote Conservative.®** The ‘Oranges 
or Lemons?’ document was certainly a very thorough and hard hitting attack on 
Democracy Now and Patrick Wintour o f the Guardian claimed that “the strong tone o f the 
document is understood to have raised eyebrows in the Labour Leader’s office.”®*^  Indeed, 
Kate Hoey responded by writing to John Smith to seek his disapproval o f the document 
(which in the event was not forthcoming) and by handing in to the NEC a 1,000 signature 
petition in early August calling for Labour to be organised in Ulster.®^ ® Nevertheless there 
was mounting evidence that Democracy Now did have an integrationist/unionist agenda 
and McNamara may well have felt vindicated by the fact that Harry Barnes, at this stage a 
Democracy Now supporter, began to publicly support the Unionist demand for a Northern 
Ireland select committee at the same time that the ‘Oranges or Lemons?’ document was 
published.®^* Kate Hoey had already taken up such a position; in a debate on the talks 
process, in November 1992, she made a rare contribution to a Northern Ireland 
parliamentary debate in order to call on the government to introduce a select committee for 
the province.® 2 2 Perhaps the most interesting passage in ‘Oranges or Lemons?’ was the 
two paragraphs which made comparisons with other regional conflicts. Included in the
Irish Times, 1 April 1992.
®*9 Guardian, 27 July 1993.
®2®/m/î Post, 31 July 1993.
®^ * Ibid.
Hansard, Vol. 213 Col. 892 (11 Nov. 1992).
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study were a range o f comparative examples from the Basque region and Cyprus to Quebec 
and Sri Lanka with the argument being presented that if in any o f these areas there were 
state-wide political parties (and in some cases such as Canada and Spain there are) then 
clearly such a factor has no bearing whatsoever on the political attitude o f the alienated or 
discontented national/ethnic c o m m u n i t y . whilst this is an unquestionable fact the 
document had unwittingly undermined the Irish ‘unity by consent’ idea. It was argued in 
the last chapter that Spanish-wide economic co-operation had done little to help reconcile 
the Basques to the Madrid government and thus all-Ireland economic co-operation would 
do little to reconcile Ulster Protestants toward the Dublin government. So this argument, 
that any attempt to erode nationalist parties with a state-wide party would fail, also 
presents a problem for those who believe all-Ireland wide political institutions and 
arrangements will erode Protestant support for Unionism. Of course the authors o f this 
document were arguing that organising British parties in Northern Ireland would not 
reconcile Irish nationalists to the Union but conversely this highlights the fact that ‘unity by 
consent’ would remain an elusive goal precisely because all Labour’s plans for winning 
such consent involved all-Ireland economic, institutional and political harmonisation in 
order to win Protestant consent even though it has been argued that in other comparable 
regions polarisation and ethnic/national consciousness has increased regardless. Paul Dixon 
has argued that “if the tendency o f closer European integration is towards increasing the 
cultural and political importance o f the regions at the cost o f the nation-state, then 
Labour’s harmonisation strategy appears to be working against rather than - as it claims - 
with the grain o f European developments.” He also managed to gain an admission from
623 McNamara, K. et al op cit. pp. 29-30.
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Kevin McNamara that there is no precedent anywhere in the world for the success o f a 
haimonisation strategy.®^ '*
Regardless o f developments in the Labour representation debate, the most 
important event during this period and one which did far more to polarise the McNamara 
and Democracy Now camps as well as having far reaching implications for McNamara and 
the pro-nationalists in the PLP, was the leaking o f the front bench’s proposals for joint 
sovereignty for Northern Ireland at the end o f June 1993. On the first occasion that the 
story was reported a year earlier (just after the general election) nobody took any notice 
whatsoever. Frank Millar who first reported the existence o f the plans entitled ‘Options for 
a Labour Government’, in the Irish Times in the summer o f 1992, said at the time that 
although Neil Kinnock and others knew o f the plans before the general election, nobody in 
the Labour Party was prepared to make any comment about its existence or otherwise.®^  ^
When the story broke again a year later panic set in and Patrick Wintour o f the Guardian 
reported that “Labour officials said the paper had not been seen by the shadow cabinet 
prior to the election or by the then Labour leadership.”®^® In fact McNamara has stated 
that the leadership had asked the shadow team to prepare a paper in preparation for taking 
office. Rather than the document being the product o f a few over zealous advisers and 
shadow team members it had been asked for by Neil Kinnock in order to provide the 
leadership with some alternative ideas in the event o f Labour taking over at the NIO.® ’^^ 
McNamara had previously made statements which indicated that his line o f thought was 
shifting towards some form of shared responsibility: in January (as has already been 
mentioned) he had argued that if the talks process failed, then the British government
®^"* Bew, P. & Dixon, P. ‘Labour Party Policy and Nortliem Ireland’ in Barton, B.& Roche, P. (eds.) The 
Northern Ireland Question: Perspectives and Policies (1994) pp 156-7.
Irish tim es, 12 June 1992.
®^ ® Guardian, 29 June 1993.
®27 McNamara, K. Interview, Nov. 1997.
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should develop better co-operation with Dublin in order to fill the political vacuum. In 
June 1993 he went even further arguing that if the Northern Ireland parties could not reach 
agreement “The two Governments should seek to make whatever progress is possible and 
seek ways to share responsibility”.®^* These statements aroused very little interest and not 
even the Unionists took issue with McNamara over them. The sensationalism which 
surrounded the ‘leak’ had everything to do with party political games within Westminster 
and little to do with any real shock at the plans which had never, even in secret, been 
agreed as Labour Party policy. In 1984 Neil Kinnock had, publicly, given consideration to 
the idea o f some form o f joint authority with very little response from unionism.®^9 The 
LPIS had produced a document entitled ‘Ireland: Time for Peace’ in May 1993, which also 
advocated a form o f joint authority, but again very little interest was aroused.®^ ® 
Everybody knew that the government needed the Unionist MPs’ support in the forthcoming 
Commons vote, in July 1993, on the Maastricht Treaty and so it would appear that the so 
called ‘leak’ (o f a document that the Tories already knew about) was timed to help ensure 
that the Unionists (who also already knew about it) would save the government in the 
crucial vote. Brendan O’Leaiy (McNamara’s advisor) has argued that the Unionists did 
not need persuading but would have voted with the government regardless, because they 
did not want to precipitate a general election which would almost definitely have resulted in 
a Labour victory.®^* Kevin McNamara and others were to argue that it was not the ‘leak’ 
of a Labour document which swayed the Unionists but an alleged “squalid deal” to 
introduce a Northern Ireland parliamentary select committee thus fulfilling a long standing 
Unionist demand.®®^  The issue became very high profile with John Major immediately
Hansard, Vol. 227 Col. 480 (24 June 1993). 
®^ 9 See Chapter 3.
6'iO Irish Post, 29 May 1993.
®5* McGariy, J. & O’Leary, B. op cit. p. 305. 
Irish Post, 9 April 1994.
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calling on John Smith to sack Kevin McNamara the day after the ‘leak’ appeared in the 
Guardian, t h u s  prompting many observers and even some on the Labour benches to 
conclude that McNamara had single handedly lost Labour the chance o f winning the 
Unionists over to the Opposition’s side in the Maastricht vote. The Commons exchanges 
became increasingly acrimonious with McNamara becoming clearly irritated by Major’s 
apparent intention o f abandoning any form o f bipartisanship, declaring that on the Union 
between Britain and Northern Ireland “we in the Conservative and Unionist Party stand 
four-square behind it.” John Smith refused point blank to comment on the matter, but when 
Sir Patrick Mayhew joined in the attack on McNamara he responded by delivering a 
lengthy defence o f himself only to be interrupted by the Speaker for using up excessive time 
and so, in an untypical display o f emotion and Irish nationalist jargon, declared “I can 
assure you, Madam Speaker, that this croppy does not lie down before a pile o f Tories 
behaving like that.”®®^* In spite o f McNamara reacting in precisely the manner that the 
government and Unionists had hoped, the reality was that the whole fuss over the joint 
authority proposals was a smokescreen whilst the real reason for the Tories winning 
Unionist support was the alleged deal on a Northern Ireland select committee. It has been 
asserted that the Unionists were responsible for the ‘leak’ and that they had possession of  
the document since before the general e le c t io n .® ^ ^  indeed, James Molyneaux came out and 
explained that the “certain other reasons which it wouldn’t be fair to state publicly” why he 
would not be willing to co-operate with McNamara if Labour were to form a government 
after the 1992 election, were that he had ftill knowledge o f the joint authority plans; “It was 
for that reason that I refused to commit myself to continuing the Brooke talks if there was a
Hansard Vol. 227 Col. 823 (29 June 1993).
®54jbid. Cols 1092-1103.
®35 Fortnight, No. 13, Sept. 1993 (article by Jonatlian Moore) & Irish Post, 24 July 1993 (article by Martin 
Collins).
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change o f government. McNamara’s hysterical reaction at that time indicated that he knew
the reason.”®56
The sensationalism and outrage in some quarters (Paisley said the joint sovereignty 
plan would lead to civil war®^ ?) was certainly an over reaction to plans which were in many 
ways simply the logical next step after the Hillsborough accord between London and 
Dublin. The plan envisaged a five member Executive Joint Authority (EJA) for the 
province with one representative from the British government, one from the Irish and three 
from within Northern Ireland. But the document made clear that “Unionists are unlikely to 
be happy with our proposals. It is therefore necessary to reassure unionists that shared 
responsibility is not an immediate staging post to Irish unity. We propose that the 
constitution o f Northern Ireland under shared responsibility can only be changed if there is 
overwhelming support for such a proposal.” The plan was to “give unionists a veto on 
integration with the Republic o f Ireland and nationalists a veto on integration into the 
United Kingdom.”®^* This was certainly no move towards unity but was a fiarthering o f the 
process o f seeking a solution from above by essentially introducing direct rule from 
Westminster and Dublin albeit with a devolutionary dimension in the shape o f the Northern 
Irish majority on the EJA.®^ ® It could also be argued that the plan strengthened the unionist 
veto and partition because, with some demographic experts predicting a Catholic majority 
in Northern Ireland by the early 21st century, the paper says that “Unionists, however 
might be attracted by the idea that if shared responsibility is justified where there is a 
nationalist minority o f 38-40 per cent, it would be equally justified when there is a
®5® Guardian, 30 June 1993.
®^  ^Ibid.
®5* Labour Party ‘Options for a Labour Government in Northern Ireland’(November 1991).
®®9 Cox, W.H. ‘Uphill all the Way: Constitution Making for Northern Ireland’ Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 
44 (1991) In tliis it is argued tliat joint authority “would be essentially colonial.”
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substantial unionist minority in the North.”®'*® So why would Kevin McNamara, a long 
standing supporter o f Irish unity, agree to such a plan? First o f all McNamara consistently 
continued advocating ‘unity by consent’ and so for him the plan was perhaps just another 
possible option. He also distanced himself from the BPPR report, which appeared later and 
advocated weighted majorities in order to make changes to the joint authority arrangement. 
Secondly the plan was initially born out o f frustration with the failure o f the Brooke talks. 
It envisaged that if Labour had won power in 1992 the Northern Ireland parties would be 
given six months to reach agreement after which time, if nothing was agreed, the Labour 
government should then go ahead with the joint sovereignty plan. The draftsmen o f the 
paper took a cynical and pessimistic view o f the Brooke talks and told Kinnock “We would 
not expect such an initiative to succeed but it would prevent accusations that the parties in 
Northern Ireland were not given a chance to determine their own future by a Labour 
government.”®'** This apparent surrender o f the principle o f self-determination was 
paradoxically seen by many on the left as a positive step and the plan was given a guarded 
welcome by the LPIS and the LCI. The latter argued that “Joint sovereignty as outlined in 
the leaked draft document would represent an advance on existing Labour policy.” With 
many on the left having argued that Hillsborough had reinforced partition, the LCI was 
now arguing that in the light o f the failed Brooke initiative “the new proposals would break 
the stalemate by circumventing Unionist intransigence and actively pursuing an agreement 
with Dublin. They represent an attempt to pursue unity by constitutional means, subtly yet 
crucially different from the conditionality o f ‘unity by consent’ which leaves the loyalist 
veto intact.”®'*^ The plan seemed to mean all things to all people. Clive Soley welcomed 
the plan but also saw it as a short term measure leading to eventual complete transfer of
®'*® Labour Party, op cit.
Irish Times, 29 June 1993.
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sovereignty to Dublin.®'*® But to suggest that it would bring Irish unity closer and sooner, 
was not what the document itself envisaged. The paper recognises that “Transitional 
shared responsibility perceived as a prelude to a British withdrawal would be destabilising” 
and so joint sovereignty “should be acknowledged to operate for a period o f not less than 
20 years.”®'*'* The joint sovereignty idea could not be described as part o f a new direction in 
the British Labour movement’s thinking on Ireland; it was a plan drawn up by McNamara 
and a small team o f advisors which was never endorsed as Party policy. Many on the left 
may well have been enthused about the plan precisely because o f the hysterical reaction o f  
the Unionists and the Tories. If such a document had have been produced in the 
Conservative Party the reaction from the Labour left would have no doubt been much more 
ambivalent and suspicious. And if such a suggestion might appear absurd, as the Party that 
had signed the Hillsborough accord it would not really have been particularly surprising.
Despite gradually distancing himself from the joint sovereignty idea, Kevin 
McNamara’s position was becoming increasingly threatened. When the Institute o f Public 
Policy Research launched its extended version o f the proposals, McNamara officially kept 
his distance. He had intended to write the introduction for the IPPR but decided against 
such an idea precisely because o f the volatile political atmosphere.®'*5 Most were happy to 
make their views known; Clare Short declared her support for it, Peter Hain opposed the 
ideas and Clive Soley said he welcomed them but still would rather pursue consensual 
unification.®'*® All that McNamara would say was that “‘Labour Party policy is Irish unity 
by consent and there are no plans at present to change Party policy.’”®'*^  But the LCI
®'*2 Ireland Agenda, No. 10, Oct. 1993.
®'*®/râ/î Post, 9 Oct. 1993.
®'*'* Labour Party ‘Options for a Labour Government in Northern Ireland’ (November 1992). 
®'*5 McNamara, K. Interview, Nov. 1997.
®'*®7m/j Times, 20 Oct. 1993.
Guardian, 20 Oct. 1993.
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observed that “Over the summer Labour’s pro-unionist camp has continued to pile pressure 
on McNamara. Austen Morgan, a well-known supporter o f Democracy Now... raised the 
prospect o f Kevin McNamara being replaced by Maijorie Mowlam, MP for Redcar. Others 
see the fingerprints o f Peter Mandelson MP.”®'** Kate Hoey also made public her desire to 
see McNamara replaced after the shadow cabinet elections in the November. ®'*9 Jonathan 
Moore wrote after the summer that “On the Labour side, meanwhile, some back benchers 
have turned on the party spokesperson, Kevin McNamara, blaming him for pushing the 
unionists into the government’s hands. One Labour source noted during the run-up to the 
crucial vote o f  confidence in July that there ‘were cabals o f Labour MPs meeting 
everywhere. Kevin was an outsider in every one o f them’.”®^® Much was made o f a 
whispering campaign to get rid o f McNamara and Democracy Now begun to canvass 
support for Mo Mowlam as a replacement for McNamara in the knowledge that she indeed 
had ambitions to become a future Secretary o f State for Northern Ireland.®5*
The campaign by Democracy Now appeared to have won a small victory at the end 
o f August 1993. In late 1992 the Labour Party’s NEC set up a National Policy Forum 
which would look at its Northern Ireland policy as part of a wider review. The body began 
work in May 1993 and four months later an organisation and development sub-committee 
agreed to send a delegation to Ulster to look into the possibility o f setting up the Labour 
Party in the province. When questioned about the significance o f this development Clare 
Short played down the decision saying that “It wasn’t an urgent matter but we agreed to it. 
There wasn’t a long discussion about organising in Northern Ireland.”®^  ^ Nothing came of 
the delegation and what appeared to be a small victory was later overshadowed by the
®*** Ireland Agenda, No. 10, Oct. 1993, 
®'*9 Guardian, 28 July 1993.
6^0Fortnight, No. 13, Sept. 1993.
Irish Post, 11 Sept. 1993. 
Guardian, 27 August 1993.
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embarrassing news that the CLR had announced that it was suspending all activities and 
dissolving itself “because the issue which it put on the Labour agenda has been hijacked and 
prostituted to the interests o f Ulster Unionism by the group o f English MPs and Ulster 
Loyalists called Democracy Now.”®53 xhe timing was just right for Kevin McNamara, 
coming the week before Labour’s 1993 annual conference. The CLR made clear that it 
was unhappy about Democracy Now’s “somewhat hysterical campaign against McNamara” 
and had in fact tried to counter it. In the organisation’s final bulletin they said that 
“Democracy Now... is working to a narrow unionist agenda and sees Labour representation 
as a means o f undermining the party’s commitment to Irish unity by consent.” It went on 
to argue that Hoey had “systematically and with much deception, developed her 
Democracy Now group in hostility to the CLR.”®54 David Morrison forwarded these views 
to the Labour Party leader, John Smith, and McNamara and his team, having been vilified 
by some for the ‘Oranges or Lemons?’ paper, must have felt vindicated.
The political climate was also clearly affected by the fact that the Conservative 
government had shifted its position to an attitude o f clearer sympathy for Unionism. 
McNamara frequently took issue with the fact that the government had shifted from the 
position adopted by Peter Brooke. In November 1990 Brooke had declared that Britain 
had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’ and McNamara went as 
far as to say that “This was the most important speech made by a British politician about 
Ireland since 1921. Eight hundred years were apparently erased in that one speech... It was 
a liberating speech even for a T o r y . ” ®55 McNamara has also admitted that he believes Peter 
Brooke to have been the best Secretary o f State that Northern Ireland has ever had.®56 Of
®53 CLR Final Bulleün, Sept. 1993.
Irish Post, 25 Sept. 1993.
655 McNamara, K. Speech to the PLP Nortliem Ireland back bench Committee/Labour Parly Irish Society 
Fringe Meeting, 27 Sept. 1993,
®56 McNamara, K. Speech to St. M aiy’s University College, 14 May 1998.
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course he was not so praiseworthy at the time, but following the joint authority affair the 
pro-Irish unity left were having to adapt to the changed climate and McNamara’s response 
was to go on the offensive. He told the 1993 conference fiinge meeting on Ireland that 
within the North “43% of the population look to the Republic and identify with the Irish 
nation” and complained that “Mere lip service, putting up street names in Irish, is not 
sufficient.” Criticising the role o f the RUC he complained that “In the eyes o f the present 
minority they are policed by another nation... The Governments themselves must consider 
possible models o f shared a u t h o r i t y . T h e  very fact that he talked o f the present 
minority is indicative o f the thinking o f McNamara and many other pro-nationalists who 
were no doubt influenced by certain demographic projections (mentioned earlier) which 
predicted a Catholic majority within the six counties early in the 21st century. However 
whilst he was still prepared to present models o f shared authority as an option, the plan that 
had been drawn up by Brendan O’Leary and Jim Marshall proposed a British-Irish authority 
which “may be changed only through a referendum in which the consent o f three quarters 
of the turnout o f the electorally registered citizens of Northern Ireland has been 
obtained.”®58 There were differences between O’Leary and McNamara on precisely this 
point and in opposition to McNamara’s view Jim Marshall made clear that he had finally 
changed his mind. Having been an assistant to McNamara since 1987 Jim Marshall was 
replaced with Bill O’Brien after the 1992 general election and in late 1993 in a lengthy 
Commons debate Marshall made known his views. McNamara had first o f all reiterated his 
views on the government’s changes as compared with Peter Brooke’s views and attacked 
them for resurrecting the name the Consei*vative and Unionist Party. However Jim
®57 McNamara, K. Speech to the PLP Northern Ireland back bench Committee/Labour Party Irish Society 
Fringe Meeting, 27 Sept. 1993.
®58 O’Leary, B., Lyne, T., Marshall, J. & Rowthom, R. Northern Ireland: Sharing Authority (1993) p. 44.
218
Marshall’s contribution was perhaps an indication o f the changes in thinking that were 
taking place throughout the Labour Party. He stated that “I have reluctantly come to the 
conclusion that the 50 per cent, plus one concept is a great source o f uncertainty in the 
Province. For that reason, I no longer accept the main thrust o f the Labour party position 
because I should like to see a constitutional settlement which would be fair to both 
communities but durable and not subject to the uncertainty which surrounds the 50 per 
cent, plus one rule.” “I now accept, and an increasing number o f people accept, that 
Northern Ireland cannot be stably eased into purely Irish institutions. I have espoused the 
official Labour party policy for a decade, and have spoken in its favour at many private and 
public meetings. It is with some reluctance that I discard the views that I have held for the 
past decade.” He concluded that, precisely because the two communities in Northern 
Ireland each looked to two different nation states and because the Protestants “cannot be 
pushed into a united Ireland”, shared authority was the only arrangement that could provide 
a stable and lasting settlement.®59 Jim Marshall was also a co-author o f the 1988 Labour 
Party statement, ‘Towards a United Ireland’, and so this was a significant shift: on his part 
and one which puts a slightly different complexion on the state o f the PLP on the Irish 
question, in spite o f Kevin McNamara’s forthright stance and his very different view o f the 
purpose o f any joint authority proposals. Ian Paisley criticised McNamara over the fact 
that he opposed majority rule within Northern Ireland (in other words a return to 
Stormont) but if a majority favoured reunification then the wishes o f such a majority would 
be respected.®®®
By the end o f 1993 Kevin McNamara’s position as Party spokesperson appeared 
slightly more secure. In the shadow cabinet elections McNamara’s vote had actually
Hansard, Vol. 230 Col. 536-540 (22 Oct. 1993). 
®®®Ibid. Vol. 245 Col. 975 (30 June 1994).
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increased from 61 votes in 1992 to 87 votes in October 1993, despite the row over joint 
authority.®®* The misjudged optimism was summed up by Jim Marshall (ironically) who 
predicted wrongly that this trend would continue so that next year McNamara’s vote would 
increase by the same percentage so that he would become a fully elected member o f the 
shadow cabinet.®®^  The ‘unity by consent’ policy was reaffirmed at the annual conference 
in early October and the Democracy Now composite resolution, which was opposed by the 
NEC, was defeated on a show o f hands.®®® Democracy Now had gained the support of the 
UCW but their general secretary, Alan Johnstone, hit out at the left’s campaign against 
those calling for Labour representation in Ulster, condemning an anonymous leaflet that 
was circulated at conference entitled Exposed: Who are Labour's Ulster Unionists? and 
complained o f “the smear, innuendo and disgraceful tactics that have been used by those 
who don’t want to discuss the issues.”®®'* Democracy Now, and Kate Hoey in particular, 
did gradually make their position on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position more and 
more clear. In September 1993, at precisely the same time that the CLR was disbanding 
because o f Democracy Now’s ‘Unionist agenda’, Kate Hoey and Nick Raynsford wrote an 
article in the Sunday Times in which they made it explicitly clear that “Like most Labour 
Party members we support the policy o f Irish unity by consent.” They argued that Labour 
should organise in the province because “Far from contradicting a policy o f unity by 
consent, it would build bridges between a divided working class and build the basis for 
consent. And when unification comes. Labour in the north would fuse with Labour in the 
south.” So “the suggestion that Democracy Now is supporting a Unionist agenda is 
laughable.”®®^ However, within a year this view was completely overturned in an article
®®*/m/i Post, 30 Oct. 1993.
®®2 Hansard, op cit.
663 Report o f the 1993 Labour Party Conference. 
Irish Post, 9 Oct. 1993.
Sunday Times, 26 Sept. 1993.
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written by Kate Hoey and Scottish Labour MP, Calum Macdonald, for the Sunday 
Telegraph in which they argued that “Labour’s current policy o f ‘unity by consent’ is a glib 
slogan which gets us nowhere.” They went on to argue that the policy was only adopted in 
1981 to appease the ‘troops out’ element and the traditional nationalist sympathisers. But 
now “It is time unionism, in the strict sense o f wishing to uphold the unity o f the United 
Kingdom, stopped being considered a dirty word in Labour Party circles.”®®® Rather than 
Hoey’s views evolving into this unambiguous support for Unionism, one must conclude 
that she had held these views for some considerable time and only felt that this was the 
most opportune moment to declare her position. What is o f greater significance, therefore, 
is the fact that she felt that the atmosphere and mood within the Labour movement was 
right for her to take up her pro-Unionist position publicly and without fear o f being 
ostracised by her colleagues.
After the 1993 conference and shadow cabinet elections Kevin McNamara, with the 
support o f a large majority o f the PLP, directed his efforts into dealing with the 
government’s plans to introduce a parliamentary select committee on Northern Ireland. 
The idea had, o f course, been suggested by Stuart Bell prior to the 1987 general election 
and was therefore seen as a sop to the Unionists. A contradiction obviously exists here, 
because Stuart Bell and Peter Archer still argue that the idea then was simply a sensible 
addendum to existing parliamentary arrangements.®®”^ The Labour front bench in 1993 
certainly did not see it as such despite the argument that since the end o f the Northern 
Ireland Assembly there had been a democratic deficit (see Chapter 3) and even the Dublin 
government had taken a decision not to express an opinion on the subject.®®* McNamara
Sunday Telegraph, 2 Oct. 1994.
®®7 Archer, P. Interview, Dec. 1996 & Bell, S. Letter o f reply, Nov. 1996.
®®8 wiiford, R. & Elliot, S. ‘The Nortliem Ireland Affairs Select Committee’ in Irish Political Studies No. 
10 (1995).
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declared “If we believe that proposals are being introduced into the House which are 
integrationist in nature; which seek to tighten the bond between Northern Ireland and 
Britain, either administratively, legislatively or in the procedures o f this House; or if they 
seek to pretend that Northern Ireland is purely and exclusively British, they will be firmly 
and rigorously o p p o s e d . ” ®®  ^ Along with the irritation o f having a small minority, which 
included Kate Hoey, on the back benches supporting the government’s plans, McNamara 
was aware that it would not be entirely appropriate to create too much conflict with the 
government because o f wanting to support the impending Westminster/Dublin joint 
statement, designed to aid the emerging peace process, and because John Smith and Tony 
Blair, the shadow home secretary, were seeking an accommodation with the government 
over the Prevention o f Terrorism Act. The significance o f a parliamentary select committee 
was not as great as the Unionists might suggest and so Archer and Bell’s compliant attitude 
is, to a certain degree, understandable. But in Kevin McNamara the Labour Party had a 
spokesperson who saw his opposition to Unionism as a personal crusade and, with the issue 
of the Maastricht vote and the criticism he suffered fresh in his mind, he was particularly 
angry at witnessing this rare Unionist victory. The select committee was to end up with ten 
Tory and Unionist members and three Labour and SDLP members. Labour tried to have 
their representation increased because o f what they described as a Stormont style Unionist 
majority and David Trimble argued that they should have no representation as the Labour 
Party had no Northern Ireland membership and barred Northern Ireland citizens from 
joining the Party.®^ ® The outcome was that Labour was to have just two members, namely 
Clive Soley and Jim Marshall, and McNamara complained that “the sense o f betrayal is only 
heightened by the knowledge that the government chose to over ride their principled stance
®®9/m/î Post, 6 Nov. 1993. 
®^® Guardian, 9 March 1994.
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for the sake o f a squalid deal.” That deal had “nothing to do with peace in Northern 
Ireland and everything to do with the government’s narrow and unstable majority in the 
House.” Ken Maginnis replied that that was “the type o f performance we expect to hear 
from third-generation expatriates.”®”^* McNamara was further frustrated by the knowledge 
that Albert Reynolds had agreed to the introduction o f a Northern Ireland select committee, 
during talks with John Major on the forthcoming Downing Street Declaration, as a 
sweetener to the Unionists.®'^ ® The agreement that Labour had hoped for on the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act was never achieved because details o f a secret meeting between John 
Major and John Smith were leaked to the Sunday Express by Tory right-wingers who 
feared a removal o f the provision for exclusion orders in the Act,®”^® The frustration was 
made even worse by the fact that the Unionists were prepared to back Labour on the 
exclusion orders but the Home Secretary, Michael Howard, would not agree to the 
changes®'^ '* and so the Continuance Order was agreed once again with the Parliamentary 
Labour Party voting against the government although many, especially Tony Blair, 
genuinely wanted to be able to vote for the Act with the changes they sought in p l a c e .  ®^5
The ‘principled stance’ that McNamara had spoken of, referred to the Downing 
Street Declaration signed by the British and Irish premiers and signalling the furthest step 
the British government had taken to date in recognising Irish nationalist aspirations. The 
Declaration stated that “The British government agree that it is for the people o f the island 
o f Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of 
self-determination on the basis o f consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South,
®^*/mA Post, 9 April 1994.
®72 McNamara, K. Interview, Nov. 1997.
®^® Sunday Express, 6 March 1994.
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to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.” '^^  ^ This historic step, as with so many 
previous developments, had an immediate impact on the debate within the Labour 
movement. As a Party steadily moving to the right, the Labour left broadly thought it wise 
to support the Declaration; after all, the above statement is almost identical to the ‘unity by 
consent’ policy for so long criticised as the product o f fnnge left pressure. Ken Livingstone 
became a late convert to ‘unity by consent’. He said “Many o f us used to feel that ‘unity by 
consent’ was a bit o f pious nonsense. But by a miracle the British Labour Party policy is 
just what is needed now.” He later argued that “the Labour Party has exactly the right 
policy for the situation... What were marginal debates about demilitarisation and self- 
determination are now part o f the mainstream discussion. The danger for the left is to be 
mesmerised and isolated as sideline spectators.”^^  ^ This last statement is virtually what did, 
ultimately, take place with the left but at the time the rapid realignment on the Labour left 
appeared to favour McNamara and leave the Democracy Now elements looking slightly 
isolated. Whilst John Smith stated that he welcomed the Declaration “with enthusiasm” 
and had the backing o f the overwhelming majority o f the PLP on the matter, Kate Hoey 
took issue with the inclusion in the Declaration o f the famous words “Britain has no selfish 
strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland.” She put it to the government that 
“Even if Hon. Members do not like it, they must accept that many people in Northern 
Ireland will regard that as a betrayal, even if we think it is wrong” and said to John Major 
“Does he, as a British Prime Minister, think that British citizens, many o f whom lost 
members o f their families fighting for this country in the war, might feel a little sad?” "^^  ^
Although a number o f Tories supported her position, Hoey was very much on her own
Downing Street Declaration  (1993)
Irish Post, 25 Feb. & 16 April 1994.
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within the PLP in this regard. However even Tony Benn, who had taken up a renewed 
interest in the Northern Ireland debate, began to develop a subtle change in his position. 
(The shifting ground on the Northern Ireland debate was generating new thinking even 
amongst the old troops out enthusiasts, such as Benn and Livingstone.) Whist maintaining 
a devout belief in bringing British governance o f Northern Ireland to an end, Benn 
recognised that Britain could not impose unity, not least because he argued that Dublin did 
not want to try to take responsibility for the North and stated that “If Irish unity came, by 
no stretch o f the imagination could it mean the reabsorption o f the north into a constitution 
which was devised for the Republic.” When Jim Molyneaux tried to anticipate him by 
asserting that he was going to argue for Ulster independence (as Callaghan had once done), 
Benn replied “I am determined not to be another British politician with an answer to the 
problems. I am speaking about the British involvement.” '^^  ^ He did argue that Dublin 
should not be asked to give up articles 2 and 3 o f the Irish constitution unless Britain gave 
up its claim to Northern Ireland, but the essence o f his position was that Britain should 
disengage from Ireland regardless o f whether the outcome was unity, repartition or an 
independent northern state because that, he now believed, was a matter for the Irish people 
and their political representatives. Despite the realignments that were taking place 
throughout the Labour movement, the state o f flux within the Party and the ever 
developing debate within Irish nationalism, Kevin McNamara maintained the traditional 
nationalist position on retaining articles 2 and 3. In late 1993 he told an Irish audience that 
“unilateral abandonment o f articles 2 and 3 would not bring peace to the island o f Ireland, 
because they are at most a symptom of the present discontent, not the cause...” “It would 
damage the position o f the SDLP and would serve to encourage the extremists in the
Cols 1190-1193.
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Republican movement” and “It would do little to assuage the Unionists’ ‘siege 
m e n t a l i t y J o h n  Smith was rather concerned about this particular speech and 
McNamara was in fact called to the leader’s office over the matter to explain himself but 
argued that his words had been taken out o f context and exaggerated by the press. *^  ^ He 
then took the opportunity to make his position clear in the House o f Commons presenting 
the argument that articles 2 and 3 should not be abandoned unilaterally because neither 
should the other “competing sovereignty claim”: the Ireland Act o f 1920 which established 
the constitutional status o f Northern Ireland as a part o f the United Kingdom.®^  ^ other 
words, the articles could indeed be negotiated away but only as part o f a wider 
constitutional settlement which took into account nationalist aspirations over the 1920 
Ireland Act, Regardless o f how McNamara modified his position this was, nevertheless, an 
almost unique situation: a politician aspiring to government office, arguing that another 
state’s constitutional claim to territory within his own jurisdiction is not only perfectly 
acceptable but that any move to unilaterally abandon the claim should be opposed.
On the 12 May 1994 an event took place which was to lead to drastic changes in 
the Labour Party’s position on Northern Ireland, regardless o f the peace process. The 
death o f John Smith led to the election o f Labour’s most moderate or centre-right leader 
since Hugh Gaitskell, namely Tony Blair. Blair went on to remove clause four o f the 
Party’s constitution, steered the PLP back to simply abstaining on the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act and marginalised the left to the extent that the NUM leader, Arthur Scargill, 
left Labour to form the Socialist Labour Party. Blair had never previously made his views 
known on the Irish question but during the campaign for the leadership he issued a
McNamara, K. Speech to tlie Philosophical Society, University College Cork, 16 Oct. 1993. 
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statement outlining his views on Northern Ireland which said little about the constitutional 
question except that there “should be no transfer o f sovereignty without the consent o f a 
majority.” The other two candidates, John Prescott and Margaret Beckett, also said very 
little except to endorse the current policy o f ‘unity by consent’. It was for this reason that 
neither the LPIS or the LCI would give their backing to any one c a n d i d a t e . T h e  anti­
nationalists in the Labour Party were clearly encouraged by the prospect o f Tony Blair 
becoming leader and their isolated position began to change. As a Blair victory began to 
look inevitable a renewed campaign began against Kevin McNamara. Edward Pierce, 
writing in the Guardian, called on Tony Blair to sack McNamara, if he won the leadership, 
because his Irish nationalism was an embarrassment to the Labour Party.^ *'^  In reply, Kevin 
McNamara and Harry Barnes appeared to interpret the Downing Street Declaration and the 
peace process differently. McNamara defended his position by arguing that ‘unity by 
consent’ was as good as government policy now and that he too was prepared to be flexible 
declaring that he would support changes to Articles 2 and 3 o f the Irish Constitution if it 
was achieved as part o f an overall settlement. Harry Barnes, with a new found confidence, 
directly attacked Party policy; he argued that “Labour adopted the ‘unity by consent’ 
formula in 1981 to marginalise extreme ‘troops out’ positions. Provo apologism is now an 
irrelevant rump within the Party.” *^^  Despite Blair winning the leadership election at the 
end o f July 1994, any hopes o f an immediate change in policy were unrealistic, but the 
rumours and innuendo over McNamara’s position continued over the next three months.
With the IRA announcing its ceasefire in August 1994 the new positive and 
optimistic political climate that was created did not have such a great impact on the debate
Irish Post, 2 & 9 July 1994. 
Guardian, 2 July 1994.
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within the Labour Party. Whilst Ken Livingstone and others on the left wanted the Labour 
Party to become ‘persuaders’ for a united Ireland and Kevin McNamara immediately began 
calling for demilitarisation,6»6 Harry Barnes, conversely, argued that the Downing Street 
Declaration and the IRA ceasefire “have created entirely new historical circumstances and 
made redundant Labour’s 13-year old policy o f seeking a particular outcome for the Irish 
people: unification.” He went on to call for the Labour Party to do what was done in 1981 
and begin a major review o f its Northern Ireland policy.68? The paradox was that although 
developments were moving in a nationalist direction (the Unionists were growing 
increasingly fmstrated at the fact that what they described as a ‘pan-nationalist front’ was 
setting the agenda) the left was no longer in a position of strength and thus unable to set 
the agenda in Britain, even though they felt they should take some credit for the direction in 
which both government and opposition policy had gone, and so did eventually become 
‘isolated as sideline spectators’. Speculation began almost immediately that Tony Blair was 
going to try and give comfort to the Unionists who were becoming deeply suspicious o f the 
government. Blair held a meeting with Jim Molyneaux shortly after the ceasefire was 
announced, but McNamara was not in attendance. 688 The DUP openly said that now that 
relations were so strained with the government they would be seeking dialogue with the 
Labour Party.689 Blair then took a rather unusual position on the peace process, in a radio 
interview, when he said that the Downing Street Declaration had in fact overtaken the 
traditional position o f all the parties and went on to apparently support the unionist veto 
stating “The important thing that has changed, and where I think the Downing Street 
Declaration puts the whole future o f Northern Ireland in a different context, is that it is
Irish Post, 3 Sept. 1994. 
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agreed by both the Republic and by the British government that it is for the people of 
Northern Ireland to determine their future. Now the important thing is not that the 
government takes up the role o f pushing people in one direction or another, but that they 
facilitate the wishes o f those in Northern Ireland to be paramount.”69o The sharp divisions 
and differing interpretations o f the Downing Street Declaration caused embarrassment to 
McNamara whose supporters played down the affair arguing that there had simply been a 
misunderstanding and that Tony Blair had probably not been very well briefed.^ i^ Those 
close to Blair also considered the affair to be an embarrassment because most 
commentators interpreted the interview as a policy shift^ ^^  ^nd the LPIS felt obliged to 
respond with a spokesperson pointing out that “No individual can overturn policy - that is a 
matter for the whole party. I am sure that Labour conference this year will be 
concentrating on the next steps to facilitate unity on the island o f  I r e l a n d . ” ^ ^ ^
At the Labour Party’s annual conference in the October it was widely believed that 
the leadership would still be pushing for a change in policy. In fact the NEC prepared a 
statement before conference reaffirming the Party’s “historic commitment to the unification 
of Ireland by consent”.6^ 4 The conference proved to be a great success for Kevin 
McNamara; he was said to have been in his element with Ireland being debated on a 
Wednesday afternoon, rather than its usual Friday morning slot, and John Hume, his 
important political ally, receiving a standing ovation having addressed conference with an 
historic speech on the peace process. There had been nine pro-Irish unity resolutions and 
amendments as well as thirteen welcoming the ceasefire, of which only three called for a 
review o f Party policy. An aggrieved Kate Hoey complained during the conference “It is
Irish Times, 6 Sept. 1994. 
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time unionism stopped being a dirty word in the Labour Party” and “Instead o f cajoling or 
badgering the unionists into joining a state they wish to reject, Labour’s job should be to 
ensure there is no backsliding by the Conservative government on the democratic 
commitment made in the Downing Street Declaration.”695 Martin Collins o f the LCI wrote 
after the conference “Having seen off the pro-unionist lobby in the Labour Party and gone 
some way to distance himself from last year’s leaked options paper which appeared to 
advocate an imposed settlement, Kevin McNamara now faces a new battle to keep his place 
on the shadow cabinet.”696 It was a battle that he was to lose. After the shadow cabinet 
elections in late October Kevin McNamara’s vote dropped to just 70 with Mo Mowlam 
securing 125 votes and coming eighth. One must conclude that the explanation for this is 
that first o f all the pro-unionist lobby had not in fact been cowed but in the coming years 
actually became more confident and secondly and most importantly Blair’s influence was 
having an impact on the PLP so that McNamara, despite his enthusiasm for the new mood 
and emerging peace process, was seen as very ‘Old Labour’ and, for some, the debacle 
over joint authority had not in fact been forgotten.
Tony Blair replaced McNamara with Mo Mowlam as the Party’s Irish affairs 
spokesperson immediately after the shadow cabinet elections.^^? Despite Mo Mowlam’s 
immediate declaration o f support for current Party policy the fact that she and Tony Blair 
were now in charge o f Northern Irish policy meant a very new direction for Labour on the 
Irish problem. This in itself is one o f the major problems with the ‘unity by consent’ policy: 
Blair chose not to alter the policy precisely because it did not matter to his plans, it had 
always been more o f an aspiration rather than a practicable policy and so under the
Irish Post, 8 Oct. 1994. 
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guidance o f Blair and Mowlam it was to ultimately mean something very different to what 
it did under Clive Soley and Kevin McNamara. This is a development all the more 
interesting considering Mo Mowlam had served with Kevin McNamara and Jim Marshall 
during 1988-89 in what was probably Labour’s most pro-nationalist Northern Ireland team, 
producing as it did the Party’s detailed ‘Towards a United Ireland’ document. Although 
this undoubtedly constituted the end o f an era, the question posed is was it the consequence 
of deep rooted changes in the Labour movement or was it the result o f  John Smith’s 
untimely death thus leading to the election o f Blair and the beginning o f ‘New Labour’? 
One must conclude that the latter explanation is unfortunately too simplistic. Of course 
Blair had an immediate impact but Labour’s steady drift to the right can be traced back to 
1983 and Neil Kinnock’s leadership. By 1994 an individual such as Kevin McNamara was 
seen by Labour’s new modernisers as an anachronism. As Ed Pearce in Fortnight wrote 
cruelly “The point about Kevin McNamara is that - to be brutal - he was a Catholic 
Irishman allowed to take more latitude than a responsible opposition party should ever 
afford a departmental spokesperson”... “a clean break was necessary and a secular 
politician with no religious baggage had to be put in Mr. McNamara’s place.”698 Blair was 
to write to McNamara to argue that “I believe that the bipartisan approach is the best way 
to peace and that to disturb it, particularly now, would be irresponsible and wrong. I have 
felt a deep responsibility to do all I can to help the peace process and strongly held the view 
that should not attack the government over it unless I believe they are fimdamentally ill- 
intentioned or mistaken, in respect o f it, which I don’t.”699 Kevin McNamara had argued 
precisely the opposite. He sent Blair a confidential memorandum a year after his dismissal 
in which he argued that ‘unity by consent’ should be maintained because continuity of
Fortnight, No. 27, Nov. 1994.
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policy would actually help the stability o f the peace process: “First our policy has been part 
of the environment in which John Hume has been able to persuade Sinn Fein and the IRA 
that unification can occur through consent... Secondly, our policy position is one which will 
encourage unionists to negotiate the best possible deal for themselves in the next two to 
three years. If we shifted policy, unionists might be encouraged to hold out against any 
pressure from the Conservatives to compromise - in the belief that we will prove a softer 
touch.”7oo This may very well be Tony Blair’s line of thought. The Irish question has 
never been important to him and the commitment to unity was perhaps altered precisely to 
ensure that Labour might be able to win some Unionist parliamentary votes in their struggle 
to unseat the Tory government.
To begin with Mo Mowlam was at pains to make clear that nothing had changed, 
following her appointment as shadow spokesperson on Northern Ireland, and that the 
‘unity by consent’ policy remained intact. Despite not bringing with her any specific 
ideological baggage in the same manner as Kevin McNamara, she was carefiil to quote 
often from his last speech to conference and she asked for her name to be removed from a 
petition calling on the Labour Party to be organised in Northern Ireland.’^^ She kept up 
good relations with Democracy Now and with New Consensus (which later became New  
Dialogue) but her basic position on the Northern Ireland problem was perhaps best 
exemplified by the fact that the front bench policy adviser Brendan O’Leary was to explain 
that “During McNamara’s time as Labour’s front bench spokesperson, O’Leary’s role was 
often to defend the interests o f unionists in discussions and policy papers... By contrast, 
after Mowlam became Labour’s shadow spokesperson, O’Leary was often to defend the
Ibid.
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interests o f northern nationalists in discussions, drafts of speeches and policy papers.
The debate on Northern Ireland had become markedly changed as compared with the 
polemic which took place in the eighties. Mowlam was operating in an unusual climate 
with an IRA ceasefire in place and the old left campaigners such as Clare Short and Ken 
Livingstone remaining curiously reticent in comparison with the outspoken positions they 
took up just a few years earlier. With the publication o f the government’s ‘Framework 
Document’ there was also a feeling that developments were moving in nationalist Ireland’s 
favour and so the confrontational attitude o f the left in the eighties was no longer required.
i.--
The document discussed at length the proposal for “a new North/South body or bodies” 
which it envisaged would develop an important political and economic role throughout the 
island o f Ireland.'^ ®^  The Parliamentary Labour Party gradually made clear that a return to 
bipartisanship would take place precisely because o f the delicacy o f the peace process. Mo 
Mowlam went on a personal diplomatic crusade to build good relations with all sides, both 
governments and all parties but she did continue to reiterate Labour’s commitment to ‘unity 
by consent’. After the publication o f the framework document she set out the four 
requirements that she felt were needed for a lasting settlement: first a strong devolved 
assembly elected by proportional representation, secondly legislation to ensure fair 
employment as well as improved policing and legal institutions to achieve equity of 
treatment and parity o f esteem between the two communities (the latter phrase she used 
frequently), thirdly cross border co-operation and finally a new negotiated constitutional 
arrangement “securely and appropriately g u a r a n t e e d . T h e s e  proposals would 
undoubtedly appear more suited to Soley or McNamara than to Mason or Concannon, so
O’Leary, B. & McGarry, J. ‘Proving Our Points on Nortliern Ireland (and Giving Reading Lessons to 
Dr. Dixon)’ in Irish Political Studies Vol. II (1996) p. 144.
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why was it that Mowlam was hailed as being more Unionist friendly? The reasons were 
that she simply was not as clearly Irish nationalist friendly as Kevin McNamara nor was she 
associated with the joint authority proposals o f 1992 and also the political climate was such 
at the time that many on the Tory benches could have been forgiven for suggesting the 
proposals outlined above.
As Mowlam began to try and foster good relations with the Unionists she was 
received positively. Despite the fact that there was officially no change in Labour Party 
policy following the change on the Labour front bench, Mowlam’s appointment was met 
with some satisfaction in Unionist circles not least because after seven years with Kevin 
McNamara as spokesperson the change was, from their point o f view, a move in the right 
direction. In Februaiy 1995 she addressed the constituency association o f the Ulster 
Unionist MP, William Ross, thus arousing a great deal of media interest and speculation. 
Of course it would have been highly unlikely for Kevin McNamara to have been invited to 
such a meeting but the media reaction suggested that the meeting was designed to cement
fLabour’s inclusive approach towards the Unionists. In her speech to the Unionists at 
Garvagh in County Londonderry she set out her four key proposals described above and 
she did make clear that Labour Party policy was to continue “to support the unification o f  
Ireland by consent - consent being crucial, which is why we support the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement and the Downing Street Declaration.” She also stated (as she was to do 
repeatedly) that no one will benefit from prevarication or procrastination in the hope that in 
a few years time a Labour government might deal with the peace process in a manner more 
favourable to them.^os Nevertheless, in spite o f making clear to journalists that the reason 
for her presence in Garvagh was not because o f a deal between Labour and the UUP, the
Mowlam, M. Speech at tlie British Legion Hall, Garvagh, 4 Feb. 1995.
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Sunday papers carried stories o f Mowlam’s “ground breaking speech” and Labour’s newly 
established rapport with U n i o n i s m ^ ^ e  p^rt o f the reason for the fuss was that journalists 
were continually speculating about the voting intentions o f the smaller parties in Parliament 
because o f the Tories small and fragile majority; but Mo Mowlam made it clear that on the 
question o f Northern Ireland Labour would not seek to gain political advantage in the 
House o f Commons. She stated this in the Garvagh speech and again in an interview in the 
New Statesman that “there should be no deal with any Northern Irish parties either to bring 
this government down or to keep them in power. If there was a vote o f confidence in the 
government on the framework document, we would not support that motion.” °^^  However 
it was argued by some that admittedly the Labour Party were not looking to make political 
gains but that the Unionists were trying to cause problems for the government. Ken 
Maginnis said that Labour were now “rowing back from a united Ireland” and one Labour 
source suggested, following a similar statement from the new UUP leader, David Trimble, 
that this was all simply a Unionist ploy to bring pressure to bear on the g o v e r n m e n t .  
Despite this the controversy still prompted left-wing MP, Max Madden, to threaten that if 
Blair went ahead with a deal with the Unionists then there would be a rebellion by up to 
fifty Labour MPs.'^ ®^  The truth o f the matter is that there was no policy change at this 
stage, there was not going to be a deal with the Unionists but Mo Mowlam did want to 
initiate a more inclusive attitude towards the Unionists in addressing their concerns. The 
Garvagh speech took place shortly after excerpts from the governments framework 
document (with the proposals for the North/South body) had been leaked to the media and 
so the Unionists were feeling particularly isolated in the face o f these Irish-British
Sunday Observer (editorial), 5 Feb. 1995 & Sunday Times, 5 Feb. 1995. 
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government proposals and the pan-nationalist front. As the Observer stated “The Unionists 
are actively flirting with Labour in an evident attempt to raise Tory concerns - and Labour 
is not repelling the advances.”7io
Over the next six months very little developed in terms o f debate or policy changes 
in the Labour Party although in the wider debate on Northern Ireland, the framework 
document created a great deal o f discussion and then the call for decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons took centre stage, ultimately frustrating the peace process. On the 
two latter matters Labour continued to support the government line and they supported the 
ministerial level talks with Sinn Fein which took place in April 1995. However there were 
still to be no changes in terms o f Party policy. Despite some predictions o f a change in 
Labour’s position on the anti-terrorist laws the PLP continued to oppose both the 
Prevention o f Terrorism Act and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act. It was 
self evident that the Labour leader and Party managers were deeply uncomfortable about 
continued opposition to the anti-terrorist legislation. Tony Blair was determined to push 
on with his modernisation o f the Party and to improve the public perception and electability 
of New Labour. If the Labour Party was to be seen as truly responsible - a party to be 
trusted in power - it did appear inevitable that they would not continue to oppose 
legislation which Tony Blair and Jack Straw would undoubtedly continue to implement 
once a Labour government was elected. What the PLP had sought for some time was an 
accommodation with the government on the PTA but they had always been fmstrated in 
their attempts. Labour had consistently made three demands on the PTA: first an end to 
exclusion orders (a demand which had Unionist support), secondly provision for judicial 
review o f the extended detentions for seven days and finally a comprehensive, independent
Sunday Observer, 5 Feb, 1995.
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review o f the workings o f the Act. In the debate on the Continuance Order o f the PTA in 
March 1995, Jack Straw admitted that “It is the Opposition’s fervent hope that there 
should be a bipartisan agreement on the measures that are needed to defeat terrorism. 
Unfortunately, such a bipartisan agreement has proved no easier to achieve this year than 
last, but our endeavours to reach such an agreement will continue beyond tonight’s vote.” 
The PLP voted against the Continuance Order.’ D In the debate on the EPA Continuance 
Order in the June, Mo Mowlam explained that the reason for Labour’s opposition was that 
the Act still contained provision for the introduction o f internment without trial and 
because, under the Act, only limited access Is provided for legal advice for those in the 
holding centres. Again the PLP voted against the order. i^^
Although all appeared satisfactory in so far as that there had been no change in 
official Labour Party policy, there was in fact a growing frustration during the summer over 
the bipartisan arrangement in the House o f Commons and at the lack o f progress in the 
peace process generally which eventually led to the resignation o f Kevin McNamara from 
Labour’s front bench in September 1995. Mo Mowlam supported the government line on 
almost every issue including the early release in July o f Private Clegg, the paratrooper 
convicted o f murder in Belfast. McNamara was particularly uneasy about this matter which 
he claimed was a “shameful example” o f John Major trying to improve his standing in the 
Tory Party and ensure his re-election as leader having resigned in late June.^ ^^  The SDLP 
were also becoming frustrated with the slow progress o f the peace process and following 
Mowlam’s declared support for the release o f Private Clegg, Seamus Mallon challenged her 
to explain what she would have done differently to Sir Patrick Mayhew. Mowlam refused
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to reveal any differences, answering only that “I will not draw a clear distinction between us 
and the Government in relation to the peace process/’^ M The stumbling block to all party 
talks had become decommissioning: an unforeseen problem which critics accused the 
government o f allowing to prevent progress because o f Unionist demands for IRA 
weaponry to begin being handed in as a precondition to talks. Mo Mowlam supported the 
government’s position and, despite the frustration, the Labour left remained rather muted. 
The political climate during the peace process was such that there remained something o f a 
consensus in the Labour Party that rather than criticise and attack the leadership, or 
otherwise, everybody should simply wait and see what the peace process threw up once 
talks actually began. There existed on the left a confident expectation that ultimately the 
two governments would agree some sort o f an “almighty fudge” involving a cross border 
body, Dublin participation and reform o f the RUC to satisfy nationalists, along with a 
Northern Ireland Assembly and constitutional guarantees to satisfy u n i o n i s t s . 7^ 5 This 
perhaps explains the curious silence on the part o f those such as Tony Benn, Ken 
Livingstone and Clare Short as well as Jeremy Corbyn. A more cynical explanation is that 
of the Provisional who believed that the Labour Party spin doctors wanted to promote a 
Unionist friendly image in case their votes were to be needed in the event o f a hung 
parliament and so Kate Hoey was to be permitted to speak as often as possible whilst Clare 
Short was to be silenced.7‘6
When Kevin McNamara did in fact resign in September 1995 as the Party’s front 
bench spokesperson on the civil service, it was rather unexpected considering the main 
reason he stated was the Party’s decision to “follow the government down the cul de sac o f
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decommissioning’’^  17 when McNamara had, for so long, prided himself on his outright 
opposition to the physical force tradition in Irish nationalism. It was also rather unexpected 
because there had been so little criticism from the left o f Mowlam’s handling o f the 
decommissioning issue. Mowlam herself argued that Labour’s policy had not changed but 
that Labour’s role had changed in response to the new and ever changing circumstances.^i* 
In addition the Labour Party conference in October 1995 again endorsed the ‘unity by 
consent’ policy.^i^ It was in fact an interview in the Irish Times with Tony Blair which 
prompted Kevin McNamara to resign. In the interview Blair repeatedly declared his 
support for the government’s position on each issue about which he was questioned and he 
stated that “A lot o f people feel that we should have been on the back o f the British 
government all the way through this, sort of pushing then forward, prodding them and all 
the rest o f it. I think that would have been deeply unhelpful to the peace process.” But 
what was most interesting was his analysis o f the Tory Party: “You have to remember that 
they have got their own group o f people within their own party... You have to remember, 
too, that there has been a huge historic shift in the Conservative Party, in a sense, in its 
attitude to Northern Ireland.”72o This was o f course true, but that shift had been 
developing ever since the signing o f the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985. The interview 
also highlighted a significant difference o f emphasis on the question o f Irish unity between 
Blair and Mowlam. Although the latter continued to support the policy o f ‘unity by 
consent’, when Tony Blair was asked about Irish unity in the Irish Times intemew he said 
that “I believe that the most sensible role for us is to be facilitators, not persuaders in this, 
not trying to pressure or push people towards a particular objective. I may say if we did try
7^7 McNamara, K, op cit.
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and push them towards that objective [Irish reunification] I think it would be almost 
certainly counterproductive.”7zi This was the clearest indication from a Labour leader to 
date that Labour’s ‘historic commitment to Irish unity’ had been jettisoned in all but name. 
The attempts over the previous twelve or thirteen years to develop a strategy to turn the 
‘unity by consent’ policy into an achievable objective now appeared simply a futile exercise 
as Blair made clear that Labour would no longer favour any one “particular objective”. In 
the light o f this, McNamara’s resignation does not appear so surprising and indeed Blair did 
not ask him to reconsider when he did in fact inform the Labour leader o f his intentions. It 
is also a fact that there were political factors at play beyond the subject o f Northern Irish 
policy. Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour’ crusade had succeeded in removing Clause 4 o f the 
Party’s Constitution (which committed the Party to common ownership o f the means of 
production, distribution and exchange); a move which had the support o f Mo Mowlam.^^z 
Kevin McNamara was seen as very much ‘Old Labour’ and was concerned about Blair’s 
plans to reform the Labour Party’s relationship with the trade unions and to shift from what 
he saw as the traditional democratic socialist vision.723
During December 1995 to January 1996 the government began to adopt what 
critics regarded what was a broadly unionist agenda announcing, first, support for Senator 
Mitchell’s idea o f a ‘twin-track’ approach involving arms decommissioning along side all­
party talks and, secondly. Northern Ireland elections to an assembly or forum for
negotiations. The latter proposal was determinedly opposed by the SDLP, Sinn Fein and
!•
some elements on the Labour left. Again the Labour leadership gave full support to each 
and every government proposal despite growing left-wing/nationalist anxiety. Then in
721 Ibid.
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February 1996 the IRA ceasefire was brought to an end with the Docklands bombing. 
Following McNamara’s resignation in the September, Brendan O’Leary resigned as an 
adviser to Labour’s front bench team in December 1995 explaining that he felt that the 
Labour Party’s support for the recommendations o f the Mitchell report would have a 
detrimental effect on the peace process; he was to consequently argue in the aftermath of 
the Docklands bombing that he was indeed proved right in his reading o f the s i t u a t i o n .  724 
Kevin McNamara was also no longer prepared to hold back in his criticisms o f the 
government especially as he was now in support o f his old allies, the SDLP. In addition 
there were many in the Labour Party who, behind the scenes, felt that Blair and Mowlam 
had been caught off guard by the government’s announcement o f Northern Ireland 
elections.725 Despite the hostility o f the SDLP to the announcement, Blair responded by 
stating simply that “We agree that this proposal deserves serious consideration”726 and 
ultimately chose to support the planned elections. The SDLP argued that elections were 
not in fact one o f the Mitchell recommendations, they were unnecessary as all that was 
needed was to bring the Parties into talks as they stood at the moment and that the plan 
was part o f the Unionists’ agenda who saw elections as an opportunity to display their 
electoral strength. These arguments were echoed by Kevin McNamara who was actually 
heckled by his own ‘New Labour’ back benchers727 and was specifically criticised by Kate 
Hoey.728 After the breakdown o f the IRA ceasefire only Tony Benn was prepared to try 
and blame the government, accusing Major o f setting aside the idea o f the twin track
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approach and favouring the election plan without proper consultation with DublinJ^^ The 
accusation that the government wap trying to woo the Unionists because o f their slender 
majority in the House o f Commons had appeared again and again in the media, but only the 
likes o f Tony Benn and Kevin McNamara were prepared to raise the issue publicly. Blair 
and Mowlam would not direct such accusations at the government except for the one 
occasion when Blair put the suggestion to John Major and following the Prime Minister’s 
reassurance never pursued the matter again.^ o^ One can speculate, once again, that Blair 
and Mowlam knew perfectly well that the government had to try and keep the Unionists on 
board but were not prepared to push them on matters relating to Northern Ireland because 
when in government themselves Labour would not want a difficult time from a Tory 
opposition. At the launch o f Labour’s draft manifesto in July 1996 Blair explained that 
“We have supported the present government strongly in the Northern Ireland peace 
process. We will continue to do so. There will be as great a priority attached to seeing 
that process through under a new Labour government as under the Conservatives... We will 
expect the same bipartisan a p p r o a c h . ” 7 3 i
As the probability o f Labour forming a government became greater and the historic 
general election drew closer, Blair and the shadow home secretary. Jack Straw, took the 
decision to bring to an end Labour’s opposition to the anti-terrorist emergency legislation. 
The decision was taken after the Docklands bombing and announced by Jack Straw on 
London Weekend Television at the end o f February 1996. In spite o f the fact that the 
shadow Home Secretary drew to a close thirteen years o f Labour Party opposition to the 
Prevention o f Terrorism Act without any debate and simply announced the decision in a
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television interview, the left-wing rebellion that many might have predicted did not in fact 
materialise. The Labour Committee on Ireland immediately wrote to members o f Labour’s 
NEC and much o f the PLP urging them to maintain opposition to the PTA and Kevin 
McNamara led the attack on Jack Straw accusing him insulting Neil Kinnock, John Smith, 
Roy Hattersley and Gerald Kaufman, all o f whom had consistently upheld the Party’s 
opposition to the emergency legislation in the House o f C o m m o n s .7 3 2  In 1982 when the 
PLP abstained on the PTA Continuance Order, 52 out o f the 209 Labour MPs rebelled and 
voted against the Act, but after Jack Straw’s decision just 25 out o f a total o f 271 defied 
the whips and opposed the PTA Continuance Order in March 1996. (Amongst those 
voting against were McNamara’s one time assistant Roger Stott and the ‘unionist friendly’ 
Harry Bames.)733 Party discipline was such at this stage that a left-wing rebellion could be 
thwarted with the determined efficiency that had become typical o f ‘New Labour’s’ 
renowned slick professionalism. Nothing was to be heard from some o f the old opponents 
of the PTA such as Clive Soley, Harriet Harman and even Clare Short. A heated PLP 
meeting took place before the vote on the PTA Continuance Order in which Party unity 
was demanded and a resolution from Max Madden demanding continuing opposition to the 
Act was defeated. However Jack Straw did give a firm undertaking that when in 
government he would make certain that the provision for exclusion orders would be 
r e m o v e d . 7 3 4  in the event Jack Straw had more o f a problem with the government than with 
his own back benchers. Michael Howard put Jack Straw on the defensive because the 
latter argued that Labour had abstained on the second reading of the EPA in the February 
because Sir Patrick Mayhew had announced that there would be a review o f emergency 
legislation under Lord Lloyd. This was not the case; Labour had in fact still voted against
732//7,s// Post, 2 March 1996.
Hansard, Vol. 273 Col. 1171 (14 March 1996).
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the EPA and so Straw had to apologise to the House.^^s Despite this embarrassment Straw 
continued to argue that this newly announced review was reason enough for Labour not to 
oppose the PTA. It has also been suggested that Labour had been briefed by the 
government that intelligence reports indicated that an IRA ‘spectacular’ was likely to take 
place at the beginning o f April, on the 80th anniversary o f the Easter Rising, and so the 
Labour leadership took the decision to abstain on the PTA rather than face the possibility 
o f being castigated for opposing anti-terrorist measures when the IRA were still such a 
potent threat.736
The relative ease with which Labour’s thirteen year opposition to the Prevention of
Terrorism Act was overturned was remarkable and indicative o f the state o f and nature o f
the Labour Party by the mid-1990s. The policy o f opposition had appeared firmly
entrenched and even a number o f trade unions had adopted policies demanding repeal of
the Act following the quashing o f the convictions o f  the Guildford 4 and the Birmingham 6.
The T&GWU had done so in 1991, ASLEF had in 1991, the GMB in 1990 and the TUC
had adopted a comprehensive policy statement in 1989 on civil liberties issues which
included the demand for repeal o f the PTA.737 in addition to this the Labour Party’s 1995j;
annual conference had reiterated support for “the dismantling o f emergency legisIation”.738 
The dramatic shift by the Labour Party was not solely indicative o f changing attitudes on 
Ireland, but was also an indication o f the authority that the ‘New Labour’ leader had and 
his obsession with presenting the Party to the electorate as a responsible and trustworthy 
alternative government. Opposition to the PTA had not necessarily been based on concern
Irish Post, 9 March & 13 April 1996.
Hansard, Vol. 273 Col. 1136-37 (14 March 1996).
Irish Post, 6 April 1996. Article by Martin Collins.
737 Britain and Ireland Human Rights Centre, Discrimination Human Rights & the Trade Unions: A Policy 
Report (1994).
738 Report o f tlie 1995 Labour Party Conference.
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about British treatment o f Irish nationalists but, rather, it was based on civil libertarian 
concerns about what was seen as an abuse o f human rights; even the Unionists had opposed 
the use o f exclusion orders as a form of internal exile. Anger at the Labour Party’s decision 
was limited to the 25 back benchers, the LCI and Labour Party Irish Society and the 
victims o f miscarriages o f justice, such as Paddy Hill and Billy Power o f the Birmingham 6, 
as well as Judith Ward (wrongly convicted o f the M62 coach bombing).739 Along with the 
persistent demand that Labour Party unity must be seen to be maintained in order to be 
certain o f electoral success, other tactics were also employed. For example the left-wing 
Labour MP, John Austin-Walker, addressed the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis in Dublin and blamed 
the Tory government for the collapse o f the peace process with the ending of the IRA 
ceasefire. Tony Blair and the Labour chief whip put enormous pressure on him and 
publicly castigated him for the speech.^^o He was finally forced into making a public 
apology, but he was also reassured that Labour had to be seen to speak with one voice and 
was assured that once in government Labour would begin making changes to the 
Prevention o f Terrorism Act. Having voted with the rebels in the March vote on the PTA, 
when the government introduced further measures giving the police new stop and search 
powers in the April Austin-Walker fell in line and abstained with the rest o f the 
parliamentary Party whilst only 14 Labour MPs opposed the Prevention o f Terrorism 
(Additional Powers) Bill.^ i^ Tony Blair was intolerant with those in the Labour Party who 
still wanted to associate themselves with Sinn Fein, but with the matter o f the emergency 
legislation the leadership were remarkably successful in avoiding a large rebellion partly by 
their reassurances on amending the PTA when in government.
Irish Post, 16 March 1996.
740 Ibid. 30 March 1996.
741 Ibid. 13 April \99^8l Hansard, Vol. 275 Col. 299 (1 April 1996).
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During the IRA cessation o f violence there had been maintained, throughout the 
Labour movement, a consensus and unique lack o f division on the Irish question. 
However, from February 1996 and the Docklands bombing divisions began to appear once 
again with the pro-Irish unity lobby being re-established through Kevin McNamara with the 
launch o f a new pressure group entitled the Agreed Ireland Forum. The group was set up 
in late 1995, after McNamara’s resignation, with one o f its main stated aims being the 
maintenance o f Labour’s ‘unity by consent’ both in opposition and government.742 The 
Forum had the support o f individuals such as Ken Livingstone and Clive Soley. Kevin 
McNamara was by no means reticent following his resignation and essentially returned to 
his old role as a back bench opponent o f bipartisanship. At the same time Kate Hoey also 
began, increasingly, to come clean with her unionist sympathies. Writing in the Ulster 
Review (the magazine o f the Young Unionists) in March, she predicted that Labour was 
soon to drop its “outdated and contradictory” policy o f ‘unity by consent’ and stating her 
approval for the removal o f McNamara said that “It was time for new Labour to build a 
new union.” Attacking anti-unionist sentiment in the British Labour movement she said 
that “As a politician in England I have had to listen to some o f the most uninformed and 
biased views on Ulster Unionism. Few people have had to endure so much 
misunderstanding and abuse...” She did not disguise her admiration for Unionists such as 
David Trimble and Bob McCartney and she displayed contempt for the SDLP who she 
declared could “continue to be a Catholic Nationalist Party” but called on the UUP to 
modernise by breaking its links with the Orange O r d e r .743 in addition to those such as 
Harry Barnes, Calum MacDonald and Nick Raynsford supporters o f her position in the 
Labour Party were becoming less and less reticent. For example the Labour MP Andrew
742 Agreed Ireland Forum, statement 1995.
743 Ulster Review, Issue 19, Spring 1996.
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McKinlay addressed a meeting in Belfast, in the March, o f the Ulster Unionist Labour 
Group to “dispel the age-old myth o f old Labour ideas about a united I r e l a n d . ” 744 The 
importance o f these developments (especially in the light o f the moderated positions 
adopted by those such as Clare Short and Ken Livingstone) was that such arguments and 
such activities were unprecedented in the Labour movement, not even in the late seventies 
when Labour sympathy with Irish nationalism was considered to be at an all time low were 
such pro-unionist sentiments so unashamedly aired.
One can assume that the Labour leadership and Party managers did not see a 
problem in those such as Kate Hoey presenting such arguments - they certainly were not 
threatened in the way that John Austin-Walker was - and the intolerance o f flirtations with 
Sinn Fein was clearly evident. As the 1997 general election approached, intelligent political 
debate was considerably stifled as nervousness and trepidation characterised what political 
debate there was. The Labour leadership were particularly careful to ensure that no 
embarrassing problems emerged in the run up to the election. It was for this reason that, 
for example, Tony Blair went as far as to threaten Jeremy Corbyn with having the Labour 
whip removed following his invitation to Gerry Adams to visit Westminster in September 
1996. The situation was resolved when Adams finally decided to turn down the 
invitation.745 The incident did have the effect o f impressing the Ulster Unionist leader, 
David Trimble, who was also no doubt aware o f the strained relationship between the 
SDLP and the Labour Party. Relations between the two parties reached a new low 
following Blair’s decision to support the government’s plans for elections to a Northern 
Ireland forum. In late January Tony Blair had held a meeting with Seamus Mallon and John 
Hume to discuss the government’s plans but Blair was unsympathetic to the SDLP’s
Irish Post, 30 March 1996. 
Independent, 5 Oct. 1996.
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position. They also asked Blair if a future Labour government would introduce 
proportional representation for Westminster elections in Northern Ireland but again Blair 
disappointed them and finally John Hume walked out o f the meeting.746 The Labour Party 
appeared, at this stage, to actually have better relations with unionism than with 
nationalism. In stark contrast to the sympathy displayed by the Labour left to Sinn Fein in 
the early eighties, in January 1996 Labour controlled Lambeth council refused to lease Sinn 
Fein a building in the borough (prior to the Docklands bomb) for use as a London 
headquarters after protestations from local Labour MPs Glenda Jackson and Frank 
Dobson.747
Despite Blair’s relative indifference towards Irish nationalism one could describe 
Mo Mowlam as slightly more sympathetic towards both the SDLP and Sinn Fein. In 
January 1996 she held meetings with both parties^ s^ and then during the summer there was, 
for the first time, a slight strain in the bipartisan relationship with the government. For the 
first time she began to criticise the government for dragging its feet and picked out Michael 
Howard, the Home Secretary, for particular criticism on the question o f Irish prisoners. 
Whilst the Irish government had been prepared to release certain IRA prisoners early in 
response to the IRA ceasefire the British government had been reluctant to follow such a 
policy and there had been complaints by Peter Hain, for example over the Home 
Secretary’s refusal to transfer back to Ireland the IRA prisoner Patrick Kelly who was 
suffering with cancer.749 Mo Mowlam’s calls for greater flexibility over prisoners had been 
ignored by Howard of whom she said “I have seen no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 
he is interested in facilitating the peace process. Just the r e v e r s e .  ”75o On the question of
Irish Times, 29 Jan. 1996.
Irish Post, 20 Jan. 1996.
Irish Times, 27 Jan. 1996.
Hansard, Vol. 264, Col. 1133 (July 1995). 
"750 Irish Post, 18 May 1996.
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the political stalemate in the peace process she began to make the kind o f criticisms that 
McNamara had been making over the government procrastinating. In a speech in Belfast 
she said that “If a ceasefire is called by the IRA there should be an acknowledgement o f the 
IRA decision and a welcome to Sinn Fein into the talks process. Any procrastination, calls 
for validation, would rightly be seen as unfair and unjust calls for further preconditions to 
Sinn Fein’s entry into talks and should be rejected. Why relive the problems and the logjam 
o f the last 18 months?”'^ *^ She seemed to be gradually moving towards the analysis of 
those such as McNamara and Tony Benn who were arguing that the Tories had squandered 
the chance offered by the IRA ceasefire. Benn argued that there was a pointless refusal 
over 18 months to include Sinn Fein in talks “Had other Governments followed that 
principle, there would have been no peace process in the middle east or settlement in South 
Africa.”^^  ^ After the Drumcree crisis in July 1996 Mo Mowlam was prepared to launch 
attacks on both Mayhew and the Ulster Unionist leadership. She attacked Mayhew for “a 
lack o f political leadership, as well as a failure o f initiative, for which he must take much 
personal responsibility.” And whilst displaying some sympathy for the SDLP, she called on 
the Unionist leadership “to show some humility and acknowledge their part in this present 
escalation o f violence when the Orange Order threatened the rule o f law by a show o f  
power and the threat o f violence at Drumcree.”^^  ^ David Trimble was to make clear that 
he preferred Blair to Mowlam who he said had “made a good impression when she was first 
appointed [but] latterly there has been some concern, particularly with her view that ‘the 
status quo is not an o p t i o n ’ . ” '^54 should also be noted that the Unionists were always
careful to read into an individuals national and religious origins (most notably with Kevin
Irish Times^ 4 June 1996.
Hansard, Vol. 279, Col. 116 (11 June 1996). 
152 Irish Times, 15 July 1996.
754 Times, 2 Dec. 1996.
249
McNamara) and were, no doubt, aware that Tony Blair’s mother was an Ulster 
Protestant.755 Regardless o f events surrounding the Drumcree crisis Mo Mowlam had 
made clear at the beginning o f the summer that she was going to change tack; she was not 
going to maintain the overtly non-confrontational attitude towards the government and she 
continued to reiterate Labour’s support for the idea o f cross border bodies and for eventual 
reunification by consent.756 However, this was relatively short-lived and by the beginning 
of 1997 most people’s minds seemed to be concentrated on the forthcoming general 
election with the result that debate on Northern Ireland was sidelined by the desire to focus 
on the crucial election issues o f tax, education, ‘sleaze’, Europe and constitutional reform, 
including devolution for Scotland and Wales but not Northern Ireland.
One o f the very reasons for the gradual disappearance o f the ideological debate on 
the Irish question within the Labour movement was that the general purpose o f the peace 
process, which had the support o f the entire British party political scene, was to facilitate 
talks involving those who were party to the conflict to seek a resolution based upon an 
accommodation o f their various fears and aspirations rather than seeking to impose a 
resolution from above. For years the polemic in the Labour Party evolved, very often, 
around seeking a resolution for Northern Ireland whereas the peace process sought to place 
the onus on the Northern Irish parties to seek a resolution among themselves. This move 
away from conflict and argument over Ireland was aided by the fact that a new Labour 
leadership particularly disliked those trying to articulate the republican argument in the 
Party. Blair also did not want to feel bound by the pro-nationalist policy which favoured 
Irish unity and was established before he had even been elected to Parliament and when 
Labour was dominated by the old left. In July 1996 Labour launched its draft election
755 Ibid. 13 Dec. 1996.
Irish Post, 18 May & Irish Times, 4 June 1996.
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manifesto which stated that “On the basis o f consent, Labour is committed to reconciliation 
between the two communities and the unity o f the peoples o f  I r e l a n d .”757 Despite this the 
final Labour Party manifesto launched in March 1997 made no mention o f  Irish unity and in 
actual fact the policy statement said a lot about what Blair’s strategy had been over the 
previous two years. The resignation o f Kevin McNamara, the return to bipartisanship and 
the weakened relationship with the SDLP set the scene for Labour’s neutral and non­
committal election manifesto statement. No conference decision had been made to drop 
‘unity by consent’ but Blair’s authority and influence was such that hardly a complaint was 
made by the left.
Such was the state o f the Labour left by the time o f the general election that in the 
Commons vote on the PTA Continuance Order o f March 1997 only 15 Labour MPs voted 
against.758 In addition to this, perhaps the most remarkable indication o f the transfoimation 
in the Labour Party was the decision by Ken Livingstone not to join the rebels in the lobby 
and the one time hate figure o f the Labour centre-right - following the Enniskillen bombing 
- asked the government the following question shortly before the general election: “Given 
the Government’s clear determination to exclude Sinn Fein until the IRA campaign stops, 
and given the frequent statements from the republican leadership that it has no intention o f  
restoring the ceasefire, does the Minister have any proposals for increased security 
measures to defeat the IRA campaign - or are the people of Northern Ireland doomed to 
live with the situation forever?” (Even the Northern Ireland Minister, Michael Ancram, 
noted what a remarkable change this was for Ken Livingstone.)759 One can speculate that 
Livingstone had his eye on a job in a future Labour government but what is certain is that
Belfast Telegraph, 5 July 1996.
Hansard, Vol. 291 Col. 959 (5 March 1997). 
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Blair was confident enough o f his authority to expect little resistance to the moderate 
manifesto statement which also made clear that he expected a quid pro-quo from the Tory 
Party in the event o f Labour forming a government: “There will be as great a priority 
attached to seeing that [peace] process through with Labour as under the Conservatives... 
We will expect the same bipartisan approach from a Conservative opposition.” Also, for the 
first time, the Labour leadership clearly omitted Irish unity and explained its reasoning and 
logic for so doing: “Labour recognises that the option o f a united Ireland does not 
command the consent o f the Unionist tradition, nor does the existing status o f Northern 
Ireland command the consent o f the Nationalist tradition. We are therefore committed to 
reconciliation between the two traditions and to a new political settlement which can 
command the support of both.”76o To argue that Labour had come full circle since 1979 in 
time for its return to power in 1997 would be simplistic and inaccurate. The 
metamorphosis through which the Labour Party went over the seventeen years in 
opposition must be analysed against the backdrop o f enormous changes in British party 
politics, most especially the Conservative attitudes to the Irish problem, enormous changes 
in the international arena and dramatic shifts in the political situation in Ireland both north 
and south. The changes in the politics and economy o f the Republic were o f immense 
importance as an exogenous factor influencing attitudes to the North. The Republic’s 
economy had become far stronger than that o f the North and the beginnings o f a gradual 
process o f secularisation had help sweep away the old Unionist arguments about the 
backward South.^ i^ A consensus had also developed within the Irish party political 
establishment which was much more pragmatic and cautious, with enthusiasm for taking on 
responsibility for the six counties visibly waning in view o f the stable and ethnically
760 Labour Party, 1997 Election Manifesto, New Labour Because Britain Deserves Better.
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homogenous state which had developed in the South.762 it is for these reasons that trying 
to make comparisons between Labour’s leaders o f 1979 and 1997 is fraught with 
difficulties. For example, if one chooses to compare Mason and Callaghan with Mowlam 
and Blair most observers would describe the latter two as much further to the centre-right, 
not least because o f their attitude to clause 4. However, Mo Mowlam was undoubtedly 
much more Irish nationalist fiiendly compared with Roy Mason and before the general 
election she was still making clear that she favoured early inclusion o f Sinn Fein in talks if 
the IRA were to call a new ceasefire (a position she has in fact held to in government).763 
But, whilst the Labour Party o f 1997 did contain those such as Kate Hoey and Harry 
Barnes there were still more in the PLP who would have greater sympathy with the views 
of Kevin McNamara and Tony Benn. As for the official Labour policy spelt out in the 
election manifesto, the very reality o f taking office must have affected the psyche o f a Party 
which had learnt that the electorate were not persuaded by policies which appeared more 
idealistic than realistic. Blair and the Party ‘modernisers’ no doubt concluded that ‘unity by 
consent’ did not fall into the latter category and perhaps believed that it would have been a 
millstone around Mo Mowlam’s neck when Secretary o f State for Northern Ireland.
761 Girvin, B. ‘Church, State and the Irish Constitution: The Secularisation o f Irish Politics’ Parliamentary 
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Chapter 6; Conclusion
Whilst there is a temptation to take a rather cynical view o f Tony Blair’s Labour 
government as having precisely the same view as the Tory Party on Northern Ireland and as 
having simply come full circle since 1979, the reality is in fact far more complex. It may 
appear that Labour have conveniently chosen, at certain times, to talk o f their ‘historic 
commitment’ to a united Ireland but, in very sharp contrast to the Tories, Blair’s cabinet 
does contain those such as David Blunkett, Frank Dobson, Harriet Harman and Mo 
Mowlam, all o f whom, at some time or another, have advocated Irish re-unification. So 
too have government ministers Clare Short, Tony Banks, Michael Meacher and Peter Hain. 
Admittedly the Conservative Party changed its attitude towards the ‘Irish dimension’ 
drastically during its eighteen year term o f office in comparison with the Party which tried 
to maintain Stormont up until 1972; but the nature o f the Labour Party is such that, despite 
the return to bipartisanship with ‘New Labour’, there still exists (to varying degrees) an 
instinctive sympathy with Northern Ireland’s nationalist community and a suspicion 
towards the political leaders o f unionism. The change that has taken place during the 
Labour Party’s eighteen years in opposition has been a gradual adoption o f a pragmatic and 
less partisan position in response to various developments. Those developments are as 
follows; changes in the debate within Ireland which include a more pragmatic Sinn Fein and 
the dropping o f irredentism in the Republic; changes in the Conservative Party which has 
shifted away from overt unionism and fostered greatly improved relations with nationalist 
Ireland and finally enormous changes in the international arena with the end o f the cold war 
and the beginning o f attempts to resolve regional conflicts such as the middle east and 
South Africa as well as a general mood o f understanding and tolerance replacing the 
conflict and intolerance o f the eighties. All o f these factors presented the Labour Party
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with a challenge as to whether the policy and attitudes adopted in 1981 could be maintained 
into the next century or could the Party adopt a new position which did not entail a return 
to the policies and attitudes o f the Rees/Mason era. To try and take the problem facing the 
Labour Party and reduce it into simple terms, the problem was and still is that most who 
approach the Irish problem from a left-wing/non-unionist position are caught between two 
motivating factors. The first is to try and pursue what is considered to be morally and 
historically correct and the second is to pursue what is politically practical and equitable. In 
other words, whilst there are those such as Clare Short and Kevin McNamara who may feel 
that taking into consideration that the Catholics are the indigenous, majority population on 
the island and who suffered with the Penal laws, the suppression o f the Irish language, the 
confiscation o f land by settlers, the Coercion laws and the Famine, that it is their aspirations 
and their (nationalist) agenda to which the Labour Party ought to be more sympathetic. It 
was this thinking which was perhaps in the ascendant in 1981 when, after another tragic 
episode for nationalist Ireland entered the history books, the Party elected to pursue a 
nationalist agenda. The criticism with the Irish unity policy was subsequently always its 
practicability. For example, some may argue that all Australian land which once belonged 
to the Aboriginal people should be returned to them en masse. This may be morally and 
historically favourable but it is not practicable because history cannot be reversed and the 
present day demographic and political circumstances make such a policy impossible and 
unachievable. Clare Short once argued that “if all the people that had been born in 
Northern Ireland - since it was partitioned - were still living there, there would already be a 
nationalist m a ) o r i t y ." 7 6 4  %he implication being that, had it not been for systematic 
discrimination forcing many Catholics to emigrate, a united Ireland would have been
764 Transcript o f BBC Radio 4 interview witli Clare Short by John Humpluys, 4 Feb. 1987, (Kevin 
McNamara arcliive collection, University o f Hull.)
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democratically achieved so that todays politicians have a moral obligation to right that 
historic wrong. The problem for a British government pursuing Irish unity is that, in crude 
terms, the kind o f question that arises is that (favourable though it might be to an Irish 
nationalist population that has for so long aspired to a completely independent unitary Irish 
state) how could an Irish national police force maintain control over east Belfast or patrol 
the Shankill Road? Or how could Dublin Government policy be implemented throughout 
the densely Protestant populated regions o f north Down or south Antrim? It is this 
dilemma over what is desirable and what is practically achievable that brought the Labour 
Party to the position it arrived at in 1997. What basically took place in the 1990s was a 
shift away from the partisan/pro-nationalist position partly because o f the changed political 
circumstances listed above and so a struggle took place between those who continued to 
adhere to sympathy for the nationalist cause and those such as Blair and Mowlam who 
sought to achieve parity o f esteem between nationalism and unionism rather than come 
down in favour o f one or the other. Harry Barnes and others in New Agenda articulated 
the latter position and described themselves as simply ‘neutrals’ - a new concept within the 
Labour movement - whose stated intention was to avoid taking a partisan position but to 
act as facilitators for the two traditions in Ireland to come to agreement amongst 
themselves. In 1981 such a notion would have appeared rather cowardly and conservative; 
in the era o f conflict and class struggle it was felt that Labour had to decide which side they 
were on, yet in 1997 such a notion itself had begun to appear rather simplistic and 
outdated.
During the eighties there also existed the simplistic supposition that to be left-wing 
was to support Irish nationalism and that to be right-wing was to support Ulster unionism. 
However this simplistic analysis was to be challenged as the honeymoon period o f friendly
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relations between Sinn Fein and the Labour left gradually came to an end in the aftermath 
of the Enniskillen bombing. The violence o f Irish republicanism had always repulsed most 
in the Labour movement and the extent to which Sinn Fein had moved to the left during the 
eighties was not enough to seriously challenge the SDLP as Labour’s official political ally 
in Northern Ireland. Despite the position that the SDLP held as technically the sister party 
in Ulster, many in the Labour Party knew that this was more o f a nationalist party than a 
socialist party. It was well known that the SDLP had expelled Paddy Devlin in 1977 
because he opposed the Party’s nationalist direction and that Gerry Fitt left them two years 
later for the same reason. The demise o f the old Northern Ireland Labour Party and the 
non-existence o f any other moderate socialist party meant that the SDLP continued as 
Labour’s ally in the province. It should also be noted that many in the Labour Party were 
rather sympathetic to the Workers’ Party and were frustrated that this particular brand o f  
Irish socialism did not achieve the same electoral success as Sinn Fein or the SDLP. Harry 
Barnes openly conceded that the Workers’ Party made a considerable impression on him, as 
did the one time front bench spokesperson, Peter Archer.765 The SDLP usually voted with 
the Parliamentary Labour Party and although relations between the Tories and the 
Unionists became increasingly strained, especially following the signing o f the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement, they would rarely vote with Labour in the House o f Commons. This is one of 
the principal reasons why support for unionism is so often perceived as a reactionary 
position in the Labour movement.
The Ulster Unionist Party’s links with the Orange Order, their historic association 
with the Conservative Party and their record as the party responsible for the discrimination, 
the gerrymandering and the use o f internment and excessive police measures during the
765 Barnes, H. Interview, Nov. 1997 & Archer, P. Interview, Dec. 1996.
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Stormont years all help to alienate them from the overwhelming majority o f the British 
Labour movement. Even as late as 1993 this image was not helped when, on a vote in 
Parliament on the government’s planned pit closure programme, the Ulster Unionists 
refused to join with the Labour Party in opposing the Tories. (Even Paisley’s Democratic 
Unionist Party voted with the Labour Party). A few months later Roger Stott summed up 
the feelings o f many in the Labour movement thus: “I say to the right hon. Member for 
Lagan Valley (James Molyneaux) and his colleagues on the Unionist Bench that there are 
thousands o f families in the coalfield communities o f this country, mine included, who will 
not lightly forgive or forget the part played by the Ulster Unionist party in aiding and 
abetting the Government in the butchery o f the British Coal industiy. Loyalism is a two- 
way street.”766 Nevertheless to dismiss unionism in all its forms as reactionary and alien to 
the principles o f the Labour movement would be inaccurate and simplistic. Those such as 
the Labour MP Harry Barnes, and o f course Kate Hoey, began to argue for a more 
favourable attitude towards unionism during the 1990s. It is well documented that the 
difficulties faced by the Protestant working class are no different to those faced by the 
Catholic working class in Northern Ireland and so as the debate has matured, the admission 
has increasingly been made that unionist fears (having to exist in an all-Ireland state) and 
unionist aspirations (self-determination within the United Kingdom) are o f equal validity to 
nationalist fears and aspirations. This view is what Mo Mowlam frequently likes to 
describe as ‘parity o f esteem’. The emergence o f political parties from the Loyalist 
paramilitaries, namely the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster Democratic Party, has 
also help to thwart the idea that unionism means Ian Paisley and David Trimble. The 
presence o f these new parties and that o f Chris McGimpsey (UUP councillor in the
Hansard, Vol. 230 Col. 546 (22 Oct. 1993).
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working class district o f the Shankill) has introduced the concept o f a working class or 
progressive unionism into the debate. The Ulster Unionist Party, and latterly the two 
Loyalist parties, have often ensured that they are present at the Labour Party’s annual 
conference fringe events.
The fact that the Labour Party has also consistently refused to extend its 
organisation to the province has also given a revealing insight into the Party’s attitude to 
Northern Ireland. In spite o f the CLR’s and Democracy Now’s claim that this was a denial 
o f the right to vote Labour in the province, as an independent political party it was and still 
is Labour’s right to choose where it wishes to organise. The conclusion that one must 
draw is that, although the CLR claimed that the Party would cut through sectarianism. 
Labour’s leaders feared that they would either be drawn into the sectarian ‘dog fight’ or 
else the venture would prove fruitless, resulting in the same fate as the old Northern Ireland 
Labour Party. The only major external political parties to try and organise in the province 
have been the Irish Labour Party in the 1950s and the Conservative Party in the 1990s both 
o f which were unsuccessful. The deterrence for parties from both the Republic o f Ireland 
and from Britain is the fact that the nature o f Northern Ireland politics is very different to 
the politics in their own states which centre around the ‘bread and butter’ issues o f tax, 
jobs, health and education. This is one o f the most important reasons why Labour has 
recoiled at the idea o f becoming involved in the province. There has consistently existed in 
the British Labour movement a deep sense o f disillusionment with the sectarian nature o f 
Northern Irish politics and the culture o f conflict over national and religious identity; both 
being anathema to a movement which espouses a modem, secular, internationalist politics. 
It would also be particularly over optimistic to predict that the presence o f British parties in
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Northern Ireland would result in a change in the political culture in the province.^^? 
Another important factor is that, whilst the Tories could entrust individuals in Northern 
Ireland to take on the job o f organising the Conservative Party with few problems, the 
Labour Party would have been opening the way for individuals such as David Morrison, 
Ben Cosin, Bob McCartney and perhaps even Kate Hoey to take up the leading positions in 
the Northern Ireland Party. The problem would have been that these people had all 
opposed Labour’s policy o f Irish unity and so the Labour leaders would have feared a 
Labour Party developing in Northern Ireland which would not have followed the Party line 
but would evolve into an organisation with a very different political complexion to the 
Labour movement in Britain.
There have been many arguments presented and predictions made about organising 
Labour in the six counties, but rather than becoming involved in that rather emotional 
debate the argument presented here is that regardless o f what may or may not happen to 
the Labour Party in the province, the leadership in Britain will not countenance such a 
move precisely because the culture, the history and the very nature o f Ulster politics is 
considered so alien. Admittedly the argument presented here challenges those who claim 
that the introduction o f class politics or ‘ordinary’ politics would help to challenge 
sectarianism and help to secure Northern Ireland as a stable, integral part o f the United 
Kingdom. But presented here is the reverse argument; it is precisely because Northern 
Ireland is not perceived as an integral part o f Britain, where the Labour movement has 
evolved over a century with its own distinct political culture, that it is a forlorn hope to 
expect them to challenge a three-century-old Ulster political culture, especially with a
767 This is tlie basis to the arguments presented in McNamara, K., Scott, R.& O ’Brien, B. Oranges or 
Lemons? Should Labour Organise in Northern Ireland? (1993) and also argued in McGarry, J. & 
O ’Leary, B. Explaining Northern Ireland  (1995) p. 134.
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leadership which believes in devolving power down to the people rather than seeking 
solutions ‘from above’. If an attempt was made by people on the ground to set up a 
Labour Party in Northern Ireland, the British Labour Party would not try to stand in their 
way, but the one prediction that can be made with confidence is that the Labour Party will 
not, at any time in the years ahead, attempt to extend its organisation to Northern Ireland.
The problem of devising a policy for Northern Ireland had to be pursued by dealing 
with a broad spectrum o f opinion throughout the Labour Party. Opinion was not simply 
divided between those who did and did not favour Irish unity. The situation was far more 
complex because the Party contained those who favoured decentralisation and devolution, 
those who favoured a solution ‘from above’ such as unity or shared authority, those who 
favoured a solution from within Northern Ireland such as power sharing and those who 
were basically indifferent (such as Foot, Kinnock, and Smith) which in itself was actually 
part o f Labour’s problem. Of course the picture is not nearly as black and white either; for 
example the 1988 document ‘Towards a United Ireland’ still included the proposal of 
devolution for Northern Ireland. The 1993 document ‘Northern Ireland: Sharing 
Authority’ envisaged a five member executive with Ulster politicians having three seats and 
Irish and British representatives just one member each. When one considers the myriad o f  
different policy ideas, from Jim Callaghan’s Ulster independence to Ken Livingstone’s 
united Ireland, the only consistent theme which existed throughout the movement was clear 
opposition to any return to Stormont. If one tries to look for a clear trend in policy over 
the eighteen year period it is that the Labour Party wanted to move on from the 
Mason/Rees era o f crisis management and so adopted the policy o f ‘unity by consent’; then 
as the peace process emerged in the mid-1990s it became apparent that there was no reason 
for the Party to hold to a particular policy on the constitution but instead to provide for
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talks enabling the local politicians to agree a settlement for themselves. As has already 
been explained this is how the ‘neutrals’ one the argument over the pro-nationalists and 
Blair and Mowlam were able to abandon the commitment to a united Ireland, The policy o f  
‘unity by consent’ had been overtaken by events. The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 and 
then, more explicitly, the Downing Street Declaration offered the possibility o f  
constitutional change if there was majority consent. To some consent had actually become 
the obstacle to unity and the left in the mid-1980s wanted Labour’s policy revised precisely 
because they considered consent as representing a veto for unionism. Now that Labour are 
in power the term ‘consent’ is used persistently by the Unionists and by Tony Blair because 
instead o f being viewed as something to be won over to support re-unification it is now 
seen as the reason why there cannot be unity. In other words the policy has been turned on 
its head and the contradictions in ‘unity by consent’ have been used to argue for the status 
quo: there will be unity if there is consent, but there is not consent and so partition must be 
maintained. If Labour had wanted to adopt a pro-nationalist policy, they could have chosen 
British withdrawal or Irish unity. They chose the latter but with a get out clause: the 
consent o f the very people whose existence and political identity was based on their 
opposition to Irish unity. If, during the early eighties. Labour had added to its policy o f  
unilateral nuclear disarmament a proviso that no such move could take place without the 
consent o f NATO, the policy would have been ridiculed as a cynical ploy designed to 
appear radical knowing that in actual fact unilateral disarmament would not take place. 
But, despite these problems and contradictions the policy of ‘unity by consent’ was never 
seriously challenged, not least because o f the aforementioned indifference.
It is also important to consider the accusation that the British Labour Party does not 
have the political will to take on the challenge o f the Northern Ireland problem and has
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proved to be altogether rather fickle on the subject. If a comparison is made between the 
historic developments in Northern Ireland and the changes in attitude, emphasis and even 
publicly stated policy it is evident that the Labour Party has all too often responded to 
events. The 1981 decision by the Party to support a policy o f Irish unity has already been 
examined closely and the causative factors include the Party’s sharp move to the left during 
1980-81 and the impact o f the H Block hunger strikes. However close analysis o f events 
makes clear that it was the latter event, or more accurately the electoral display o f support 
for the hunger strikers in the Fermanagh/South Tyrone by-election, which was decisive in 
ensuring that an Irish unity policy was adopted. In other words it is wrong to conclude that 
the 1981 decision was just another part o f the shift to the left. As the NEC minutes reveal 
and as Dick Barry (himself unsympathetic to Irish nationalism) conceded the by-election 
and the deaths in the H Blocks during the summer months o f 1981 made a united Ireland 
policy inevitable. The Labour movement was relatively content with this policy and the 
pro-nationalist bias that the Party maintained throughout the early eighties until the 
Hillsborough Agreement was signed in 1985. Although there was enthusiastic support for 
the Agreement the public show of resistance on the part o f the Protestant/unionist 
population undoubtedly had an impact on the Labour Party reminiscent o f the effect that 
the UWC strike had on Merlyn Rees and the then Labour government in 1974. This 
fickleness is an important indication o f the nature o f the British Labour movement. There 
is no question that individuals throughout the Labour movement have deeply held 
convictions on matters such as the maintenance o f the NHS, redistribution o f wealth or an 
egalitarian education system, but there are very few that have such deeply held convictions 
on the subject o f Northern Ireland. Those such as Kevin McNamara and Kate Hoey are 
very much the exception. The individuals who led the Labour Party during the eighteen
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years in opposition have, without exception, been completely agnostic on the issue. Very 
few would look at the images o f Orange parades or loyalist demonstrations and feel any 
great compunction about challenging unionism as a matter o f principle. Clare Short and 
Tony Benn might, but the priorities o f the Labour leadership are such that taking up an 
explicitly confrontational position to Unionism is considered neither practical nor desirable. 
However, it would be wrong to give the impression that the sympathy that emerged in 1981 
following the hunger strikes and the electoral rise o f Sinn Fein in the following years, was 
completely overturned during the late eighties. A consensus does now exist in British party 
politics that both Irish nationalism and Ulster unionism are equally formidable political 
forces and that trying to side with one in the hope o f defeating the other is a political path 
fraught with danger.
This problem leads to another important matter in relation to the nature o f Labour 
as a party o f government. Coupled with a lack o f conviction in relation to Northern 
Ireland, the Labour Party (by virtue o f its history and social roots) has to contend with a 
credibility problem and an image problem as a movement seen to be potentially subversive, 
unpatriotic and irresponsible. No doubt, these issues were foremost in Tony Blair’s mind in 
attempting to make the Party an electorally viable force. Because the Party’s social base 
has historically been in the working class and the trade unions and because they have 
consistently opposed upper class privilege whether it be in the shape o f the House o f Lords 
or the public school system, the Party’s leaders have had to be prepared for an onslaught 
from an alliance o f the establishment and upper classes in the form o f the Tory Party, the 
Lords, the newspaper magnates and the military establishment. During the mid-eighties 
Kevin McNamara warned that this factor had to be taken seriously because loyalist 
opposition to Irish unity “will be formidable in terms o f its ability to present an acceptable
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face and to appeal to allies in the British Establishment (1912 style).”768 When, in early 
1995, it emerged that the government had been maintaining secret contacts with the IRA 
Sir Patrick Mayhew managed to ride the political storm with relative ease. Brendan McClua 
pointed out in his ‘Dolan’ column in the Irish Posf^^ that only the Tories could survive 
such an affair with few political scars but for a Labour government the attacks by such an 
alliance would have “savaged” them precisely because o f their historic vulnerability to being 
portrayed as the party o f pacifists, trade union militants and unpatriotic internationalists. If 
this conservative alliance were to rally together to resist a Labour government pursuing an 
Irish nationalist agenda one could predict that, whether the Party were led by Tony Blair, 
John Smith, Neil Kinnock or Michael Foot, they would almost certainly back down and 
change course. This is by no means an attempt to draw parallels with 1912 when the Tory 
Party were willing to go to extraordinary lengths in support o f the Union. In spite o f Kevin 
McNamara’s warnings, it is highly unlikely that the modern Toiy Party would behave in 
such a way, because it would not serve their class interests in the way that keeping the 
Union with a heavily industrialised Ulster did in 1912 or when it was considered o f such 
strategic and symbolic importance for the British Empire in the early part o f the twentieth 
century. However, we can still surmise that a very image conscious Labour Party would 
not wish to precipitate a conflict over a matter which is simply no great priority. The 
Labour government was elected in May 1997 with a 179 seat majority and had the 
confidence and public support to proceed with plans for devolution for Scotland and Wales 
with little to fear fi*om a Tory Party still reeling from its electoral disaster and a press still 
coming to terms with the size o f the Labour landslide. This is an unusual position for the
768 McNamara, K. ‘Obstacles on the Path to Unity’ (paper for tlie NEC/PLP joint policy coinittee) Labour 
Party RD: 3502/May 1985.
Irish Post, 11 March 1995.
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Labour Party to find itself in but the leadership would still be unwilling to try any bold 
moves in relation to Northern Ireland because the potential for a destabilising outbreak of  
violence is such that the prospect o f facing this alliance o f the establishment in tandem with 
trying to maintain law and order in the province would be too much for a political party 
which simply does not have the political stamina or convictions on the Irish question to face 
such a battle.
It is also clearly evident that after more than ten years o f trying to maintain a 
distinct policy on Northern Ireland, Labour returned to bipartisanship, partly as a matter of 
political expediency, but mainly because o f the changes that had taken place in the 
Conservative Party and in the political situation in Northern Ireland itself. Paul Dixon has 
argued that, in effect, bipartisanship was never in fact dropped even during the mid-eighties 
with Clive Soley and Kevin McNamara.77o It can unquestionably be asserted that this 
argument is incorrect as far as party policy is concerned and as it was articulated from the 
front benches. As has already been argued, ‘unity by consent’ was no different to the 
commitment made on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position by the Tory government in 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement and Labour unreservedly supported the Agreement. However, 
what is important is that there was o f course a very significant difference o f emphasis as 
well as a determination by the Labour front bench to be seen to be maintaining a partisan 
position distinct from the government.^?  ^ The Tories proposed that change in Northern 
Ireland’s constitutional position would be permitted if there was consent because it shifted 
the onus o f responsibility onto the electorate within the six counties rather than letting the 
British government be portrayed (in the US and elsewhere) as an imperial power interfering
776 Dixon, P. ‘A House Divided Cannot Stand: Britain Bipartisanship and Nortliem Ireland’ Contemporary 
Record VoX, 9, No. 1 (Summer 1995).
771 Archer, P. Interview, Dec. 1996. See also Chapter 3.
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in Ireland against the popular will. The Labour Party, with those at the helm such as Soley, 
Archer and most especially McNamara, proposed that change in Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional position was something that they positively favoured and would be pursuing 
with a view to Irish re-unification were they on the government front bench. The acid test 
of a party’s position on Northern Ireland is perhaps the response o f the Unionists and, as 
has been well documented, the Unionists made known their disquiet at the prospect o f  
Kevin McNamara becoming Secretary o f State for Northern Ireland in a manner that was 
quite unprecedented. Paul Dixon has explained that the advantage o f bipartisanship is that 
it “prevents those groups [Northern Irish parties] from exploiting the political differences 
between the British parties and playing one off against the other and holding out on 
agreement.”772 This is precisely what Tony Blair and Mo Mowlam argued was the 
rationale behind the decision to return to bipartisanship in 1994: the peace process required 
the British parties to unite around the consensus that no one was to pursue their own 
favoured outcome or be persuaders for a particular outcome, but would simply be 
facilitators in letting the Northern Ireland parties achieve an agreement amongst 
themselves. This is where the political situation - namely the IRA ceasefire and the peace 
process - helped to determine a return to bipartisanship in addition to the changes in the 
political complexion o f the Labour Party following the launch o f Tony Blair’s ‘New Labour 
Party’. During the Brooke talks o f 1990-92 bipartisanship was evidently not in existence 
because, with the possibility o f Kevin McNamara taking over at the Northern Ireland 
Office, there was clearly a great deal o f concern within Unionism and a lack o f enthusiasm 
about continuing with the Brooke talks as the 1992 general election approached. There 
might be some justification for the criticism that Labour dropped bipartisanship and
772 Dixon, P. op cit.
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adopted an Irish unity policy, during the heady political days o f the early eighties, in order 
to simply be seen to be opposing the Tories on Ireland. During the late eighties Kinnock 
argued, in his speech announcing his opposition to continuing with a policy o f unilateral 
nuclear disarmament, that with the emergence o f Gorbachev and the thawing o f the cold 
war there was no longer any need for such a policy; so Mowlam and Blair were responding 
to an equally changed situation in Northern Ireland. Because o f the confrontational and 
volatile political climate during the early eighties many in the Labour movement could not 
stomach and would not have tolerated a continuation of bipartisanship with Thatcher on 
Northern Ireland. The pragmatism o f ‘New Labour’ was such that this type o f overtly 
adversarial logic would not be entertained especially considering that Blair was veiy much a 
long term planner and was, no doubt, anticipating the importance o f earning a quid pro quo 
from the Tories for returning to bipartisanship in 1994.
The historic period that has been looked at has also been one o f enormous changes 
in the international arena and it is imperative that the changes in the Labour movement and 
its attitude to the Irish problem be analysed against the backdrop o f the global political 
trend. Although there has been a great deal o f confusion over the global political direction 
in the wake o f the fall o f Soviet communism, the apparent increase in regional conflicts and 
the steady move towards greater European integration, one can assert that by the time of 
the general election o f 1997 the Labour Party appeared to reached a fairly accurate analysis 
of the future o f international political development. The assumption has been made by 
some that as the world had become smaller in terms o f trade, transportation, language 
barriers and communications so the more local forms o f government would be superseded 
by larger institutions such as the European Union. Peter Archer has stated that he is in 
favour o f this particular analysis and during the early nineties such an analysis was
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presented as reason for believing that the Irish border would ultimately become irrelevant. 
However, the Labour Party under Tony Blair has recognised that in actual fact the 
international trend is two-fold: first o f all there is an ever developing global economy 
dominated by multi-nationals and globally organised financial institutions which cut across 
national boundaries but secondly there is an ongoing political trend towards devolving 
political power down which is demanded by people regardless o f the development of the 
European Union or o f the global economy. The trend towards devolution is evident across 
the globe and attempts at trying to either ignore it or thwart it has result in the proliferation 
of regional conflicts. Even within the EU the problem continues in a number o f member 
states including Belgium, Italy and o f course Spain.
As the Labour Party decided on a programme of devolution for Scotland, Wales 
and perhaps eventually the English regions after their return to office in 1997, they clearly 
recognised the need to fulfil regional/nationalist aspirations whilst also taking a much more 
favourable attitude towards the development o f the European Union. The significance o f  
the Labour Party’s ideological commitment to devolution was that if it was to be translated 
into seeking a resolution to the Northern Irish problem then there was always likely to be a 
continued distancing o f Party policy away from the ideas of a solution ‘from above’. The 
basic thrust o f the ideas o f Soley, McNamara and others, be it in the shape o f re-unification 
or joint authority, was towards drawing up a blueprint for a new Ireland for Ireland rather 
than being facilitators for a solution from within Ireland. If there was one broad ideological 
shift from the Labour Party o f the early eighties to the Labour Party o f the late nineties it 
was this. Labour gradually gave up ‘unity by consent’ and replaced it with no specific plan 
or policy but rather a commitment to continue the Conservative policy o f trying to shift the 
onus o f responsibility towards the Irish in the shape o f the Dublin government and the
269
Northern Irish parties. Neil Kinnock once described any talk of British withdrawal as the 
‘politics o f Pontius Pilate’ (see Chapter 4) but there developed a gradual recognition that 
this maybe precisely how a solution could be found. Pilate decided that Christ’s fate should 
be determined by the Jews; the Labour Party, whilst not countenancing British withdrawal 
as long as a majority oppose it, tried to adopt a neutral position on the constitutional 
question and allow Northern Ireland’s fate to be determined by the Northern Irish, 
ultimately in a referendum. In other words the Labour Party under Tony Blair, with its 
ideological commitment to devolving power down and empowering people at a local level, 
became committed to trying to seek a solution ‘from below’. Although this may have 
drawn the criticism that it would result in another failed attempt at an internal/partitionist 
solution. Labour continued to include the Irish government in the search for a solution 
precisely to avoid such accusations and to ensure a continuation o f the Conservative 
recognition o f the importance o f the ‘Irish dimension’. It was also fortuitous for the 
Labour Party that they returned to office at a time when the Northern Irish political climate 
was far more favourable compared to that which existed in the 1970s. They also had a 
large enough majority not to have to worry about needing Unionist votes. However, 
shortly after the historic general election o f May 1997 Tony Blair delivered a speech in 
Northern Ireland from which the Unionists drew great comfort. Blair stated that he 
believed that “none o f us in this hall today, even the youngest, is likely to see Northern 
Ireland as anything but a part o f the United Kingdom. That is the reality because the 
consent principle is now almost universally accepted.” ?^^  All the indications were that there 
was very little difference between Tony Blair and John Major on Northern Ireland, but 
Tony Blair is not the Labour Party. The Labour Party is a very broad church which Blair
773 p., Patterson, H. & Teague, P. Northern Ireland: Between War and Peace, the Political Future o f
Northern Ireland  (1997). (appendix.)
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will have to cany with him and if the new attempt at devolution fails and the Northern Irish 
situation begins to deteriorate once again then the diversity o f opinion in the movement 
may well begin to reveal itself again. The fact that the diversity o f opinion exists even 
amongst government ministers makes the prospect o f failure with the peace process and the 
1998 Good Friday Agreement all the more intriguing and to try and predict the 
consequences o f such a scenario would be almost impossible.
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Appendix A 
Contingency plans in the event of Irish re unification 
drawn up by Clive Soley (Shadow Home Office 1985)*
A; POSSIBLE POLICIES - LEAST BAD UNIONIST RESPONSE
Action by Government Unionist Response Government Response
1. Appointment o f Secretary of 
State known to be in favour 
of united Ireland.
2. Statement o f policy by 
Secretary o f State.
3. Announcement o f intention 
to enter into high-level 
discussions with Irish 
Government.
4. Setting up o f joint UK/ 
Eire inter-departmental 
committees.
Demonstrations; sporadic or 
weakly-supported strikes; 
sporadic killing.
As above.
Apathetic response.
Apathetic response.
Sit it out. Use security 
services to deal with para­
militaries.
As above.
Introduce positive measures 
e.g. joint citizensliip. 
Human Rights Court, 
economic policies to 
alleviate poverty and 
unemployment.
As above, but also bring in 
economic orders from tlie 
Soutli, subsidised by UK; if  
necessary, e.g. ships from 
Harland & Wolff, aircraft 
from Shorts.
Amiouncement o f cross 
border plans e.g. All-Ireland 
Development Committee; 
All-Ireland Court or Police.
Refusal to co-operate but 
divided and confused 
response.
Increase farming benefits 
either directly or via EEC.
6. Harmonising o f social and As above,
economic policies.
7. Involvement of people from As above,
the Soutli e.g. courts, police,
juries, civil servants, 
business-people.
8. Establishment o f Britisli/ As above.
Irish Council.
As above.
As above.
As above.
9. Statement o f British/ 
Irish plans for miity.
10. Act o f unity.
As above.
As above plus possibility o f 
emigrants to Britain,
As above.
UK to continue financial 
support.
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B: POSSIBLE WORST RESPONSE BY UNIONISTS
Action by Government Unionist Response Government Response
1. Appointment o f Secretary of 
State known to be in favour 
of united Ireland.
2. Statement o f policy by 
Secretary o f State.
3. Announcement o f intention 
to enter into high level 
discussions witli Irish 
Government.
Very real danger o f strike 
and/or demonstrations and 
killing o f Catholics.
As above.
Difficult to predict but 
possibly as above.
Sit out demonstrations; 
break strike or sit it out.
As above.
As above.
Setting up o f joint UK/ 
Eire inter-departmental 
committees.
As above. As above.
5. Announcement o f cross 
border plans e.g. All-Ireland 
Development Committee; 
All-Ireland Court or Police.
6. Harmonising of social and 
economic policies.
7. Involvement o f people from 
tlie South e.g. courts, police, 
juries, civil servants, 
business-people.
8. Establishment of Britisli/ 
Irish Council.
Possibility o f boycott; 
killing o f Irish or Roman 
Catholic members o f tliese 
institutions.
Boycotts; strikes (selective 
to organisations concerned?)
Selective strikes and 
boycotts; killing of selected 
individuals (possible 
kidnapping).
Boycott.
Structure institutions in 
such a way tliat they can 
function in tlie absence of 
some groups and parties.
Continue policy and sit out 
or break strikes.
As above plus some anti­
terrorist activity, especially 
security services.
Continue policy.
9. Statement o f British/ 
Irish plans for unity.
10. Act o f unity.
Very real possibility of 
strikes and violence.
General or sporadic 
violence.
Break strikes; use security 
forces to deal witli violence 
and para-militaries.
Use troops - where possible 
Irish, backed by British.
* This document appeared in the Campaign for Labour Representation’s The Labour Party and Northern 
Ireland An Official History (Belfast, 1986) and its authenticity was verified by Clive Soley; letter 3 
November 1997.
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Appendix B 
Annual Conference decisions on composite motions calling 
for Irish re unification and British withdrawal*
1979 Motion defeated on show of hands.
1980 Motion defeated on show o f hands.
1981 Card vote on motion:
1982 Motion defeated on show o f hands.
1983 Card vote on motion:
1984 Card vote on motion:
1985 Motion defeated on show o f hands.
1986 Card vote on motion:
1987 Motion defeated on show o f hands.
1988 Motion defeated on show o f hands.
1989 Card vote on motion:
1990 No motion.
1991 Card vote on motion:
1992 No motion.
1993 No motion.
1994 No motion.
1995 No motion.
1996 No motion.
708.000 in favour.
5.003.000 against.
356.000 in favour.
5.142.000 against.
450.000 in favour.
4.625.000 against.
402.000 in favour.
4.408.000 against.
600.000 in favour.
5.308.000 against.
384.000 in favour.
4.447.000 against.
* Figures taken from Labour Party annual conference reports at the Labour Archives, Manchester.
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